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ABSTRACT
Brindley, Jacob A. PhD, Purdue University, August 2016. Essays in Experimental
Economics on Contract Design. Major Professors: Timothy N. Cason and Steven
Y. Wu.
This dissertation contains three related essays which examine contracting environments with moral hazard. I use laboratory experiments to study how across treatment
variations affect contractual outcomes including the types of contracts that principals
design, the overall efficiency of the contractual relationship, and the surplus distribution between the principal and agent(s).
In the first chapter, which is joint work with Steve Wu, I investigate relational
contracting within a bilateral relationship. Specifically, I explore how contracting is
impacted by a reduction in the agent’s market power as proxied by an exogenous
decrease in the agent’s expected outside option. Surprisingly, principals did not lower
promised payoffs to agents. Instead, contracts are restructured to shift more strategic uncertainty onto agents. Thus, agents are no worse off under successful relational
contracting but are significantly worse off when there is a breakdown in the relationship and/or performance outcomes are not favorable. Additionally, agents are
more willing to engage in trade despite strategically riskier contracts thereby increasing efficiency via trading volume. An implication of these findings is that standard
monopsony models may overestimate efficiency losses from a reduction in volume of
trade if production occurs under a contract.
In the second chapter, I explore how the relational contract is impacted by the
potential for the principal and agent to dispute over the agent’s performance level.
Both parties publicly observe the agent’s performance value during each period in
the baseline treatment. In the treatment of interest, the principal privately observes

xi
the value and must send the agent unverifiable feedback concerning the value of the
performance signal. Therefore, parties may have conflicting beliefs about the agent’s
performance in the latter treatment only. Despite the lack of contracts that facilitate
relational contracting under the private signal, no efficiency losses, as measured by
contract acceptance rates and agent effort provision, occur across treatments. Furthermore, principals honor their promised performance bonuses at similar rates. As
in the first chapter, however, principals increase their discretion under the private
performance signal by shifting more strategic uncertainty onto the agents, but they
do not lower the agents’ promised payoffs. Agents only experience significant payoff
reductions across treatments when the principal under reports a good performance
outcome and fails to pay the promised bonus. Principals, however, tend to provide
accurate performance feedback so that the agent’s overall welfare is unchanged across
treatments. These results imply that relational contracting may be relatively no worse
off in environments where the performance measure is subjective.
In the third chapter, I study a contracting problem with two agents whose production technologies are independent but verifiable. My treatment variation compares the
types of team incentives that principals design across static and dynamic contracting
relationships. Most principals implement cooperative compensation schemes, which
compensate agents the most when both perform well. Furthermore, a larger proportion of observed contracts support cooperation in one-shot relationships. Assuming
parties are self-interested, this finding contradicts the comparative static prediction
where the proportion of contracts favoring cooperation should not decline when the
relationship is repeated. The across treatment difference, however, is statistically
insignificant although the types of incentives designed are significantly more variable
in repeated relationships. Furthermore, the agent’s expected compensation is similar across treatments. I also illustrate how agents who are inequity averse to the
principal’s earnings, but not to their peer’s earnings, can explain why contracts favor
cooperation and agents earn higher rents in one-shot interactions.

1

1. INTRODUCTION
Contract design, or the process in which parties construct agreements, has important
implications for many economic relationships. In labor markets, employers strive to
provide efficient incentives for their employees. Franchisers have a similar objective
for their distributors. Regulators, furthermore, oversee public utilities and services
that typically have access to valuable private information (Brousseau and Glachant
(2002)). Finally, many agricultural commodities are produced under production or
marketing contracts. In the United States, for example, contracts have accounted for
an increasing value of total agricultural production, covering 39% of the value in 2008
compared to 11% in 1969 (MacDonald and Korb (2011)).
Although contractual relationships have many applications, field studies on contract design can be challenging in terms of identification. Besides issues of obtaining
accurate field data, contracts are usually highly adapted to specific contexts. Because
of this, empirical findings may critically depend on particular aspects of the contracting environment. Just and Wu (2009) note that testing theoretical predictions with
field data is difficult due to aspects that are hard to measure yet influence the observed
contract structure such as each party’s beliefs, preferences, and private information.
Because of these challenges, a controlled laboratory experiment has its advantages
when attempting to analyze how variations in the contracting environment affect
contractual outcomes.
In this dissertation, I conduct three laboratory experiments which expand upon
the current empirical literature on contract design. More specifically, I study contracting environments with asymmetric information. With few exceptions, previous
contracting experiments make all relevant information public to both the principal
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and the agent(s).1 In contrast, at least one party has access to private information
in all of my essays. Within each chapter I focus on a different moral hazard problem.
That is, principals cannot perfectly observe each agent’s action and, consequently,
cannot directly contract on it. I therefore do not focus on adverse selection or signaling problems, which are also frequently studied in the contracting literature.
The basic structure of the experimental design remains common throughout the
chapters and aligns closely with standard models on moral hazard. At the start each
experimental period, a subject, acting as the principal, contracts with at least one
other subject, acting as the agent, to carry out an action, which cannot be observed
or verified by the principal. The agent, therefore, can shirk on the contracted action
if he desires. Principals make take-it-or-leave-it offers to their exogenously matched
agents, so there is no scope for agents to bargain over the contractual terms. Agents
can however decide to either participate in the contract or reject the offer and receive
their outside option. When participating, the agent makes a costly yet hidden effort
choice that noisily maps into the value of the agent’s performance measure. This
realized value determines the amount of surplus to be divided between the principal
and the agent(s). Furthermore, this value is retained by the principal as earnings
although the principal may pay the agent a fixed payment and/or a performancecontingent bonus. To reiterate, the agent’s effort choice helps determine the group’s
total surplus while the principal’s payment decisions determine how the surplus is
divided among the contracting parties. The stage game is repeated over many periods
so that subjects can learn from their past decisions.
Within each chapter, I exogenously vary some aspect of the contractual environment across treatments to study how this variation affects contractual outcomes. The
most important of these outcomes is the contract’s structure, or the types of incentives
that principals design in an attempt to motivate the agent to choose the contracted
effort level. This main outcome is also related to other important results including
1

For experiments where the agent’s action remains hidden from the principal see Irlenbusch and
Sliwka (2005) and Hoppe and Schmitz (2015).
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the overall efficiency of the contractual relationship and the manner in which the
surplus is distributed between the principal and the agent(s).
In the first two chapters, I focus on dynamic relationships between the principal
and a single agent. Along with the agent’s effort choice, the value of the agent’s
performance measure is unverifiable. Due to this assumption, the principal is not
required to uphold any payments specified in the contract offer that are contingent
upon the performance value. The agent’s compensation consists of two components:
1) a fixed payment independent of the agent’s performance implying that it must
be honored and 2) a promised performance bonus that is discretionary. Principals,
therefore, determine their amount of discretion through the incentives that they design
in the contract. For instance, the principal may only promise to compensate the agent
via the bonus leaving her with complete discretion. Subjects, however, are matched
together in principal-agent pairs for an indefinite amount of periods, and the repeated
relationship may create an incentive for the principal to honor the promised bonus.
Given this context, the first chapter, joint with Steve Wu, studies the effects of increasing the principal’s market power across treatments. If the market is concentrated
in favor of the principal, the agent faces fewer contracting alternatives. Because of
this, we increase the principal’s market power by reducing the value of the agent’s
expected outside option by one-half in the second treatment. With increased market
power, contracts are significantly restructured to shift more strategic uncertainty onto
the agents. Principals increase their discretion by lowering the guaranteed, upfront
payment and increasing the discretionary performance bonus. Despite this restructuring, the agent’s promised expected compensation, which is calculated under the
assumption that all informal contractual agreements are honored, is similar across
treatments. This implies that agent earnings do not decrease under successful relational contracting but are significantly reduced when the principal reneges on the
promised bonus for good performance or the agent performs poorly and, therefore,
receives a relatively small bonus payment. In terms of efficiency, the agent’s effort
provision and the total surplus per-period are similar across treatments. Agents,
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however, are significantly more likely to accept contract offers when the principal’s
market power increases despite contracts being strategically riskier. Efficiency gains
therefore occur through an increased trade volume. These findings imply that traditional market power models may overstate efficiency losses if production takes place
under a relational contract.
The second chapter adds additional asymmetric information into the contractual
relationship. Instead of varying the agent’s outside option across treatments, I compare environments where the agent’s performance value is publicly observed by both
parties to one where only the principal observes the value. The latter environment
creates the potential for the parties to have conflicting beliefs over the agent’s performance level, which can occur in relationships where performance evaluation is
subjective. When deciding the actual performance bonus to pay to the agent, the
principal must also send the agent unverifiable feedback about his performance level
when the signal is private. This creates the potential for the principal to manipulate
the performance feedback in her favor. Despite the lack of contracts that facilitate
relational contracting under the private performance signal, across treatment changes
in efficiency are minor. Contract acceptance rates and effort provision are not significantly different across treatments. Furthermore, contingent upon the observed
performance value, principals honor their promised bonuses at similar rates. As in
the first chapter, however, principals restructure contracts which increase their discretionary latitude under the private signal. The agent’s promised expected payoff,
however, remains unchanged. Agents only experience significant welfare reductions
under the private performance signal when the principal understates good performance outcomes, which are associated with higher rates of shirking on the good
performance bonus. In general, however, principals tend to provide accurate performance feedback, which cannot be explained by the predicted truth telling incentives
outlined in the model. Therefore, these results imply that relational contracting may
be just as successful in environments where the agent’s performance is subjective or
the principal has access to private information related to the performance measure.
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The third chapter differs from the previous two in several respects. First, the contracting problem involves two agents who produce independent yet verifiable outputs.
The principal now must honor the performance bonus specified in the contract offer.
Second, the relationship need not be dynamic as the treatment variation compares
static relationships, where subjects are randomly rematched into principal-agentagent groups at the start of each period, to repeated relationships, where groups
interact for an indefinite amount of periods. Few contracting experiments contain
multiple agents, especially those with performance-contingent pay. Furthermore,
since principals design the team’s incentives, this experiment can test whether individuals prefer to implement certain types of group compensation schemes. Across
treatments, a majority of principals implement cooperative evaluation schemes which
reward the agents the most when both perform well. Furthermore, a larger proportion of observed contracts support cooperation in one-shot relationships, which
contradicts the comparative static prediction. That is, assuming parties are selfinterested, the proportion of contracts favoring cooperation should not decline when
the relationship is repeated. When analyzing the data more closely, however, the
types of team incentives designed are not significantly different across treatments.
The agent’s expected compensation is also similar across treatments although it is
predicted to decrease when the relationship is repeated. I also illustrate how agents
who are inequity averse to the principal’s earnings, but not to their peer’s earnings,
can explain why the efficient contracts favor cooperation and why agents earn higher
rents in one-shot interactions. Behavioral contracting models, therefore, can be useful
in understanding how agents working in teams are compensated.
These chapters highlight important findings that can be further explored in future theoretical and empirical research on contract design. First, principals may be
more likely to structure contracts that give them more discretion when they have an
informational advantage over the agent or relatively better contracting alternatives.
Although this discretion exposes the agent to more risk and uncertainty, it does not
imply that the agent’s welfare will decrease. If the parties can engage in successful
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relational contracting, the agent’s welfare and the overall efficiency of the relationship
may not decline. Second, non-standard preferences are sometimes relatively better
at predicting the observed contract structure and surplus distribution. Revising the
standard assumption of self-interest therefore may be a worthwhile exercise in models
where the equilibria are fairly easy to derive with this revision. Finally, experimental
work on contract design should study more complex contracting problems such as
incorporating asymmetric information or multiple agents into the environment. Such
results can speak to the robustness of current theories and provide avenues for future
research.

7

2. RELATIONAL CONTRACTING AND MARKET
POWER: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
This paper investigates the impact of market power on relational contracting outcomes, with a particular focus on efficiency, distribution and endogenous contractual
form. While textbook microeconomic models predict welfare losses when firms have
market power, it is not clear whether such models are reliable for predicting welfare
losses characterized by both market concentration and contracting. Contracts are
designed to mitigate agency problems whereby principals and agents have conflicting
objectives. Intuitively, it seems plausible that when the principal has more power,
the principal has more latitude to structure contracts that provide high-powered incentives to align objectives. Indeed, if the lack of competition facilitates the ability
of principals to manage agency conflicts, then the efficiency losses due to decreased
quantity under traditional market power models might be mitigated, making it more
difficult to identify aggregate welfare losses in input markets characterized by both
monopsony and contracting. While there is a long and vast literature on monopsony
power, to the best of our knowledge, there is a paucity of research that explores the
impact of buyer power on the agency/contracting dimension of the problem.
We also contribute to the experimental literature on relational contracts by showing that a reduction in the outside option of the agent does not necessarily lead to a
drop in expected payoffs to the agent as theory or intuition might predict. Instead,
our results show that principals restructure contracts in order to shift more strategic
uncertainty onto agents so that in the event that relational contracts unravel, the
agents are left “holding the bag.” Thus, the distributional impacts largely occur following a breakdown of a relational contract rather than through an ex ante reduction
in promised pay. Moreover, we find that overall efficiency increases because agents
are more willing to accept even strategically riskier contracts thereby increasing the
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volume of trade. While prior experimental papers on relational contracts have documented the impact of competition on distribution, efficiency, and relationship length,
our paper is the first to show the allocation of strategic uncertainty as a function of
changes in outside options.
The importance of this research lies in the fact that contractually based trading
can be controversial, particularly in industries where there is a perceived imbalance
of market power. For example, in U.S. agriculture, the emergence of contract farming
has raised concerns that increasing concentration and consolidation of agribusinesses
limits the bargaining power of farmers when negotiating contracts (Domina and Taylor (2010)). As a consequence, some growers have complained that their incomes fall
below expectations based on information provided by their counter parties (Schrader
and Wilson (2001)). In many developing countries, there is an emerging trend of contract farming between smallholders and exporters. While many development strategists see contract farming as providing market access opportunities for smallholders,
there is also some awareness that the potential imbalance of bargaining power can
erode the long term viability of smallholders (Catelo and Costales (2008)). Another
sector in which contracting and market power might be relevant is the U.S. retailing
industry. There is concern that large retailers such as Walmart have exerted power
over suppliers and squeezed their profit margins (Bloom and Perry (2001)).
In our analysis, we incorporate two stylized observations. First, transactions typically occur via incomplete contracts that do not cover every relevant contingency.
Contracts typically combine legalistic components that are enforceable by a thirdparty, such as a court, along with implicit components that are not third-party enforceable. Second, many contracting relationships are not just one-shot transactions
but take place repeatedly over time so that there is relational contracting. We believe
these assumptions are fairly general and cover a wide array of contracting situations
in practice.
When some important performance measures are not third-party enforceable,
Bernheim and Whinston (1998) show that it is in the interest of the principal to
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design a contract that provides a high degree of discretionary latitude to the principal through, say, discretionary bonuses. The discretionary latitude benefits the
principal by improving post-contractual incentives that induce the agent to exert
effort. Intuitively, the principal can use the discretion to reward and punish unenforceable performance factors. We, however, highlight an important countervailing
effect; namely, that highly discretionary contracts can weaken pre-contractual incentives for parties to contract in the first place. Intuitively, under a highly discretionary
contract, the agent faces significant strategic uncertainty because the principal can use
her discretionary flexibility for opportunistic purposes. Thus, agents face significant
counter-party risk which may erode the agent’s willingness to accept the contract.
Consequently, the principal faces a tradeoff between the provision of informal
incentives and inducing agent participation. If the principal wants to maintain highpowered informal incentives, she must raise the level of pay, which provides the agent
with a counter-party risk premium. Alternatively, she can keep the same level of
pay, but then must reduce discretionary latitude, which weakens informal incentives.
Thus, there is tension between distribution and efficiency. In this situation, market
concentration in favor of the principal can actually improve efficiency by weakening
this tension. That is, with market concentration, the agent is more willing to accept
highly incomplete contracts as his outside option has eroded under concentration.
Thus, market power potentially lowers the cost of incentive provision.
We test the theory using using experimental economics. Our experimental design is unique in that we allow for flexible contractual forms; i.e. our subjects who
are placed in the role of principals can endogenously choose a contractual form that
is consistent with how principals behave in standard relational contracting models.
Most previous experimental studies on relational contracts impose specific contractual forms, such as efficiency wages, which would limit our ability to examine how
contractual form responds to changes in market power. Most importantly, our design
allows our subjects who are placed in the role of principals to endogenously leave
themselves with greater or lesser amounts of discretionary flexibility which allows us
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to examine not only the response of expected payoffs to a change in market power,
but also the way strategic uncertainty is allocated.
Our experimental design proxies a change in the principal’s market power by
adjusting the agent’s expected payoff from his outside option. Compared to the
control treatment, the agent’s expected outside option in the market power treatment
drops by 50%. One way to justify our reduction in the expected outside option as a
proxy for market power is that the outside option is the agent’s next best offer from
another principal given that he stays in the industry. The expected payoff from the
outside option is affected by whether the agent is on the long or short side of the
market; i.e. if the agent is on the short-side, there will be excessive demand for his
services so his expected outside option will be high. If he is on the long-side of the
market, there is excess supply so his expected payoff from the outside option will be
low and the principal has “market power.”1
Several examples highlight situations in which a seller’s outside option can be
reduced relative to the buyer. Recent increases in concentration among processors
within the American livestock industry have raised concern that processors will lower
the compensation paid to suppliers who have difficulty selling their commodities to
a competing firm (Sexton (2013); U.S. Government Accountability Office (2009)).
Similarly, potential mergers in local health insurance and grocery retail markets have
led to antitrust investigations due to concerns of increased buyer power over suppliers
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2008)). Finally, when
1

An astute reader may wonder why we did not set up our experiment to explicitly allow for multiple
principals and agents and vary the ratio of principals and agents. One problem with explicitly
allowing for a general equilibrium type market experimental design is that there will be endogenous
matching of principals and agents. It is now well known that endogenous matching can create
significant biases when studying contractual form (Ackerberg and Botticini (2002)) . A second
advantage of using a reduced form, exogenous matching approach as we have, is that the design is
much simpler and statistical analysis is simpler and more transparent since we need not speculate
about the size of outside options faced by each agent in a given trading period. For instance, we
know that the main channel through which market power affects contracting outcomes is through
the agent’s outside option. With our setup, we explicitly control the size of the outside option. In
a market based experiment, one has to infer the size of the outside option by accounting for all
possible contracts that each subject received in each period and back out the size of the outside
option. In short, our design is more parsimonious and much more consistent with standard partial
equilibrium models of principal-agent relationships.
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labor market conditions are unfavorable, such as a decrease in the demand for labor,
workers searching for jobs face fewer alternative options (Acemoglu and Newman
(2002)).
Overall, our experimental results are consistent with relational contract theory
in that agents are more likely to accept contracts when the participation and the
principal’s self-enforcement (i.e. “promise keeping”) constraints are satisfied and
that agents’ effort provision is higher when the incentive compatibility constraint
is satisfied. Therefore, the theoretical framework performs fairly well, which lends
confidence in the ability of the theory to make generalizable predictions about the
impact of our main treatment effect which is how an exogenous decrease in the agent’s
expected payoff from his outside option affects contractual outcomes.
We find that an increase in the principal’s market power causes a significant
restructuring of relational contracts where principals reduce the size of the fixed,
guaranteed payment and make a larger fraction of pay discretionary. Thus, agents are
exposed to more strategic uncertainty since shirking on the discretionary bonuses by
principals has a greater negative impact. Surprisingly, principals do not reduce agents’
expected promised payoffs in response to a change in market power. The combination
of same expected payoffs and riskier contracts implies that agents’ actual payoffs are
unaffected by market power when all is well in that the high output is realized and the
principals pay the promised bonuses. However, if there is a deviation by the principal
or output is low, then the agent suffers significant reductions in pay. In short, when
agents lose market power, they are forced to bear significantly more counter-party
risk even if contractual terms, as measured by expected pay, seem unaffected ex ante.
We also find that total surplus per-trade is unaffected while principals’ actual pay
increases with market power. Finally, despite being offered riskier contracts, agents
are more likely to accept contracts when the principals’ market power increases and
thus, overall efficiency increases since there is a greater volume of trade.
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2.1

Related Literature
Our theoretical model is largely based on the moral hazard model of Levin (2003)

though we simplified the model to facilitate experimental implementation. Like the
theory, our experimental design allows for endogenous contract structure, which is important for examining how optimal contractual form responds to variations in market
power.
With regard to experimental studies, Brown et al. (2004) (BFF) focus on relational
contracting based on the efficiency wage theory, complemented by social preferences.
Subjects are allowed to trade with fixed-price contracts and form reputations within
a marketplace where buyers and sellers can endogenously match with each other.
Outcomes differ depending on whether the identities of the subjects are fixed, thereby
allowing subjects to form reputations, or randomly generated each period. With fixed
identities, the absence of third-party enforcement results in the formation of long-term
pairings that are insulated from competitive pressures with performance disciplined
by the threat of firing.
While BFF did not explicitly look at competition issues, an extension of BFF,
Brown et al. (2012) (BFF12) includes a treatment in which there are more principals
than agents in the market. This extension still finds that high performance can
be sustained through relational contracts though agents are more willing to switch
trading partners. Much of BFF and BFF12s’ results are consistent with the efficiency
wage theories of Klein and Leffler (1981) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984).2 The main
difference between our work and BFF/BFF12 is that we impose exogenous matching
of principal-agent pairs, indefinite repetition, and allow for endogenous contractual
form so that our results can be interpreted with respect to the principal-agent theory
of Levin (2003) rather than these efficiency wage theories. Moreover, our work focuses
more on contract design and the allocation of strategic uncertainty within the context
2

For a recent survey of the experimental literature on efficiency wage contracts, see Casoria and
Riedl (2013).
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of a standard game-theoretic principal-agent model rather than the allocation of rents
in an efficiency wage model of intrinsic motivations and fairness considerations.
Fehr et al. (2007) study the effectiveness of two different types of performance
pay. They show that discretionary bonus contracts can increase efficiency relative to a
contract where the agent is fined when caught shirking below the principal’s preferred
performance level. For this reason, a large majority of principals used discretionary
bonus contracts. Although our study also analyzes a contracting environment with
informal bonuses, we focus on repeat transactions rather than one-shot transactions.
Thus, the primary focus of Fehr et al. (2007) is on how fairness considerations interact
with contractual form to sustain productive one-shot trades, whereas we rely on
relational contracts as the self-enforcing mechanism. Moreover, Fehr et al. (2007)
does not study market power issues.
Furthermore, Erkal et al. (2015) (EWR) is similar to this paper in that it allows
for endogenous contractual form. EWR find that experimental results are consistent
with a number of canonical predictions from the relational contracts literature. In
addition, EWR find that subjects play “semi-grim” style strategies in response to
contractual deviations, which is consistent with the findings of Breitmoser (2015) in
the context of prisoner’s dilemma games. The main difference between our paper and
EWR is that our study focuses on the impact of market power whereas EWR test a
number of standard predictions from relational contract theory. Additionally, there
are differences in the model and experimental design in that EWR base their work on
a symmetric information model, whereas our model incorporates moral hazard where
there is a noisy relationship between performance and effort.
Aside from experimental work, there are also some empirical papers on relational
contracts using observational data. Antràs and Foley (2015) use transactions level
data from an exporter of frozen food products to examine how payment terms are
structured with importers. They find that strategic uncertainty and counter-party
risk are significant drivers of contract structure. Like their study, we also find that
contracts are structured to manage strategic uncertainty, although we mainly focus
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on the impact of market power while they focus on variations in contract enforcement. Moreover, our study is experimental whereas they rely on observational data.
Nonetheless, both studies confirm each other in terms of identifying the importance
of counter-party risk in relational contracting. Gil and Zanarone (2015) provide a
recent survey of some additional empirical work on relational contracts.

2.2

Theoretical Framework

2.2.1

Model

A principal and agent are infinitely lived, risk neutral, and share a common discount factor δ. If the parties wish to trade in period t, they must enter into a contract.
This contract summarizes the compensation promised to the agent, which depends
on the agent’s performance level in period t. Additionally, the contract may specify
the likelihood of trading in future periods. Denote q ∈ {qL , qH }, where 0 < qL < qH ,
as the realized value of the agent’s performance measure in period t. The value of
q accrues directly to the principal, is non-contractible, and is a stochastic function
of the agent’s effort choice e ∈ {eL , eH }, which the principal cannot observe. The
principal can offer a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the agent, which consists of three
components:
• Payments
– Fixed Payment, p ∈ {p, . . . , p}: If p < 0, p is transfered from the agent to
the principal.3 Likewise, if p > 0, p is transferred from the principal to the
agent. Since p is fixed and does not depend on non-verifiable contingencies,
it is third-party enforceable.
– Performance-Contingent Bonuses, b(q) ∈ {0, . . . , b}: The principal specifies state-contingent payments: b(qL ) and b(qH ). Because b(q) depends on
3

This can be thought of as an upfront fee paid by the agent in order to engage in trade.
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q which is non-verifiable, b(q) is not third-party enforceable so that it is a
discretionary bonus. As such, the principal can renege on b(q).
• Desired Effort Level
– The principal requests an effort level, either eL or eH , and uses incentive
compatible payments to implement the requested effort.
• Optional Termination Condition
– For completeness, we allow the principal the option of including a termination condition that depends on the agent’s performance.4 This condition
specifies the likelihood of the relationship ending permanently after period
t. If q = qL the relationship terminates with certainty after period t. In
contrast, if q = qH the relationship continues with certainty.5 This termination condition, however, does not have to be included in the offer. If the
condition is not included in the offer, the relationship does not terminate
in the case that q = qL , which implies that the parties can trade in the
next period.
If the principal makes an offer, the agent then decides to accept or reject it. If
no contract is offered or it is rejected, the principal and agent receive their outside
options for that period, which are π̄ and ū respectively.
If accepted, the agent then privately makes his effort choice. The high effort
choice, eH , costs the agent c > 0 while the low effort choice, eL , is costless. The
probability of realizing qH given eL is denoted as l. Similarly, h is the probability of
realizing qH given eH with 0 < l < h < 1. Therefore, when the agent exerts high
effort it is more likely that the agent performs well. Both effort choices, however,
can result in the realization of qH or qL , which makes the performance measure a
4

Contracts in practice often specify termination conditions.
In a more general contract, the principal could specify the values of the termination probabilities
for both outcomes of q in the contract offer.
5
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noisy signal of effort. The mapping between effort and performance is also common
knowledge.
After q is observed by both parties, the principal must decide the actual bonus
B ∈ {0, . . . , b} to be paid to the agent since the promised bonuses are not enforceable.
Payoffs are then realized for the current period. If a contract is formed, the principal
and agent’s payoffs, respectively, for period t are:
π =q−p−B
u = p + B − c(e)
As long as the relationship has not terminated in period t, the parties are free to
enter into a new contract in period t + 1.

2.2.2

Optimal Contracts

This section characterizes the optimal contract structure which ensures that the
contract if both self-enforcing and efficient. Self-enforcement implies that both parties
have the incentive to uphold any informal agreements stated in the contract. Efficiency implies that the contract maximizes the expected joint earnings of the principal
and agent.
Define the principal’s expected payoff per-period for each effort choice as:
πeL ≡Eq [q − p − b(q)|e = eL ] = lqH + (1 − l)qL − [p + lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL )]
πeH ≡Eq [q − p − b(q)|e = eH ] = hqH + (1 − h)qL − [p + hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL )]
Similarly, the agent’s expected payoffs per-period are:
ueL ≡Eq [p + b(q) − c(e)|e = eL ] = p + lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL )
ueH ≡Eq [p + b(q) − c(e)|e = eH ] = p + hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL ) − c
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Finally, the expected surplus per-period for each effort choice is:
seL ≡Eq [q − c(e)|e = eL ] = lqH + (1 − l)qL
seH ≡Eq [q − c(e)|e = eH ] = hqH + (1 − h)qL − c
To make the contract efficient when the agent exerts high effort, eH , assume:
s̄ ≡ ū + π̄ < seH
seL < seH
Therefore, eH is the efficient effort level.
Finally, we focus on stationary contracts. Levin (2003) shows that when an optimal contract exists, then an equivalent stationary contract that is optimal also exists.
Stationarity assumes that the principal offers the same payments p, b(qL ), and b(qH )
in all periods during which trade occurs. It also assumes that the agent chooses the
same effort e in all periods as long as he has not observed the principal reneging on
a bonus payment b(q) during any previous period.6
If the principal fails to pay a promised bonus, Levin (2003) assumes that the agent
responds by issuing the worst possible punishment.7 In such a case, the agent breaks
off trade and the principal receives her outside option, π̄, in all subsequent periods.8
6

Since contracts are assumed to be stationary, it is sufficient to focus on static incentive problems
when solving for the optimal contract.
7
The concept of the worst possible punishment follows the logic of Abreu (1988).
8
Such an outcome, however, may not be renegotiation proof since the parties would be destroying
surplus. Levin (2003), however, shows that “strongly optimal” contracts exist where the parties
continue with an optimal relational contract even following a deviation but with terms adjusted to
hold the breaching party at his reservation payoff. Since the parties are still on the Pareto frontier,
there is no scope for renegotiation. Erkal et al. (2015) provide experimental evidence regarding how
subjects actually respond to relational contract deviations. Their results provide no clear evidence
of either termination or continuation with relational contracts; instead, subjects play a form of
“semi-grim” strategies (see Breitmoser (2015)).
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Conditions for Contract to be Optimal
In order for the contract to be self-enforcing and efficient, the following constraints
must be satisfied:
1. The principal’s participation constraint (P CP ) makes it worthwhile to enter the
contract:

πeH ≥ π̄

(P CP )

2. The agent’s participation constraint (P CA ) makes it worthwhile to enter the
contract:

ueH ≥ ū

(P CA )

3. The agent’s incentive compatibility (IC) constraint prevents the agent from
shirking:

ueH ≥ ueL

(IC)

4. The principal’s promise keeping (P K) constraint ensures that she will pay the
discretionary bonus for all possible realizations of q:

δ
(πe − π̄)
(1 − δ) H
|
{z
}

expected, discounted net gain from
future interactions when paying bonus

≥ max{b(qL ), b(qH )}
|
{z
}

(P K)

maximum gain from
withholding bonus

The last constraint emphasizes the relational aspect of the contract. Although bonuses
are discretionary, the principal will not find it worthwhile to renege on any discretionary payment due to the net gain she expects to receive from future trades in which
the agent acts efficiently. Intuitively, the promise keeping constraint emphasizes the
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upper bound on feasible bonuses. If a bonus is too large, the principal cannot credibly
commit to paying it.
Furthermore, the optimal termination condition is not needed for the principal and
agent to enter into an optimal contract. Including the condition would be inefficient
as it can destroy future gains from trade by terminating the relationship in the case
that q = qL .9

2.2.3

Principal’s Contract Design Problem

The next issue that needs to be addressed is the subset of contracts that the
principal should choose to implement from the entire set of self-enforcing contracts.
Assuming that both parties are self-interested, the principal seeks to maximize her
expected earnings subject to the four conditions that ensure self-enforcement. Since
eH generates that largest expected surplus, the principal chooses p, b(qL ), and b(qH )
such that πeH is maximized conditional on satisfying (P CP ), (P CA ), (IC), and (P K).
Since our theory is not new but is rather based on a simplified version of Levin
(2003)’s moral hazard model, we will discuss optimal contracts within the context
of our experimental parameterizations rather than through formal propositions. We
subsequently provide some testable predictions under our experimental parameters.
Table 2.1 displays the parameters used in the experiment. In the baseline treatment, outside options are ū = π̄ = 30. In the second treatment, ū equals either 0 or
30, both occurring with a 50% probability. Thus, the agent’s expected outside option
has fallen to 15. We refer to the latter treatment as the “market power” (MP) treatment since the agent may expect to receive less favorable terms from the principal
since his outside option has fallen.
One way to justify our reduction in the expected outside option as a proxy for MP
is that in typical bargaining problems, there is a disagreement point and an outside
option point. The disagreement point is usually the payoff a party earns if he fails
9

Theoretically, the termination condition has no impact on the set of optimal contracts. Furthermore, this condition does not fundamentally affect our qualitative results.
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Table 2.1.: Parameter values used in experiment
Variable

Value
δ
π̄
ū

0.8
30
30
0 or 30 each
with a 50% chance
qL
30
qH
120
l
0.25
h
0.75
c
10
p {−250, · · · , 250}
b(qL ), b(qH ), B
{0, · · · , 250}

Description
discount factor (probability of continuation)
principal’s outside option
agent’s outside option in baseline treatment
agent’s outside option in market power treatment
low performance value
high performance value
probability of qH given eL
probability of qH given eH
cost of eH
bounds on fixed payment
bounds on promised and actual bonuses
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to reach an agreement whereas the outside option is what a party can receive from
accepting the next best offer. We normalize the agent’s disagreement point to zero,
which might represent his payoff from selling his assets and exiting the industry. The
outside option, on the other hand, is his next best offer from another principal if he
stays in the industry. The outside option is affected by whether the agent is on the
long or short side of the market; i.e. if the agent is on the short-side, there will be
excessive demand for his services so he is always guaranteed an outside option of 30.
Hence, he has “market power.” If he is on the long-side of the market, there is excess
supply so he is not guaranteed to receive an offer from another principal since his
market position has weakened. We model this by assuming that he will receive an
outside option of 30 with only 50% probability and his expected outside option drops
to 15.10
In the baseline treatment, E[s|e = eL ] = 52.5 < π̄ + ū = 60 < E[s|e = eH ] = 87.5.
With MP, this changes to π̄ + ū = 45 < E[s|e = eL ] = 52.5 < E[s|e = eH ] = 87.5.
Therefore, the optimal outcome occurs when the parties trade and the agent chooses
eH .
Under our experimental parameters, there is a large set of contracts that simultaneously satisfy all necessary constraints for optimality while implementing the efficient
effort level, eH . Therefore, rather than specifying an optimal contract, we will discuss
comparative statics of how the set of optimal contracts change with MP.11
10

We make two additional comments. First, rather than modeling this probabilistically, it is also
possible to assume that excessive demand or supply will cause the outside option to adjust above
or below 30 and the agent will always receive this new level with probability 1. We chose the
probabilistic approach because frictions in practice often prevent employment or supply contracts
from adjusting and instead, there are frequently layoffs. Regardless, both approaches lead to a
change in expected outside options. Second, it should be noted that the outside option principle
suggests that the outside option is only relevant if it exceeds the share of the surplus the agent can
obtain through, say, Nash bargaining (see Muthoo (1999) for details). For example, if the agent had
equal bargaining power, the agent would receive 1/2 the surplus so the outside option is only relevant
if the next best offer is larger than what the agent gets from agreeing to a contract that offers him
1/2 the surplus. However, in our model, the principal is assumed to have all of the bargaining power
and makes take-it-or-leave-it offers to the agent. Hence, the agent’s outside option is relevant for all
surplus levels above zero.
11
We use numerical methods to generate comparative statics results.
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2.2.4

Comparative Statics

This section generates comparative statics predictions about the effects of MP on
contracting outcomes.
Prediction 1: The set of optimal contracts increases under MP, facilitating the use
of relational contracts.
Intuitively, reducing the agent’s outside option ū creates slack in the agent’s participation constraint (P CA ). Therefore, a larger set of contracts can now satisfy all four
conditions ((P CP ), (P CA ), (IC), and (P K)) that guarantee self-enforcement. Figure
2.1 illustrates this fact by providing a graphical summary of the relationship between
p, b(qL ), and b(qH ) for the offers that satisfy the four constraints in each treatment.
Under our parameter values, 32,453 contract offers satisfy all of the constraints in the
baseline treatment. In the MP treatment, 146,338 contracts satisfy all constraints,
which is about 4.5 times larger. This can been seen in the figure as the bounds on
feasible payments increases in the MP treatment. For instance, the minimum fixed
payment, p, decreases from -65 in the baseline to -140 in the MP treatment, which
creates a wider range of payments where the principal extracts more payment upfront
from the agent, but credibly commits to paying the agent a large performance bonus.
MP thus creates more latitude for the principal to structure contracts that shift more
risk to agents.
Prediction 2: Under MP, the principal restructures contracts to increase her own
profit while reducing the agent’s profit. A greater proportion of the agent’s profit is
also made discretionary, increasing the agent’s exposure to strategic uncertainty.
Within both treatments, a large subset of self-enforcing contracts hold the agent
to her outside option ū. Therefore, the set of payments that maximize the principal’s
expected earnings make (P CA ) binding. As a result, the agent’s expected profit, ueH ,
decreases from 30 points in the baseline treatment to 15 points in the MP treatment.
Likewise, the principal’s expected profit, πeH , increases by 15 points from 57.5 (seH −ū)
in the baseline to 72.5 in the MP treatment.
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(a) Baseline treatment

(b) Market Power treatment
The top figure represents the baseline treatment while the bottom figure represents the market power
treatment. The figures summarize the set of contracts for each treatment that satisfy the 4 necessary
constraints: (P CP ), (P CA ), (IC), and (P K). Under the parameter values, 32,453 contract offers
satisfy all constraints in the baseline treatment. In the MP treatment, 146,338 contracts satisfy
all constraints. Elements on the main diagonal are histograms (with frequencies on the y-axis
unreported) while off diagonal elements illustrate the relationship between p, b(qL ), and b(qH ).

Fig. 2.1.: Set of optimal contracts for baseline and market power treatments
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As for strategic uncertainty, table 2.2 summarizes the subset of self-enforcing
offers that maximize the principal’s expected profit for each treatment. This applies
to 1,081 combinations of p, b(qL ), and b(qH ) in the baseline treatment and to 2,926
combinations in the MP treatment. The average fixed payment p decreases from 27.25 points in the baseline to -77.25 points under MP. Furthermore, the performance
bonus for low and high outcomes respectively rises by 20 and 40 points on average.
Therefore, the principal is more likely to increase discretionary pay to agents. Figure
2.2 reinforces this fact by presenting histograms for each individual payment specified
in the contract offer. Fixed payments tend to be much lower under MP. For instance,
78% of the feasible offers have p < −50 in the MP treatment compared to just 11%
in the baseline. Demanding large upfront payments also requires the principal to pay
relatively larger performance bonuses. For high performance, the set of offers with
b(qH ) > 100 increases by 51% in the MP treatment. Therefore, the agent faces more
strategic uncertainty when his outside option decreases.
Prediction 3: Acceptance rates and effort provision should not vary across treatments.
Given that there is a large set of feasible contracts within both treatments that
satisfy all constraints, there should be no expectation that effort or acceptance rates
should vary across treatments. Nonetheless, the set of optimal contracts in the MP
treatment is substantially larger, making it easier for subjects to design optimal contracts in the MP treatment. Thus, although this prediction is our null hypothesis,
the impact of market power on effort and acceptance rates is ultimately an empirical
question.

2.3

Experimental Design
Subjects participated in experimental sessions which consisted of multiple rounds

of trading between subjects who were assigned to be buyers (principals) or sellers
(agents). At the start of a session, subjects were randomly assigned ID numbers

25

Table 2.2.: Summary statistics for contracts that maximize principal’s profit
Average Median

Min

Max

fixed payment, p

Baseline
Market Power

-27.25
-77.25

-30
-82

-65
-140

25
10

low performance bonus, b(qL )

Baseline
Market Power

30.49
50.49

27
44

0
0

90
150

high performance bonus, b(qH )

Baseline
Market Power

79.51
119.51

83
126

20
20

110
170

For the baseline, 1,081 feasible contract offers maximize the principal’s profit. For the market power
treatment, 2,926 contract offer maximize the principal’s profit.

For the baseline, 1,081 feasible contract offers maximize the principal’s profit. For the market power
treatment, 2,926 contract offer maximize the principal’s profit. The y-axis reports the fraction of
offers that fall into the given range (e.g. 0-10 points).

Fig. 2.2.: Self-enforcing contracts that maximize the principal’s expected profit by
treatment
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and a role (buyer or seller), which remained fixed throughout the session. Subjects
interacted via computers and remained anonymous. Each subject participated in only
one session. The treatment (MP or Baseline) for a session was randomly assigned and
subjects did not know which treatment they would participate in when they signed
up for the experiment.
The stage-game interaction in each round mirrors the theoretical stage-game described earlier. At the beginning of each round, the buyer could make an offer, if she
desired, to her randomly matched seller. Only the ID of one’s trading partner was
revealed to each subject. The terms of the offer were endogenously specified (in integers) by the principal within the provided bounds listed in the parameter table. An
offer consisted of a four components: p, b(q), a requested effort level, and the optional
termination condition. To specify whether or not to include the optional termination
condition, buyers simply had to click a “yes” or “no” button on the offer screen. If
the seller received an offer, he then decided to accept or reject it. If accepted, the
seller privately made his effort choice, framed as numbers with eL = 0 and eH = 1.
After this, the value of q was observed by both parties. If no contract was entered,
both parties received their outside options for that round.
At the end of each round, the screen displayed the subject’s earnings (in points)
for that round along with any choices that the subject made or observed. Points were
converted into cash at the end of the experiment.
Each unique principal-agent pairing lasted for an indefinite number of rounds
with δ serving as the probability of the pair being rematched at the start of the next
period. This method is common for implementing laboratory infinitely repeatedgame experiments (Roth and Murnighan (1978); Dal Bó (2005)).12 Therefore, once a
round was completed, subjects faced an 80% (δ = 0.8) probability of being rematched
with the same partner in the next round. This was conveyed to the subjects with a
randomly drawn integer between 1 and 10 displayed on their screens. If a 9 or 10 was
12

Note that this concept is not related to the endogenous termination condition outlined earlier.
Here, δ describes the likelihood of paired subjects being exogenously rematched together in the next
period.
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drawn, subjects were exogenously matched with a different trading partner. Subjects
could not, however, encounter an old trading partner in the rematching process. That
is, a perfect strangers matching protocol for supergames was used. Note that if a pair
had the endogenous termination clause in the contract in the previous period and
the clause was triggered, then the pair cannot engage in trade in future periods when
rematched together.
Since trading was indefinitely repeated, subjects were informed that the session
would end according to one of the following rules: 1) If subjects encountered all
unique trading partners, or 2) If the subjects had played at least 18 periods across
all supergames, then the session would end once the current supergame randomly
terminated. To keep the number of rounds and the length of each interaction consistent across sessions, the random numbers were predetermined. Subjects were made
aware of this decision before the experiment started and could verify that the random
draws were consistent with the numbers displayed on their screen by opening a sealed
envelope at the end of the experiment. Random rematchings occurred three times
after rounds 3, 11, and 16, resulting in four supergames with unique trading partners.
Sessions were conducted during Spring 2014 at Purdue University’s Vernon Smith
Experimental Economics Laboratory (VSEEL), which is a dedicated experimental
economics laboratory with an explicit no deception policy. Subjects were recruited
from the VSEEL ORSEE database, which consisted of mostly undergraduate students
that had participated in other experiments but not the specific treatments used in
this study. Each session lasted roughly 2 hours consisting of instruction, 2 practice
periods, and 19 paid periods of trading. zTree was used to conduct the experiment
(Fischbacher (2007)). Seven sessions of the baseline treatment were conducted with a
total of 64 subjects. Eight sessions of the MP treatment were conducted with a total
of 70 subjects. Average earnings were equal to $25.76 and $25.41 for the baseline and
MP treatments respectively.
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2.4

Results: A First Look at the Data
Prior to presenting our main results, which relate to the impact of market power,

we first examine whether within treatment contracting outcomes are consistent with
the theory. If so, this would lend confidence that the experimental design properly
reflects the theoretical model, that the theory robustly organizes patterns of behavior,
and that our subjects understood the instructions and the nature of the games that
they played.
Specifically, the theory predicts the following patterns of behavior:
1. Satisfying the agent’s participation constraint (P CA ) significantly increases the
agent’s willingness to accept a contract offer.
2. The incentive compatibility (IC) constraint significantly increases high effort
provision.
We will examine each of these patterns in the following subsections.

2.4.1

Participation Constraint and Acceptance Rates

Result 1: Satisfying the agent’s participation constraint (P CA ) significantly increases the agent’s willingness to accept a contract offer. Satisfying the promise keeping constraint (P K) significantly increases contract acceptance.
Figure 2.3 reports the fraction of accepted contract offers depending on whether
or not some combination of the (P CA ) and (P K) constraints is satisfied. When
aggregating the data across treatments, satisfying both constraints has the largest
acceptance rate at 79%. Offers that satisfy (P CA ) but violate (P K) have an acceptance rate of 59%. Because no observations violate both constraints simultaneously,
the lowest fraction of accepted offers, 22%, occurs when (P CA ) is violated but (P K)
is not. The evidence suggests that the agent is relatively more concerned about the
size of the promised rent rather than the credibility of the bonus payments when
deciding to accept an offer.
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The numbers located in the base of each bar chart reflect the total number of contract offers observed
for that category. Note that no offers violate both the (P C) and (P K) constraints simultaneously.

Fig. 2.3.: Contract acceptance rates: agent’s participation (P CA ) and promise keeping
(P K) constraints
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Table 2.3 reports the marginal effects from linear probability models (LPM) where
the dependent variable takes a value of “1” if the agent accepted the contract offer.13
The main interest concerns the effects of the (P CA ) and (P K) constraints on contract acceptance, though additional covariates were added as controls. One control
that requires explanation is what we define as cooperation in the last period. First,
cooperation entails that the two subjects engaged in trade previous period. Second,
conditional on the agent’s performance level, the principal paid a bonus greater than
or equal to the promised bonus stated in the contract offer.14
Note that regression (1) does not take advantage of the panel structure of the
data whereas regression (2) includes agent fixed effects, since unobserved agent heterogeneity might induce self-selection into certain types of contracts so that the error
term could be correlated with the (P CA ) and (P K) dummies. Moreover, the cooperated last period dummy in regression (2) was included to control for the possibility
that an agent might update beliefs about the principal’s reliability based on previous
interactions.
The coefficients for the (P CA ) dummy are positive and significant across both
specifications, which is consistent with theory. While the coefficient in regression
(2) is smaller (0.380 versus 0.578), the qualitative conclusions are robust and suggests that the participation constraint is an important determinant of agent contract
acceptance. The (P K) dummies also have the expected signs and are statistically
significant, though the magnitude of the coefficients are lower than the (P CA ) coefficients. Overall, it appears that agents are more willing to accept contracts that
satisfy the participation and promise keeping constraints. These results are largely
consistent with theory.
13

We also estimated marginal effects from a Probit model. While some of the numeric results
changed, the qualitative conclusions did not change.
14
Cooperation did not require that the agent picked the principal’s requested effort level because
the principal could not observe effort. Therefore, the principal could not verify that the agent was
violating or honoring their agreement.
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Table 2.3.: Linear probability estimates for contract acceptance
(1)
0.578∗∗∗
(0.067)

(2)
0.380∗∗∗
(0.086)

(P K) satisfied dummy

0.198∗∗∗
(0.036)

0.103∗∗
(0.047)

Market power dummy

0.116∗∗
(0.054)

0.054∗∗
(0.019)

(P CA ) satisfied dummy

Cooperated last period dummy

0.204∗∗∗
(0.049)

Length of relationship

-0.007
(0.011)

1
Period

0.212∗∗∗
(0.058)

0.304∗∗
(0.12)

Constant

-0.088
(0.092)
No
995
0.16

0.219
(0.111)
Yes
745
0.38

Agent fixed effects
Observations
R2
∗

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Estimates are linear probability models. The dependent
variable takes a value of 1 if the agent accepted the contract offer and a value of 0 otherwise. Robust
standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. (P CA ) satisfied dummy takes a value
of 1 if the (P CA ) constraint is satisfied. Market power dummy takes a value of 1 the observation
belongs to the market power treatment. Cooperated last period dummy takes a value of 1 if the pair
traded and the principal honored her bonus payment for the realized quality level in the previous
period. Length of relationship indicates the number of periods in which the pair of subjects have
interacted with each other.
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2.4.2

Incentive Compatibility and Effort Provision

Result 2: Satisfying the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint significantly increases high effort provision.
Figure 2.4 reports the fraction of high effort choices depending on whether or not
some combination of the (IC) and (P K) constraints is satisfied. While in theory, the
(P K) constraint should not have a direct effect on effort choice, it is possible that
it could have an indirect effect in that a forward looking agent who does not believe
that the promised discretionary bonus is credible may refuse to exert high effort.
When aggregating data across treatments, satisfying both constraints produces the
largest percentage of high effort choices at 77%. This percentage falls by 5% for offers
that violate (P K) but satisfy (IC) with bonuses that are not credible. When the
(IC) constraint is violated, however, the percentage of high effort choices declines
to around 40% irrespective of whether or not (P K) is satisfied. Therefore, incentive
compatibility is more associated with high effort provision relative to promise keeping.
Table 2.4 reports LPM marginal effects, with a dependent variable that takes a
value of “1” if the agent chose high effort. The difference between the two regressions
is that (1) ignores the panel structure of the data while (2) includes agent fixed effects
to account for potential selection biases. Regression (2) also includes the cooperated
last period dummy and length of relationship variable to control for the possibility
that agents may update their beliefs about the principal’s actions given prior behavior.
Both regressions suggest that satisfying (IC) has a positive and significant effect
(0.363 with p < 0.01 in (1) and 0.336 with p < 0.01 in (2)). The estimates for (P K),
however, are not significant, which indicates that promise keeping does not significantly influence effort provision. Overall, the results are consistent with theoretical
predictions in that discretionary bonuses that satisfy incentive compatibility increase
the probability of high effort.
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The numbers located in the base of each bar chart reflect the total number of observations for that
category.

Fig. 2.4.: High effort (eH ) provision: incentive compatibility (IC) and promise keeping
(P K) constraints
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Table 2.4.: Linear probability estimates for high effort
(1)
0.363∗∗∗
(0.061)

(2)
0.336∗∗∗
(0.074)

(P K) satisfied dummy

0.014
(0.036)

-0.0006
(0.058)

Market power dummy

-0.103
(0.081)

-0.019
(0.088)

(IC) satisfied dummy

Cooperated last period dummy

0.149∗∗
(0.056)

Length of relationship

-0.003
(0.010)

1
Period

Constant
Agent fixed effects
Observations
R2
∗

-0.121
(0.083)

-0.199
(0.188)

0.464***
(0.079)
No
655
0.14

0.04
(0.065)
Yes
483
0.44

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions are linear probability models. The dependent
variable takes a value of 1 if the agent chose eH and 0 if they chose eL . Robust standard errors
clustered at the session level in parentheses. (IC) and (P K) satisfied dummy take a value of 1 if the
incentive compatibility and the promise keeping constraints are respectively satisfied. Market power
dummy takes a value of 1 the observation belongs to the market power treatment. Cooperated last
period dummy takes a value of 1 if the pair traded and the principal honored her bonus payment
for the realized quality level in the previous period. Length of relationship indicates the number of
periods in which the pair of subjects have interacted with each other.
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2.5

Major Results: Impact of Exogenous Reduction in Agent’s Outside
Option
The previous sections showed that our data patterns are consistent with some of

the major predictions of the theoretical model, which inspires some confidence in the
theory and experimental implementation. We now explore our main question, which
is how relational contracting outcomes are affected by a reduction in agents’ market
power as proxied by an exogenous decrease in the agent’s expected outside option.
Recall that under the baseline treatment (B), an agent can assure himself a payoff of
30 points if he rejects the contract. Under the market power treatment (MP), there is
a 50% chance that the agent would receive 30 and a 50% chance of receiving nothing,
so that the expected payoff from taking the outside option drops to 15.

2.5.1

Contract Structure

Table 2.5 highlights the differences in contract structure across treatments. The
p-value for a two-sample Mann-Whitney test, using individual session averages as
the unit of observation, is also reported. The fraction of accepted offers is significantly higher by 15% in the MP treatment. In contrast, the fraction of high effort
choices, bonus payments honored, and use of the optional termination condition is
not significantly different across treatments.
Furthermore, the structure of the agent’s compensation has some noticeable differences across treatments, particularly when focusing on the fixed payment, p. For
all offers, the average p significantly increases from 6.2 points in the MP treatment to
21.6 points in the B treatment. Although these payments did not completely cover
the agent’s outside option, the average values for the accepted offers are close to ū in
each treatment—14.9 and 31.7 points respectively—and the difference is once again
significant.
Additionally, the principal offers the agent more discretionary pay under MP. For
instance, the average high performance bonus offered to the agent rises by 24.8 points
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Table 2.5.: Across treatment comparison of contract terms
All Offers
Baseline
Fraction offers accepted
Fraction offers with termination condition
Fraction of accepted offers with termination condition

.58
.26
.24

Market
Power
.73
.22
.19

Mann-Whitney
p-value
.09
.35
.56

Average price (p) offered
Average low bonus (b(qL )) offered
Average high bonus (b(qH )) offered

21.6
17.6
48.4

6.2
31.9
73.2

.03
.73
.13

Baseline

Mann-Whitney
p-value
1

Completed Trades

Fraction high effort (eH ) choices

.71

Market
Power
.61

Fraction of promised bonuses honored
Fraction honored when q = qL
Fraction honored when q = qH
Fraction honored if termination condition included

.53
.48
.57
.35

.50
.40
.58
.43

.77
.24
.82
.77

Average price (p)

31.7

14.9

.04

Average low bonus (b(qL )) offered
Average bonus paid when q = qL

14.7
2.2

19.6
1.0

.39
.06

Average high bonus (b(qH )) offered
43.3
58.6
.15
Average bonus paid when q = qH
25.3
31.1
.20
Two sided Mann-Whitney p-values reported. Session averages used (7 sessions for baseline treatment,
8 sessions for market power treatment).
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in the MP treatment. This gap decreases slightly for accepted offers with a difference
of 15.3 points on average.
To study this issue further, we define the variable

DP R =





max{b(qL ),b(qH )}
,
max{b(qL ),b(qH )}+p


1

if p > 0
if p ≤ 0

which falls in the interval [0, 1]. The discretionary payment ratio (DPR) denotes the
fraction of total pay promised to the agent that is discretionary rather than guaranteed
upfront. Note that upfront payment is guaranteed by the size of p but when p is zero
or negative, then nothing is guaranteed to the agent upfront so DP R = 1.
Table 2.6 reports regressions for completed trades of DPR on the market power
dummy variable which takes a value of “1” if the observation belongs to the MP
treatment. To determine if the results are robust, we also include several other
variables as controls and run both random-effects regressions at the session-principalagent levels as well as Tobit regressions to account for the fact that DPR is censored.
Main Result 1: The ratio of discretionary to total payment (DPR) increases with
the principal’s market power. This suggests that agents are offered fewer payment
guarantees and thus face more strategic uncertainty.
Main Result 1 is confirmed by the fact that the coefficient for the market power
dummy variable is positive and significant across all four specifications. The coefficient ranges from a low of 0.145 in regression (3) to a high of 0.154 in regression (2),
which is a fairly tight range across very different specifications. Thus, Main Result 1
also appears to be robust.
The takeaway is that MP increases the DPR so that agents are exposed to more
strategic uncertainty since they receive fewer payment guarantees. Thus, if the principal shirks on the discretionary bonus and/or the poor outcome qL is realized, the
agent is in a more vulnerable position relative to the baseline.
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Table 2.6.: Discretionary payment ratio (DPR) regressions

(2)
0.154∗∗∗
(0.053)

Tobit Estimates
(3)
(4)
∗∗
0.145
0.148*
(0.0707) (0.0753)

Cooperated last period dummy

-0.023
(0.018)

-0.0531
(0.0465)

Length of relationship

-0.0007
(0.004)

0.00452
(0.00639)

Market power dummy

1
Period

Constant
Observations
∗

(1)
0.150∗∗∗
(0.053)

-0.152∗∗∗
(0.041)

-0.312∗∗∗
(0.089)

-0.132∗∗∗
(0.0435)

-0.272∗∗∗
(0.0993)

0.60∗∗∗
(0.037)
655

0.629∗∗∗
(0.04)
483

0.591∗∗∗
(0.0533)
655

0.611∗∗∗
(0.0598)
483

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions (1) and (2) estimated using multi-level random
effects (at the session-principal-agent levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session
level. Regressions (3) and (4) are Tobit regressions with robust standard errors clustered at the
session level. Market power dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the market
power treatment. Cooperated last period dummy takes a value of 1 if the pair traded and the
principal honored her bonus payment for the realized quality level in the previous period. Length of
relationship indicates the number of periods the pair of subjects have interacted with each other.
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(a) All rounds

(b) Last 10 rounds only

The earnings are expressed in experimental points. For all rounds, the number of observations are
268 and 387 for the baseline and market power treatments respectively. 95% confidence intervals for
the mean are also depicted.

Fig. 2.5.: Average per-period earnings: completed trades only

2.5.2

Payoffs and Surplus

We now look at how efficiency and distribution are impacted by the MP treatment.
In practice, one of the concerns about market power held by principals, such as large
firms or employers, is that it negatively impacts suppliers/workers.
Figure 2.5 reports the average per-period earnings for principals and agents if the
parties engaged in trade. The sum of these averages is also reported for efficiency
comparisons. Overall, principals’ average earnings are roughly 16 points higher in
the MP treatment. When looking at the last 10 rounds only, this difference falls to 9
points. In comparison, agents’ average earnings are roughly 12 and 10 points lower
in the MP treatment for all rounds and the last 10 rounds respectively. Furthermore,
the joint earnings (surplus) differ by only 2 to 4 points on average across treatments.
Thus, the manner in which the earnings are divided changes across treatments.
For the last 10 rounds, principals capture 52% of the joint earnings in the baseline
treatment leading to a fairly equitable split. In the MP treatment, however, principals
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Table 2.7.: Regression estimates of the impact of market power on per-period payoffs
and surplus
Dependent Variables
(1)
(2)
Principal Payoffs Agent Payoffs
Market power dummy
21.10∗∗∗
-15.76∗∗
(8.000)
(7.020)

(3)
Surplus
3.985
(3.887)

1
Period

-17.17∗
(9.752)

9.025
(8.684)

-10.23∗∗∗
(3.723)

Constant

34.96∗∗∗
(3.905)
655

35.99∗∗∗
(2.124)
655

74.44∗∗∗
(3.136)
655

Observations
∗

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions estimated using multi-level random effects (at
the session, principal, and agent levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session level.
Market power dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the market power treatment.

capture 65% of the joint earnings and, as a result, have an average payoff roughly
twice as large as agents do. Therefore, principals extract more surplus from agents
in the MP treatment, but efficiency remains similar across treatments for completed
trades.
Table 2.7 presents estimates from three multi-level random-effects regressions
(session-principal-agent levels). The sign and significance of the MP dummy coefficient estimates largely verify what we saw in figure 2.5. The MP treatment induces
a 21.1 increase in principals’ per-period payoff (p<0.01), a reduction in agents’ payoff
(-15.76, p<0.05), and no statistically significant change in surplus. Hence, an increase
in the principal’s market power appears to have no impact on efficiency but does cause
distributional shifts.
Main Result 2: An increase in the principal’s market power does not impact efficiency but does have distributional effects by increasing the principal’s payoff while
lowering the agent’s payoff.
We now examine agents’ earnings in more detail to try to understand the mechanisms through which their earnings decreased. Figure 2.6 reports average earnings
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for agents across treatments for different subsets of the data. The first set of bar
charts presents the agents’ expected promised payoff, which is what agents expect to
earn under their contracts assuming the contracting parties honor the terms of the
contracts. The expected promised payoffs are quite similar across treatments, 58.91
points in the baseline versus 53.56 under MP.
Despite the fact that principals do not lower promised payoffs significantly in MP
relative to B, we see from regression (2) in Table 2.7 that agents’ actual payoffs drop
significantly by about -15.76 points. We now explore the channels through which this
drop in payoffs occurs. We know from the results in Table 2.6 that principals decrease
payment guarantees in MP by lowering the fixed payment while increasing the size of
discretionary payments. This offers some clues as where to look when attempting to
identify the channels through which agents suffer payoff losses under MP. An increased
discretionary payment ratio implies that an agent will face more risk, both in terms of
strategic uncertainty if the principal shirks on the discretionary bonus, and in terms
of exogenous risk since high effort does not map deterministically into qH . Figure
2.6 confirms these findings as average payoffs are only similar across treatments when
agents perform well and principals honor bonuses. If, however, principals fail to pay
bonuses under high quality or agents perform poorly, there is a noticeable decline in
the average payoff in the MP treatment.
Table 2.8 presents four regressions of agents’ payoff estimates that confirm these
findings. In regression (1), which focuses on agents’ expected promised payoff, the
MP coefficient is -5.009 but not statistically different from zero. Hence, it appears
that principals do not actually lower payoffs promised to agents when there is market
power. Regression (2) was estimated on the subset of data for which principals paid
discretionary bonuses so that strategic risk was not realized. We can see here that
there is no statistically significant difference in per-period agent payoffs. Thus, market
power does not cause agents’ payoffs to drop when everything is going well. However,
agents are not so fortunate when things go awry. Regression (3), which is estimated
on the subset of data where principals shirks on promised bonuses, shows that agents
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95% confidence intervals for the mean reported. There were 268 completed trades in the baseline
treatment and 387 in the market power treatment. The proportions reported at the base of the bar
charts on the right side state the fraction of observations for each treatment that fall into the listed
category. For example, 31% of the completed trades in the baseline treatment had high quality
where the principal honored the bonus payment compared to 34% of the completed trades in the
market power treatment.

Fig. 2.6.: Average agent earnings comparisons for completed trades

Table 2.8.: Regression estimates of the impact of market power on agent payoffs
across scenarios

Market Power dummy
1
Period

(1)
(2)
(3)
Expected Promised Actual Payoff Actual Payoff
Payoff
Bonus Paid Bonus not Paid
-5.009
-3.011
-21.08∗∗
(8.735)
(3.257)
(8.674)
4.758
(9.093)

6.188
(4.439)

12.31
(14.64)

(4)
Actual Payoff
qL realized
-16.85∗∗∗
(5.399)
7.517∗
(4.109)

60.95∗∗∗
43.14∗∗∗
29.91∗∗∗
28.03∗∗∗
(7.640)
(2.144)
(3.382)
(3.715)
Observations
655
337
318
281
∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions estimated using multi-level random effects (at
the session, principal, and agent levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session level.
Market power dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the market power treatment.
Constant
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are exposed to significant strategic uncertainty under MP as their profit drops by
an average of -21.08. Similarly, regression (4) shows that agents are also exposed to
considerable exogenous risk as agents’ payoffs are an average of -16.85 lower when qL
is realized under MP.15
Main Result 3: An increase in the principal’s market power does not lower expected
profit promised to agents. Moreover, agents’ actual profits are not lower in the MP
treatment when circumstances are favorable to agents (i.e. bonuses paid and qH realized). However, agent payoffs are significantly lower when either the principal shirks
on the bonus and/or qL is realized.
Finally, one might conjecture that these across treatment results are driven by
an increased rate of shirking on bonuses by principals under MP rather than riskier
contracts. The rate of shirking, however, is almost identical across treatments as seen
in table 2.5. Principals shirked on bonuses 50% of the time under MP compared to
47% in B. Indeed, when we ran a random-effects LPM with bonus paid (equals “1”)
as the dependent variable against the same independent variables as those in table
2.8, we found that the MP dummy coefficient is 0.020 with a robust standard error
clustered on sessions of 0.13 (p − value=0.88).16 The fact that the rate of shirking
on bonuses is no higher in the MP treatment despite strategically riskier contracts
is not surprising. Theoretically, an exogenous decrease in outside options should
strengthen self-enforcement so it appears that subjects assigned to be principals took
advantage of the more relaxed self-enforcement constraints by increasing the size of
discretionary payments, though not to the point of causing more systematic breaches
of the self-enforcement constraints.
In summary, it appears that the primary impact of market power on agents is
that principals restructure contracts that increase agents’ exposure to both strategic
and exogenous risk.
15

The qualitative results also remain true when separating the data by both quality level and whether
or not the principal honored the promised bonus payment.
16
We did not create a table for this regression in order to conserve space.
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2.5.3

Acceptance Rates by Agents

The previous subsection examined efficiency and distribution in terms of trades
that occurred but a second major determinant of gains from trade is whether people
are willing to engage in more trade. So far, we have seen that agents are offered more
risky contracts in the MP treatment so an obvious question arises: do agents reject
these riskier contracts at a higher rate?
If so, then one can argue that market power reduces efficiency since we have already
seen that surplus per-trade does not change. However, if agents are more willing to
accept contracts, then market power actually enhances efficiency by facilitating a
higher volume of trade.
Referring back to figure 2.3, one can see that acceptance rates are higher in the MP
treatment relative to the B treatment across all configurations of the (P C) and (P K)
constraints. We also report regression results in Table 2.9. Regressions (1) and (2)
are random-effects LPMs where the dependent variable is whether an agent accepted
(= “1”) a contract offer. Regressions (3) and (4) are Probit specifications. We ran
various specifications to check for robustness. One can see indeed that the estimated
marginal effects are positive (in the 0.13-0.151 range) across all four specifications
and statistically significant at the 10% or 5% levels.
Main Result 4: An increase in the principal’s market power increases the probability
that agents will accept the contract. This combined with the finding that there is no
difference in surplus per-trade implies that an increase in market power in favor of
the principal increases efficiency.
In terms of absolute numbers, out of 535 total contracting opportunities (i.e.
situations in which the principal could make an offer to the agent) across all sessions
of the B treatment, approximately 50% resulted in trades. Out of 576 opportunities
in the MP treatment, approximately 67% resulted in trades. Thus, significantly more
surplus was created in the MP treatments.
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Table 2.9.: Marginal effects of the impact of market power on seller acceptance

Market power dummy

(2)
LPM
0.130∗
(0.0704)

(3)
Probit
0.151∗∗
(0.079)

(4)
Probit
0.144∗∗
(0.073)

Cooperated last period dummy

0.255∗∗∗
(0.0447)

0.392∗∗∗
(0.044)

Length of relationship

-0.00542
(0.00898)

-0.016
(0.011)

1
Period

0.116∗
(0.0602)

0.200∗
(0.114)

0.123
(0.069)

0.204
(0.133)

Constant

0.573∗∗∗
(0.0697)
995

0.497∗∗∗
(0.0892)
745

995

745

Observations
∗

(1)
LPM
0.136∗
(0.0768)

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Linear probability models estimated using multi-level random
effects (at the session, principal, and agent levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session
level. Probits were estimated with robust standard errors clustered at the session level.Market power
dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the market power treatment. Cooperated last
period dummy takes a value of 1 if the pair traded and the principal honored her bonus payment
for the realized quality level in the previous period. Length of relationship indicates the number of
periods the pair of subjects have interacted with each other.
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2.6

Conclusion
The purpose of this paper is to determine how an exogenous increase in the prin-

cipal’s market power affects contracting outcomes. With regard to efficiency, our key
findings are that market power enhances the ability of principals to resolve agency
conflicts since it increases their leverage to maintain high-powered informal incentives while increasing the agent’s willingness to accept contracts. Since high effort is
maintained, surplus per-trade is unaltered and all efficiency effects operate through
an increase in the volume of trade. Consequently, market power relaxes the tension
between incentive compatibility and contract participation which enhances the ability
of principals to solve moral hazard problems. The key implication of our findings is
that traditional market power models that predict welfare losses due to a reduction
in the volume of trade may overstate the restraint of trade caused by market power.
Many modern input market and supply chains are characterized by contracting relationships so the ability of market power to relax contractual constraints can actually
increase the volume of trade and work in the opposite direction of traditional market
power effects.
With regard to distribution, we find that an increase in the principal’s market
power does not cause principals to directly reduce expected payoffs promised in contracts to agents. Rather, contracts are restructured to shift significantly more risk—
both strategic risk as well as exogenous risk—onto agents. Thus, when relationships
are stable and performance outcomes are favorable, agents do not suffer profit losses.
However, agents are exposed to significantly more downside payoff losses when either the principal defaults on discretionary bonuses or performance outcomes are not
favorable.
Our findings suggest that smallholders or suppliers contracting with large firms or
exporters may fair well in environments characterized by stable relationships with low
exogenous risk. However, in other situations characterized by significant production or
price risk, or in environments that are exposed to significant political or technological

47
change where discount factors are small or time inconsistencies are significant, market
power may have significant negative consequences for agents. One promising avenue of
future research is to conduct relational contract experiments with market power that
also involve variations in discount factors or exogenous shocks. This might provide
additional insights into how market power affects efficiency and distribution.
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Appendix: Instructions for the Market Power Treatment
You can earn money during this experiment, with the exact amount depending
on the decisions you make during the experiment. Your experimental income is
calculated in points, which will be converted into cash at the rate of: $1 = 30 points.
We will start you off with a balance of 150 points ($5).
All written information you received from us is for your private use
only. You are not allowed to pass over any information to other participants in the experiment. Talking during the experiment is not permitted.
Violations of these rules may force us to stop the experiment.
General Information
This experiment is about how people buy and sell goods for which quality matters.
Participants are divided into two groups: half will be buyers and the other half sellers.
Then a trading period will start in which a buyer and seller will trade one unit of
a good that can vary in quality. The price agreed upon between the buyer and
seller and the quality of the good traded will determine how much money each party
makes in that period. There will many trading periods throughout the course of this
experiment.
Who will you trade with? The computer will randomly match each participant
in the room with another participant to form a buyer-seller pairing. You will be
informed whether you are the buyer or seller in your pairing. You will trade with
your pair-member. You will not be informed of the actual identity of the other person
(and s/he will not be informed of your identity). All sellers and buyers are assigned a
numeric ID which is not associated with their real identity. You will also retain your
ID and role (e.g. buyer or seller) through the entire experiment.
For how many periods will you trade with the same person? All participants will remain matched with their pair-member for a random number of periods.
How is this determined? At the end of each period, the computer will determine
randomly whether the same pairings will continue for the next period or whether new
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pairings will be formed. In any given period, there is an 80% chance that the same
pairings will continue for the next period. In other words, there is an 80% chance
that you will continue to trade with the same person in the next period. To help
you understand this, imagine the computer has been programmed to spin a roulette
wheel. If it lands on 1,2,3,4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 then you will continue to trade with the same
person the next period. But if it lands on 9 or 10 the current pairings are immediately
terminated. And then for the next period, the computer will randomly match you
with a different person in the room to form a new pairing. This process will repeat
for every new pairing. At the beginning of each period, you will be notified on-screen
whether the random matching process has kept you with the same person or matched
you with a new person.
When does the entire experiment end? If one of two conditions holds:
(1) The experiment will end if all participants have already been matched with all
possible trading partners. This is because no participant will be matched with the
same person more than once during this experiment. For example, if there are 4
buyers and 4 sellers, then no buyer or seller will have more than 4 unique pairings.
After 4 unique pairings, the experiment ends. (2) Even if all unique pairings have not
been exhausted, the last pairing will occur once the experiment has lasted at least 18
periods. In other words, if you have traded at least 18 periods for the experiment,
then your current pairing is your last one. This does not mean the experiment stops
at 18 rounds exactly; it only means that when your last pairing randomly ends, you
will not be paired with a new partner.
To summarize, if you have had less than 4 different trading partners during the
experiment, and the experiment has not lasted at least 18 total periods, then when
your current match is randomly terminated, the computer will match you with a new
person and the experiment would continue. However, if the experiment has lasted
at least 18 total periods, then the experiment will end once your current pairing is
randomly terminated.
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Conducting Trades
Each trade occurs within a trading period. Each trading period is then divided
into a proposal phase followed by an effort determination phase and then followed by
a quality realization & payment determination phase.
1. During the proposal phase, the buyer can make a proposal on the terms of trade
to the seller. The seller can either accept or reject the proposal.
2. If the seller accepts the proposal, then during the effort determination phase,
the seller privately chooses the effort level to supply.
3. After the seller makes an effort choice comes the quality realization & payment
determination phase. During this phase, both the buyer and the seller observe
the realized quality. The buyer can then make final adjustments in payment
depending on the initial terms of the proposal
Specific details of each phase are given below:
1. The Proposal Phase
Each period starts with a proposal phase. A proposal allows the parties to agree
to the terms of trade by including a list of promises and obligations of both parties
(see below for details). The buyer can submit a single proposal during the proposal
phase. Once a proposal is submitted, the seller will decide to accept or reject the
proposal.
How does a buyer make a proposal? A proposal screen will appear that will
require the buyer to enter values for the following terms: price, two quality-contingent
bonuses, and a requested effort level. The buyer must also specify whether to include
an optional ending condition for the trading relationship. These four components are
described below:
• Price This allows the buyer to state the price s/he will pay for the good traded.
The buyer enters a price in the “Price” field. The price ranges from -250 to 250
(whole numbers).
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Important:

The price the buyer specifies will be binding. This is similar to

an upfront payment or a legally binding obligation once the proposal is agreed
upon, the computer will ensure that the price is paid to the seller.
b) Quality-contingent bonus There are two potential quality levels for the
good traded: 30 or 120. The quality level realized depends partially on a decision
made by the seller in the effort determination phase (see below for explanation).
In the proposal, the buyer states that s/he will pay a bonus linked to each possible quality level. That is, a bonus level must be specified for two cases: when
the realized quality is 30 and when realized quality is 120. To enter a bonus for
the case when quality is 30, enter a number into the “Bonus amount for quality
30” field to specify the size of the bonus (whole numbers from 0 to 250).
Similarly, for the case when quality is 120, enter a number into the “Bonus
amount for quality 120” field to specify the size of the bonus (whole numbers
from 0 to 250).
Important: The stated bonuses are not binding. During the payment determination phase, to come later, the buyer can choose any bonus level s/he wishes.
Thus, the stated bonuses, one for each possible quality level, are discretionary.
Only the price is ensured to be paid to the seller.
The total offered payment to the seller is: price + quality-contingent bonus.
• Requested effort level In the next phase, sellers who accept an offer must
choose an effort level of either 0 or 1 to supply. The seller’s effort choice helps
determine whether the quality level will be 30 or 120 for that period. Buyers
must request an effort level that they want their seller to choose. To indicate
the requested effort level, click the corresponding button next to the question,
“What effort level do you request the seller to provide?”
Note: If the offer is accepted, the seller is not obligated to choose the effort
level requested by the buyer.
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• Optional ending condition The buyer may also decide to include an ending
condition for the trading relationship in the proposal. To include the condition,
the buyer clicks the “Yes” button next to the question, “Would you like to
include the condition that the relationship will end if quality 30 is realized?” If
the buyer does not wish to include the ending condition, he/she clicks the “No”
button.
Note:

If included and the offer is accepted by the seller, then the buyer

and seller will not trade in future rounds if the realized quality is 30 in the
current trading period (see phase #3 below). This does not mean that the
experiment will end if the condition is satisfied. It does, however, mean that
the two parties will not be able to make or accept offers in their pairing until
randomly rematched with a new trading partner.
After the buyer has specified these terms, s/he needs to click the “Commit Decision” button to submit it. Then comes the effort determination phase.
2. Effort Determination Phase
Following the proposal phase, sellers can accept or decline the buyer’s proposal.
Sellers who accept the agreement will choose between the two possible effort levels:
0 or 1. The seller clicks the button (0 or 1) corresponding to his or her effort choice.
Important: Only the seller observes his/her effort choice. The buyer does not
observe effort but can make inferences about the chosen effort based on the quality
realized in that period.
3. Quality Realization and Payment Determination Phase
During this phase, after both the buyer and seller observe the realized quality, the
buyer will decide the actual bonus to be paid to the seller. The buyer will enter his/her
bonus choice in the bonus payment field. Nothing restricts the buyer from choosing
a bonus level that is different from the bonus that was specified in the proposal. The
actual bonus can range from 0 to 250 (whole numbers) at the buyer’s discretion.
Buyers will also be asked to make a guess about the seller’s effort choice in that
period. Click the button corresponding to your guess (0 or 1).
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Note: If the proposal included the optional ending condition and realized quality
was 30 in this round, then the buyer and seller will not trade after the current period.
That is, if the ending condition is satisfied, offers cannot be made or accepted in the
pairing until the buyer and seller are randomly rematched with a new trading partner.
At the end of each period, the buyer and seller will be shown a summary screen.
The following information is displayed on this screen:
• the points that you individually earned (or lost) in this period.
Note: Your trading partner’s points will not be displayed on your screen.
Similarly, your points will not be displayed on their screen. Furthermore,
note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses are subtracted from your points balance.
If an agreement was formed, the following information will also be displayed:
• the Price the buyer offered.
• the Proposed Bonuses (for the two possible quality levels)
• the Actual bonus granted (in bold)
Please enter all the information on the screen in the documentation sheet supplied
to you. This will help you keep track of your performance across periods so that you
can learn from your past results.
At the beginning of the next period, the computer will inform you if
you have been randomly matched with the same trading partner or with
a different partner.
How do Buyers Make Money?
• If the buyer does not make an offer or the seller rejects the offer, the
buyer will receive 30 points for that period. If the trading relationship has
ended as a result of the ending condition, the buyer will receive 30 points in
each subsequent period until randomly rematched with a new seller.
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• If the buyer’s offer is accepted, the buyer’s points for the period depend on the
realized quality, the price, and the actual bonus paid. That is,

Buyer Points = Realized Quality - Price - Actual Bonus
• As you can see, the higher the realized quality, the more points the buyer earns.
At the same time, the lower total payments (price plus actual bonus), the more
points the buyer earns.
• In summary, higher quality and lower payments means more points for the
buyer.
How is realized quality determined? The realized quality depends, in part,
on the seller’s effort choice. The table below summarizes the likelihood of observing
quality levels 30 or 120 given the seller’s effort choice:
Quality = 30

Quality = 120

Effort = 0

0.75

0.25

Effort = 1

0.25

0.75

After the seller makes his/her effort choice, the actual quality is randomly determined by the computer based on the above probabilities. That is, for either effort
choice, there is a chance observing a quality level of 30 or a quality level of 120. An
effort choice of 1, however, increases the chance of observing a quality level of 120.
To help you understand this, imagine we randomly pick one ball from a bingo cage
containing 4 balls numbered 1 through 4. If the seller’s effort choice was “0” then
drawing the ball labeled 1 would result in the quality level of 120 while balls labeled
2, 3, or 4 result in a level of 30. If the seller’s effort choice was “1” instead, then
drawing balls labeled 1, 2, or 3 would result in a quality level of 120 while the ball
labeled 4 would result in a quality level of 30.
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How do Sellers Make Money?
• If the seller rejects the proposal or the buyer does not make an offer,
the seller will receive 30 points with a 50% probability and 0 points
with a 50% probability for that period. This is like flipping a coin where
if it comes up heads, the seller gets 30 points but if it is tails the seller gets 0
points.
If the trading relationship has ended as a result of the ending condition, the seller
will receive 30 points in each subsequent period until randomly rematched
with a new buyer.
• If the seller has accepted an offer, then the seller’s points depends on the price,
actual bonus, and effort costs s/he incurs. The points of a seller are determined
as follows:

Seller Points = Price + Actual Bonus - Effort Costs
How are effort costs calculated? Effort costs depend on the seller’s private
effort choice of 0 or 1. The table below summarizes the seller’s costs:
Effort:

0

Cost: 0

1
10

An effort choice of “1” costs the seller 10 points while a choice of “0” costs the
seller no points.
• As you can see, the higher the actual payments, the more points a seller earns.
At the same time, the higher effort cost reduces points.
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3. A RELATIONAL CONTRACTING EXPERIMENT ON
SUBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE
This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study how potential disputes over the
agent’s performance level affect relational contracting outcomes in a bilateral principalagent relationship. More specifically, I focus on changes in contractual form, efficiency,
and surplus distribution when moving from an environment where the two parties cannot disagree over the agent’s performance measure to one where the principal and
agent may have conflicting beliefs concerning the agent’s performance level. In both
environments, the performance measure is a stochastic function of the agent’s effort
choice, which the principal cannot observe. The performance signal, however, is only
publicly observed in the baseline treatment. In the second treatment, the principal
privately observes the performance signal. A potential source of disagreement exists
in the latter treatment because both parties have important asymmetric information
related to the performance signal. The principal is unsure about the level of effort
provided while the agent is unsure about how well he actually performed. Therefore,
since effort maps imperfectly into performance, the agent can realize a poor performance signal after working hard due to “bad luck” but may believe that he performed
well while the principal may attribute low performance to the agent shirking. Such
conflict may hinder the success of the dynamic contracting relationship.
Furthermore, the principal has additional strategic considerations when she privately observes the performance signal. In the model, which is adapted from Levin
(2003), the principal can offer the agent two types of monetary incentives. The first is
a verifiable fixed payment, independent of the agent’s performance level, which is paid
upfront. The second is a promised performance bonus, which the principal need not
pay because performance is assumed to be unverifiable by a neutral party and, therefore, performance is non-contractible. Along with deciding the actual performance
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bonus to pay, the principal must also send unverifiable performance feedback to the
agent when she privately observes the signal. Therefore, the principal may manipulate
performance feedback to her advantage such as under reporting the performance value
after receiving the good signal in order to avoid paying a high performance bonus. In
such a case, the agent cannot verify that the principal is breeching the contractual
agreement unless she fails to pay the promised bonus for low performance. Because
of this, the principal may restructure contracts advantageously across treatments by
increasing her amount of discretion as payment deviations become harder to detect.
The importance of this research stems from the fact that performance evaluation
is inherently subjective in most tasks or occupations. Because of this, subjective
measures, such as discretionary bonuses, frequently provide incentives within many
contractual relationships. A 2014 survey of 1,452 American firms, for instance, reports
that 58.5% of employers used bonuses to compensate middle managers. For those in
non-management positions, bonuses were the second most popular form of performance pay (Bruce (2014)). Although commonly used, Prendergast (1999) notes the
lack of empirical studies evaluating the effectiveness of subjective performance systems. Existing work, instead, focuses on data where output is easily measured and the
worker’s subsequent performance is fairly easy to quantify. An important aspect not
explored in these studies is that workers and firms typically disagree, or at least have
somewhat conflicting perceptions, on the worker’s performance, making the potential
for conflict an important aspect of the bilateral relationship. In terms of laboratory
experiments on contract design, very few studies incorporate asymmetric information
into the contracting relationship. This is the first relational contracting experiment,
to my knowledge, to make the agent’s performance measure private, therefore leaving
the agent uncertain as to how well he actually performed.
Furthermore, although subjective measures are more practical in terms of how
compensation is tied to performance, they can potentially create problems that can
be easily observed in the lab. First, when disputes over performance pay arise, the
relationship between the worker and firm may be permanently strained. For example,
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in the early 1990s many managers left First Boston and Goldman Sachs after promised
bonuses were much lower than expected (Stewart (1993)). Another problem stems
from the evaluation process. When conducting performance reviews, supervisors may
be concerned about factors beyond the accuracy of their appraisals. Longenecker
et al. (1987) surveyed 60 executives and found that many manipulated performance
feedback in their favor. Some inflated performance to encourage the worker to perform
well in the future while others deflated performance for the same reason. Therefore,
in addition to the difficulty of agreeing on adequate compensation, evaluations may
not even reflect the firm’s true perception of the employee’s performance if other
motivational factors are present. The results of this experiment can easily measure
how the potential for conflict alters the efficiency of the relationship, via contract
acceptance rates and effort provision, and whether principals tend to manipulate
performance feedback for their personal gain.
Turning to the main findings, across treatment changes in efficiency as a result of
the subjects’ actions are minor. Contract acceptance rates are 58% and 57% in the
public and private performance signal treatments respectively. For completed trades,
the percentage of efficient effort choices is also not significantly different across treatments at 71% and 64%. Finally, contingent on the true value of the performance
measure, principals honor their promised performance bonuses at remarkably similar
rates, 53% and 52% of the time. Across treatment comparisons, therefore, indicate
no efficiency losses despite the theoretical lack of contracts that facilitate successful
relational contracting under the private performance signal. In terms of earnings for
completed trades, the principal’s per-period earnings significantly increase under the
private performance signal while the agent’s earnings are not significantly different.
Furthermore, pairwise earnings are significantly higher when the performance signal
is private, but this result is not driven by significant changes in the agent’s effort
provision. Agents in the treatment of interest instead experience a relatively higher
amount of “good luck” with the noisy mapping between effort and performance resulting in a larger frequency of good performance signals. Only principals benefit
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from this good luck, however, implying that principals capture a larger fraction of
the joint surplus when the signal is private.
Principals in the private performance signal treatment also significantly restructure contracts by lowering the upfront, guaranteed payment to the agent while increasing the promised discretionary performance bonus for high performance outcomes,
thereby exposing the agents to more strategic uncertainty. The agent’s promised,
expected earnings, however, do not significantly vary across treatments. This implies that although principals have increased discretion under the private signal, the
agent’s overall welfare will not decrease as long as principals honor their promised
bonus payments at similar rates, which indeed occurs. The agent’s earnings, however, are significantly reduced for high performance realizations across treatments
when the principal falsely reports that his performance was poor. These cases are
associated with much larger relative rates of shirking on the promised bonus. On
occasion, therefore, principals manipulate performance feedback to their advantage
by understating the agent’s performance.
In terms of overall performance feedback, however, principals in the private performance signal treatment tend to report performance honestly. Principals evaluate
performance honestly for 73% of the good performance realizations. Similarly, for
poor performance outcomes principals are honest 83% of the time. Furthermore, this
tendency to report truthfully cannot be explained by the theoretical framework as
satisfying the model’s incentives for truth telling result in minor increases in accurate
feedback. The general preference for truth telling, therefore, must be driven by some
aspect outside the scope of the theoretical framework such as lying aversion or beliefs
that frequent misreporting will strain the contracting relationship.

3.1

Related Literature
The experiment is adapted from the theoretical framework of MacLeod and Mal-

comson (1989) and Levin (2003). MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) characterize the
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conditions which ensure that the relational contract is self-enforcing in an environment
where the principal and agent have symmetric information related to the performance
measure. Levin (2003) extends their model among several dimensions. First, he solves
for the optimal contract structure under moral hazard. In another extension, the principal also privately observes the agent’s performance measure and sends unverifiable
performance feedback to the agent. To analyze these environments in the laboratory,
I study a simplified version of Levin (2003)’s model.
Related experimental work on contract design begins with Brown et al. (2004)
who study how contracting partnerships emerge under gift exchange contracts within
a market where principals and agents endogenously match with one another. They
find that when identities of the subjects are fixed, as opposed to being randomly
generated each period, subjects engage in repeated contracting with the same partner. Agents also choose higher efforts and receive higher earnings on average when
identities are fixed despite the market containing an excess supply of agents. In this
study, I also analyze dynamic relationships but impose an exogenous matching process of principal-agent pairs as this aligns more closely with Levin (2003)’s model.
Furthermore, principals can implement a wide variety of contractual forms, not just
gift exchange contracts, which allows me to study how potential performance disputes
alter the types of contracts that principals design. Fehr et al. (2007) compare the
effectiveness of a contract with a discretionary bonus to an incentive contract where
the agent must pay a fine to the principal if caught shirking below the principal’s
requested effort level. They find that most principals prefer to implement contracts
with a discretionary bonus. Bonuses also increase both the agent’s effort choice and
the principal’s earnings on average. The authors, however, focus on one-shot interactions whereas this experiment looks at a dynamic principal-agent relationship. Both
of these studies also do not make the agent’s effort choice hidden from the principal.
Irlenbusch and Sliwka (2005) study moral hazard in a gift exchange contract. They
find that average effort choices are not lower although they are more variable com-
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pared to environment where effort is perfectly observed. Once again, however, I focus
on contracts with informal bonuses.
Furthermore, these experiments do not create the potential for the principal and
agent to disagree over performance since they jointly observe the agent’s performance
value. Ederer and Fehr (2016) allow the principal to privately observe information
about the performance difference between two agents engaged in a two-stage tournament. I, however, do not focus on a one-shot environment with multiple agents.
Finally, Sebald and Walzl (2014) study a real-effort task in which the principal observes the agent participating in the task. The agent’s payoff may depend on how well
the principal rates his performance. After observing the performance evaluation, the
agent could punish the principal at a cost. They find that agents tend to punish principals when their self-evaluation is higher than the principal’s reported evaluation.
Although they create the potential for the two parties to dispute over the agent’s performance level they analyze one-shot instead of dynamic relationships. Furthermore,
I do not focus on a real-effort task as this does not align with the assumptions of
Levin (2003)’s model. In my environment, principals also endogenously specify the
performance incentives instead of just evaluating the agent’s performance. Therefore,
additional strategic considerations are present in this experiment as the principal has
to decide the actual bonus to pay along with evaluating the agent’s performance. To
my knowledge, this is the first experiment that studies the implications of allowing
the principal to privately observe the agent’s performance signal within the relational
contracting framework.

3.2

Theoretical Framework

3.2.1

Model

The framework of the model is closely related to the one found in the first chapter. For conciseness, I provide a summary of the main aspects of the model and refer
readers to the previous chapter for a more detailed description. A risk-neutral prin-
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cipal and agent are infinitely lived and share discount factor δ. In each period, the
principal can offer the agent a take-it-or-leave it contract offer. In the offer the principal specifies two types of payments: 1) a fixed, enforceable payment p ∈ {p, . . . , p}
which may be negative and 2) a nonnegative discretionary bonus, b(q) ∈ {0, . . . , b}.
The latter depends upon the value of the agent’s performance level, q ∈ {qL , qH }, in
the current period where 0 < qL < qH . Furthermore, q is a stochastic function of
the agent’s hidden effort choice, e ∈ {eL , eH }, where eH costs the agent c while eL is
costless. Denote l and h as the probability of realizing qH given an effort choice of eL
and eH respectively. Although eH is more costly to the agent, 0 < l < h < 1, which
implies that high effort, eH , increases the likelihood of the agent realizing the high
performance level, qH .
Along with specifying payments in the offer, the principal also states the effort
level, either eL or eH , that she wants the agent to choose. Since the principal cannot
observe e, however, the agent does not have to honor this request. Finally, the
principal can include an optimal termination condition, which contingent upon certain
outcomes or actions, specifies the likelihood of the two parties engaging in future
trade. This condition will be explained in more detail as a I discuss the two variations
of the contractual environment.
If the agent rejects the offer or the principal does not make an offer in a given
period, the principal and agent receive an outside option of π̄ and ū respectively. If
the agent accepts the offer, he privately makes his effort choice e. Depending on the
environment, the appropriate party/ies observe the value of q. Finally, the principal
decides the actual bonus, B ∈ {0, . . . , b}, to pay to the agent. The principal’s payoff
when contracting equals π = q −p−B while the agent’s payoff equals u = p+B −c(e).

3.2.2

Efficient and Stationary Contracts

To characterize the set of optimal contracts, Levin (2003) focuses on contracts
that satisfy several properties. First, contracts are efficient in that they maximize the
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expected joint earnings of the principal and the agent. Here, efficiency implies that
the agent picks eH .
To illustrate this, I first define the relevant expected payoffs per-period contingent
on the agent’s effort choice, e, and the principal honoring the promised performance
bonus, b(q). For each effort choice, the principal’s expected per-period payoff is:
πeL ≡Eq [q − p − b(q)|e = eL ] = lqH + (1 − l)qL − [p + lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL )]
πeH ≡Eq [q − p − b(q)|e = eH ] = hqH + (1 − h)qL − [p + hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL )]
Similarly, the agent’s expected per-period payoff for each effort choice is:
ueL ≡Eq [p + b(q) − c(e)|e = eL ] = p + lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL )
ueH ≡Eq [p + b(q) − c(e)|e = eH ] = p + hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL ) − c
Finally, the expected surplus per-period for each effort choice is:
seL ≡Eq [q − c(e)|e = eL ] = lqH + (1 − l)qL
seH ≡Eq [q − c(e)|e = eH ] = hqH + (1 − h)qL − c
To make the contract efficient when the agent exerts high effort, eH , assume:
s̄ ≡ ū + π̄ < seH
seL < seH
Therefore, trading under eH maximizes the expected joint earnings of the principal
and agent. Second, Levin (2003) assumes that contracts are stationary, which implies
that the principal offers the same payments p, b(qL ), and b(qH ) in all periods during
which trade occurs. Levin (2003) also assumes that the agent chooses the same effort
e in all periods as long as he has not observed the principal reneging on b(q) during
any previous period. If a discretionary payment is not honored, the agent issues the
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worst punishment to the principal by rejecting all future offers.1 These assumptions
make it possible to focus on the static, rather than the dynamic, incentive problem.

3.2.3

Optimal Contracts when Both Parties Observe the Performance
Signal

In the first environment, both parties publicly observe the value of q when they
engage in contracting. Therefore, there is no scope for the principal and agent to
disagree over the agent’s performance measure.
Along with specifying payments in the offer, the principal must also decide whether
or not to include an optional termination condition. This condition specifies the likelihood of the relationship ending permanently after the current period, therefore ending
the contractual relationship. If q = qL the relationship terminates with certainty after the current period. That is, in all future periods the parties receive their outside
options. In contrast, if q = qH the relationship continues with certainty.2 If the
condition is not included in the offer, however, the relationship does not terminate in
the case that q = qL , which implies that the parties can trade in the next period.
To ensure that the contract is efficient and all informal agreements are honored,
the following four constraints must be satisfied:
1. The principal’s participation constraint (P CP ) makes it worthwhile to enter the
contract:

πeH ≥ π̄
1

(P CP )

Levin (2003) also illustrates that an equivalent contract exists where the parties can continue
trading under a relational contract following a deviation. The terms of the contract, however, are
renegotiated to hold the deviating party to his or her outside option. Since the parties remain on
the Pareto frontier, this outcome is renegotiation proof.
2
In a more general contract, the principal could specify termination probabilities for each possible
value of q. I fix these probabilities in order to make the contract design problem less demanding for
subjects and to make the experiment easier to understand.
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2. The agent’s participation constraint (P CA ) makes it worthwhile to enter the
contract:

ueH ≥ ū

(P CA )

3. The agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (IC) prevents the agent from
shirking:

ueH ≥ ueL

(IC)

4. The principal’s promise keeping constraint (P K) ensures that she will pay the
discretionary bonus, b(q), for all possible realizations of q:

δ
(πe − π̄)
(1 − δ) H
{z
}
|

expected, discounted net gain from
future interactions when paying bonus

≥ max{b(qL ), b(qH )}
|
{z
}

(P K)

maximum gain from
withholding bonus

Furthermore, in this environment the optimal termination condition is not needed
for the principal and agent to engage in successful relational contracting. Including
the condition would be inefficient as it destroys future gains from trade when q = qL .

3.2.4

Optimal Contracts when the Principal Privately Observes the Performance Signal

In the second environment, the principal privately observes q. Along with deciding
the actual bonus to pay to the agent, she must also send unverifiable performance
feedback to him during each period.3 The principal’s message, m, can either report
that performance was high, m = “q = qH ” or that performance was low, m = “q =
3

Note that the assumption that feedback is unverifiable is critical. Otherwise, contingent the performance feedback sent to the agent, the principal would not be able to renege on the corresponding
promised performance bonus.
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qL ”. Therefore, the principal is restricted from sending an uninformative performance
report but it does not have to be truthful.
Furthermore, the optional termination condition now depends on the message
sent and not the value of q that the principal observes. If the principal includes the
termination condition and reports that performance was low (m = “q = qL ”) the
relationship terminates with certainty after the current period. If she reports high
performance (m = “q = qH ”), however, the relationship continues with certainty.4
Once again, the principal is not required to include this condition implying that
parties can continue to trade in future periods when the condition is not included
and the principal reports low performance.
In order for the contract’s informal agreements to be self-enforcing, the contract
must have additional structure when the principal privately observes the performance
signal. The issue stems from guaranteeing that the principal will uphold her promised
performance bonus b(q) for all realizations of q. In addition to the promise keeping
constraint, which theoretically ensures that it is worthwhile for the principal to uphold
the bonus due to the expected gain from future interactions, the principal now needs
the incentive to report q truthfully. Otherwise, the principal can renege on b(q) by
strategically manipulating the performance report to her advantage. More specifically,
the principal may understate the agent’s performance after privately observing a good
performance outcome but pay the agent b(qL ). When this occurs, the principal reneges
on b(qH ) but the agent cannot detect that the principal is violating the agreement.
To guarantee that all promised bonuses are honored, therefore, the principal needs to
have the incentive to report q truthfully.
Levin (2003) illustrates that to ensure truthful reporting for both values of q, the
principal must remain indifferent between reporting m = “q = qL ” or m = “q = qH ”.
When indifferent, the principal has no incentive to overstate or understate the agent’s
performance. Without additional structure on the contract, this requires that b(qL ) =
b(qH ) as this equates the principal’s expected payoff across qL and qH realizations.
4

Levin (2003) assumes that the principal specifies a value for the termination probability for each
possible message that she can send to the agent. Here, I fix these probabilities to be 1 or 0.
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The problem, however, is that this contract violates the agent’s incentive compatibility
(IC) constraint. In order to provide dual incentives for the agent to choose eH and
for the principal to report q honestly, the principal’s expected payoff cannot vary
with q while the agent’s expected payoff must increase when performing well. Levin
(2003)’s solution to this problem is to introduce the possibility of the relationship
terminating with the likelihood of termination varying with the report, m, that the
principal sends to the agent. Since b(qH ) must be greater than b(qL ) to incentivize the
agent, the principal can remain indifferent between the two performance outcomes if
the likelihood of termination increases when the principal reports that performance
was low. Although the principal pays the agent a larger bonus for good performance
outcomes, her future expected payoff is equal across the two reports since her expected
gain from future interactions is smaller when reporting that performance was poor
due to the increased likelihood of termination. Therefore, equating the principal’s
payoff across the two outcomes requires that the termination condition is included
in the offer. As noted below, however, guaranteeing equality also depends upon the
specific value of the payments p, b(qL ), and b(qH ) specified in the contract.
To characterize the set of optimal contracts under the private performance signal,
the expected payoffs must account for the probability of the relationship terminating
since the condition must be included in the offer to satisfy truth telling. These payoffs,
described in terms of their average present-discounted values, for the principal and
agent respectively are defined below:5
π̃eL = π̄ +

(1 − δ)(πeL − π̄)
1 − lδ

π̃eH = π̄ +

(1 − δ)(πeH − π̄)
1 − hδ

ũeL = ū +

(1 − δ)(ueL − ū)
1 − lδ

ũeH = ū +

(1 − δ)(ueH − ū)
1 − hδ

To ensure that the contract is efficient, all informal agreements are honored, and
the principal reports q truthfully, the following six constraints must be satisfied:
5

See the appendix for more details.
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˜ P ) makes it worthwhile to enter the
1. The principal’s participation constraint (P C
contract:

˜ P)
(P C

π̃eH ≥ π̄

˜ A ) makes it worthwhile to enter the
2. The agent’s participation constraint (P C
contract:

˜ A)
(P C

ũeH ≥ ū

˜ prevents the agent from
3. The agent’s incentive compatibility constraint (IC)
shirking:

hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL ) −c +
|
{z
}

expected discretionary payment
in current period with eH

δ
h(ũeH − ū)
|1 − δ {z
}

≥

expected, discounted net gain from future
interactions with eH given truthful feedback

lb(q ) + (1 − l)b(qL ) +
| H
{z
}

expected discretionary payment
in current period with eL

δ
l(ũeL − ū)
|1 − δ {z
}

˜
(IC)

expected, discounted net gain from future
interactions with eL given truthful feedback

4. The principal’s truth telling constraint (T˜T ) provides her with the incentive to
report feedback honestly:

δ
(π̃e − π̄)
(1 − δ) H
{z
}
|

expected, discounted net gain from
future interactions when reporting qH

−b(qH ) =

0
|{z}

−b(qL )

(T˜T )

expected, discounted net gain from
future interactions when reporting qL

5. Conditional on observing the high performance value, qH , the principal’s promise
˜ H ) ensures that she will honor the discretionary bonus,
keeping constraint (P K
b(qH ):
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Table 3.1.: Parameter values used in the experiment

Variable

Value

δ
0.8
π̄
30
ū
30
qL
30
qH
120
l
0.25
h
0.75
c
10
p {−250, · · · , 250}
b(qL ), b(qH ), B
{0, · · · , 250}

Description
discount factor (probability of continuation)
principal’s outside option
agent’s outside option
low performance value
high performance value
probability of qH given eL
probability of qH given eH
cost of eH
bounds on fixed payment
bounds on promised and actual bonuses

δ
(π̃e − π̄) ≥ b(qH )
(1 − δ) H

˜ H)
(P K

6. Conditional on observing the low performance value, qL , the principal’s promise
˜ L ) ensures that she will honor the discretionary bonus,
keeping constraint (P K
b(qL ):

0 ≥ b(qL )

˜ L)
(P K

To reiterate, (T˜T ) makes the principal indifferent between reporting m = “q = qL ”
and m = “q = qH ” since her expected payoff is equal across the two outcomes.
˜ L ) implies that b(qL ) = 0. If the principal knows the
Furthermore, note that (P K
relationship will terminate after the current period, she has no incentive to pay the
agent a performance bonus.

3.3

Experimental Design
Table 3.1 displays the parameters used in the experiment. Subjects participated

in one of two treatments with the agent’s performance value being either publicly
observed by both parties or privately observed by the principal. Experimental ses-
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sions consisted of multiple rounds of trading between subjects who were assigned to
be buyers (principals) or sellers (agents). At the start of a session, subjects were
randomly assigned ID numbers and a role (buyer or seller), which remained fixed
throughout the session. Subjects interacted via computers and remained anonymous.
Each subject participated in only one session.
The stage-game interaction for each treatment follows the theoretical stage-game
described earlier. At the beginning of each round, the buyer could make an offer, if
she desired, to her randomly matched seller. Only the ID of one’s trading partner
was revealed to each subject. The terms of the offer were endogenously specified (in
integers) by the principal within the provided bounds listed in the parameter table.
An offer consisted of a four components: p, b(q), a requested effort level, and the
optional termination condition. To specify whether or not to include the optional
termination condition, buyers simply had to click a “yes” or “no” button on the
offer screen. If the seller received an offer, he then decided to accept or reject it. If
accepted, the seller privately made his effort choice, framed as numbers with eL = 0
and eH = 1. After this, the value of q was observed by the party/parties that could
observe it. In both treatments, the principal then decided the actual bonus B to
pay to the agent. Additionally, if the signal was private, the principal decided the
performance feedback (m = “q = qL ” or m = “q = qH ”) to send to the agent. If no
contract was entered, both parties received their outside options for that round.
At the end of each round, the screen displayed the subject’s earnings (in points)
for that round along with any choices that the subject made or observed. Points were
converted into cash at the end of the experiment.
Each unique principal-agent pairing lasted for an indefinite number of rounds
with δ serving as the probability of the pair being rematched at the start of the next
period. This method is common for implementing laboratory infinitely repeatedgame experiments ([Roth and Murnighan (1978), Dal Bó (2005)]).6 Therefore, once a
6

Note that this concept is not related to the endogenous termination condition outlined earlier.
Here, δ describes the likelihood of paired subjects being exogenously rematched together in the next
period.
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round was completed, subjects faced an 80% (δ = 0.8) probability of being rematched
with the same partner in the next round. This was conveyed to the subjects with a
randomly drawn integer between 1 and 10 displayed on their screens. If a 9 or 10 was
drawn, subjects were exogenously matched with a different trading partner. Subjects
could not, however, encounter an old trading partner in the rematching process. That
is, a perfect strangers matching protocol for supergames was used. Note that if a pair
had the endogenous termination clause in the contract in the previous period and the
clause was triggered, then the pair could not engage in trade in future periods when
rematched together.
With the exception of a pilot study for the private signal treatment, subjects were
informed that the session would end according to one of the following rules: 1) if
subjects encountered all unique trading partners, or 2) if the subjects had played
at least 18 periods across all supergames, then the session would end once the current supergame randomly ended. To keep the number of rounds and the length of
each interaction consistent across sessions, the random numbers were predetermined.
Subjects were made aware of this decision before the experiment started and could
verify that the random draws were consistent with the numbers displayed on their
screen by opening a sealed envelope at the end of the experiment. Excluding the
pilot, random rematchings occurred three times after rounds 3, 11, and 16, resulting
in four supergames with unique trading partners.7
Sessions were conducted during Spring 2014 at Purdue University’s Vernon Smith
Experimental Economics Laboratory (VSEEL). Subjects were recruited from the
VSEEL ORSEE database, which consisted of mostly undergraduate students that
had participated in other experiments but not the specific treatments used in this
study. Each session lasted roughly 2 hours consisting of instruction, a quiz, 2 practice
periods, and 19 paid periods of trading. zTree was used to conduct the experiment
7

The only revision to the pilot study was to extend the number of experimental rounds. Therefore,
subjects in the pilot study were informed that the experiment would end if 1) subjects had encountered all unique trading partners (as before) or 2) the subjects had played at least 15 periods across
all supergames. The pilot therefore ended after round 16 with three supergames completed. No
other revisions were made to the experimental design, instructions, or zTree program.
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(Fischbacher (2007)). Seven sessions of the public performance signal treatment were
conducted with a total of 64 subjects. Nine sessions of the private performance signal
treatment were conducted with a total of 80 subjects. Average earnings were equal
to $25.76 and $27.25 for the public and private signal treatments respectively.

3.4

Comparative Statics
This section summarizes the comparative static predictions about the effects of

making the performance signal private within the contractual relationship. I use
numerical methods with the parameter values found in table 3.1 to derive the comparative statics.
Prediction 1: The set of optimal contracts is large under the public performance
signal while the set is empty under the private performance signal. Therefore, the
model predicts that relational contracting should be much more successful when both
parties observe the performance signal.
Figure 3.1 provides a graphical summary of the relationship between p, b(qL ), and
b(qH ) for offers that satisfy the four constraints—(P CP ), (P CA ), (IC) and (P K)—in
the public signal treatment. 32,453 contract offers satisfy all of the constraints in
this treatment. Furthermore, the principal can design a wide range of incentives that
maximize her expected per-period payoff. Table 3.2 presents summary statistics for
the 1,081 feasible contract offers that equate the agent’s expected per-period payoff
to his outside option, ū = 30. Therefore, the principal expects to earn seH − ū = 57.5
when maximizing her per-period earnings.8 In contrast, no contract offer satisfies all
six constraints when the principal privately observes the performance signal. The
truth telling constraint (T˜T ) must be satisfied with equality making it difficult to
ensure truthful feedback for both values of q as p, b(qL ), and b(qH ) are restricted to
8

This result assumes that parties are self-interested. Previous contracting experiments, however,
illustrate that more equitable distributions of the joint surplus are fairly common. The 32,453
feasible contracts contain many different distributions of the joint surplus including outcomes where
the principal is held to her outside option π̄. Relational contracting, therefore, can be supported
under many different surplus distributions.
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The figures summarize the set of contracts for the public performance signal treatment that satisfy
the 4 necessary constraints: (P CP ), (P CA ), (IC), and (P K). Under the parameter values, 32,453
contract offers satisfy all of these constraints. Elements on the main diagonal are histograms (with
frequencies on the y-axis unreported) while off diagonal elements illustrate the relationship between
p, b(qL ), and b(qH ).

Fig. 3.1.: Set of optimal contracts for the public signal treatment

Table 3.2.: Summary statistics for contracts that maximize the principal’s expected
payoff under the public signal
Average Median Min Max
fixed payment, p

-27.25

-30

-65

25

low performance bonus, b(qL )

30.49

27

0

90

high performance bonus, b(qH )

79.51

83

20

110

Under the public signal, 1,081 feasible contract offers maximize the principal’s payoff by holding the
agent’s expected payoff to the value of his outside option ū = 30.

be integers. As a result, the model predicts that all of the self-enforcing agreements
cannot be simultaneously satisfied under the private signal, thereby hindering the
success of the relational contract.
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Prediction 2: Due to the lack of optimal contracts, the model predicts that the
private performance signal should result in efficiency losses.
Efficiency losses could occur through reduced trading volume such as the agent
being less willing to accept contract offers or the contractual relationship breaking
down over time due to violations of the informal agreements. Losses could also result
from reduced effort provision.

3.5

Across Treatment Results
Table 3.3 provides a general overview of across treatment comparisons. The p-

value for a two sided Mann-Whitney test, using individual session averages as the
unit of observation, is also reported.
In terms of efficiency, contract acceptance rates are very close across treatments
at 58% and 57%. Furthermore, for completed trades the proportion of high effort
choices is not significantly different across treatments. When the performance signal
is public, agents chose eH 71% of the time, which is slightly larger than the 64%
observed when the performance signal is private. Due to the lack of across treatment
differences, changes in efficiency via trading volume or effort provision are minor.9
In relation to the theoretical framework, the theory predicts that the termination
condition is only needed when performance is privately observed in order to induce
the principal to provide truthful feedback. The data, however, illustrates that the
termination condition is only used in roughly one-third of all contract offers when the
signal is private.10 Furthermore, the percentage of contracts using the condition does
9

These results also hold true for linear probability models with multi-level random effects (at the
session-principal-agent levels). To conserve space, I did not report these results. For contract
acceptance, the dependent variable equals “1” if the agent accepted the offer and for effort provision,
the dependent variable equals “1” if the agent chose eH for the completed trade. With controls, the
estimate on the private signal treatment dummy was -0.012 with a robust standard error clustered
at the session level of 0.059 (p=0.832) for contract acceptance. With controls, the estimate on the
private signal treatment dummy was -0.031 with a robust standard error clustered at the session
level of 0.095 (p=0.749) for effort provision.
10
One caveat, however, is that principals may not be including the condition because truth telling
can not be guaranteed simultaneously for both qL and qH realizations. Another possible explanation
for the infrequent use of the termination condition is that principals may be aggregating performance
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not significantly differ across treatments with 26% of offers containing the condition
under the public signal.
Finally, one might conjecture that principals may be more likely to renege on
promised bonus payments when the agent cannot observe the performance value,
especially due to the lack of theoretical incentives to report q truthfully. Contingent
on the observed value of q, however, the proportion of trades where the actual bonus
paid is at least as large as the bonus initially promised in the contract offer does not
significantly vary across treatments. Principals honor their promised bonus, b(q), 53%
of the time with a public signal and 52% of the time with a private signal. Therefore,
principals in general uphold their promises at remarkably similar rates.

3.5.1

Contract Structure

Although the previously discussed treatment differences are insignificant, the environments differ in terms of the types of compensation that the principal offers to
pay to the agent. More specifically, when the performance signal becomes private,
principals tend to lower the guaranteed, upfront payment p but increase the promised,
discretionary bonus for high performance b(qH ). For completed trades, the average
value of p under a private signal is 18.1 experimental points which is significantly
lower (p = 0.01) than the average value of 31.7 points under the public signal. In
contrast, the average value of b(qH ) for completed trades increases by 11 points when
moving from the public to the private signal and this difference is marginally significant (p = 0.10). These findings suggest that principals become more reluctant
to offer agents payment guarantees under the private signal, thereby increasing their
discretion.
evaluations across periods and, therefore, are unwilling to invoke the termination condition until the
agent has performed poorly after several rounds of interaction (see Levin (2003) and Fuchs (2007)).
The data, however, suggests that this is not occurring as there is no clear relationship between the
agent’s past performance and the principal’s use of the termination condition. For instance, the
correlation between the average value of q in the previous periods and the use of the termination
condition in the current period is -0.08 for the offers made in the private signal treatment.
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Table 3.3.: Across treatment comparison of contract properties
All Offers
Public
Signal
Fraction offers accepted
.58
Fraction offers with termination condition
.26
Fraction of accepted offers with termination condition
.24

Average price (p) offered
Average low bonus (b(qL )) offered
Average high bonus (b(qH )) offered

21.6
17.6
48.4

Private
Signal
.57
.34
.31

Mann-Whitney
p-value
.71
.31
.53

8.9
26.0
65.3

.03
.96
.12

Completed Trades

Fraction high effort (eH ) choices

Public
Signal
.71

Private Mann-Whitney
Signal
p-value
.64
.83

Fraction of promised bonuses honored
Fraction honored when q = qL
Fraction honored when q = qH
Fraction honored if termination condition included

.53
.48
.57
.35

.52
.54
.51
.38

.92
.96
.96
.75

Average price (p)

31.7

18.1

.01

Average low bonus (b(qL )) offered
Average bonus paid when q = qL

14.7
2.2

16.9
3.3

.64
.15

Average high bonus (b(qH )) offered
43.3
54.3
.10
Average bonus paid when q = qH
25.3
29.0
.37
Two sided Mann-Whitney p-values reported. Session averages used (7 sessions for public signal
treatment, 9 sessions for private signal treatment).
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To study how the principal’s degree of discretion changes across the two environments, I follow a similar approach used in the first chapter by defining the discretionary payment ratio (DPR) which falls in the interval [0, 1]:

DP R =





max{b(qL ),b(qH )}
,
max{b(qL ),b(qH )}+p


1

if p > 0
if p ≤ 0

Contingent on the largest promised bonus stated in the contract offer, the DPR
denotes the fraction of total pay promised to the agent that is discretionary rather
than guaranteed upfront. When DPR equals 1, this implies that p ≤ 0 so that all of
the agent’s pay is discretionary. Likewise, when DPR equals 0, the agent receives all
of his compensation upfront through the fixed payment (i.e. a gift exchange contract).
Therefore, larger values of DPR indicate that the principal has more discretion.
Figure 3.2 presents the distribution of the values of DPR for completed trades
within each treatment. The average value when the signal is public is 0.54, which is
lower than the value of .68 when the signal is private. Furthermore, the distribution is
clearly skewed left under the private signal, indicating that the treatment favors higher
values of DPR, while the distribution is relatively more symmetrically distributed
under the public signal. To test for significant differences across treatments, table 3.4
presents the results of both a multi-level random effects regression (at the sessionprincipal-agent levels) and a Tobit regression where the dependent variable equals
the value of the DPR for the completed trade. Furthermore, robust standard errors
are clustered at the session level. The coefficient on the private signal treatment
dummy, which takes a value of “1” if the principal privately observes the value of q, is
positive and significant for both specifications with estimates of 0.11 and 0.12.11 As a
result, the agent is exposed to more strategic uncertainty when he cannot observe his
11

If rounds 1-3 are excluded from the analysis, the treatment estimates become marginally insignificant with p=0.12 although the values of the estimates are similar. Furthermore, when analyzing all
contract offers, instead of completed trades only, the results are similar.
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Fig. 3.2.: Discretionary payment ratio (DPR) histograms for completed trades by
treatment

performance signal since a relatively larger of proportion of his promised compensation
comes from the discretionary bonus.
Main Result 1: The discretionary payment ratio (DPR) significantly increases
when the principal privately observes the performance signal. Principals therefore
restructure contracts which increase their discretion, thereby exposing agents to more
strategic uncertainty.

3.5.2

Payoffs and Surplus for Completed Trades

Knowing that principals increase their discretion in the private signal treatment, I
now explore how efficiency and the earnings distribution change across treatments for
completed trades. Figure 3.3 displays the average per-period earnings for principals
and agents. Their average joint earnings, which is simply the sum of the two parties’
payoffs, are also displayed. For all rounds, the principal’s average payoff is roughly
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Table 3.4.: Discretionary payment ratio (DPR) regressions for completed trades

(1)
0.110∗∗
(0.0514)

Tobit Estimates
(2)
0.122∗
(0.0650)

-0.0559
(0.0397)

-0.0452
(0.0513)

Length of relationship

-0.00105
(0.00446)

0.00343
(0.00667)

Constant

0.579∗∗∗
(0.0314)
592

0.563∗∗∗
(0.0473)
592

Private signal dummy
1
Period

Observations
∗

∗∗

p < 0.10, p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regression (1) estimated using multi-level random effects (at the
session-principal-agent levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Regression
(2) is a Tobit regression with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Private signal
dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the treatment where the principal privately
observed q. Length of relationship indicates the number of periods in which the pair of subjects have
interacted with each other.

80

(a) All rounds

(b) Last 10 rounds only

The earnings are expressed in experimental points. 95% confidence intervals for the mean are also
depicted. For all rounds, the number of observations are 268 and 324 for the public and private
signal treatments respectively. For the last 10 rounds, the number of observations are 137 and 159
for the public and private signal treatments respectively.

Fig. 3.3.: Average per-period earnings for completed trades

17 points higher when the signal is private. In contrast, the agent’s average payoff
is roughly 8 points lower under the private signal. These two findings suggest two
things when the signal becomes private: 1) principals capture a larger share of the
joint earnings and 2) joint earnings increase by about 9 points on average per-period.
When excluding the analysis to the last 10 rounds of play, the results are somewhat
similar although the surplus distribution tends to be less extreme. Now, under the
private signal the principal’s average earnings increase by about 9 points while the
agent’s average earnings decrease by only 1.75 points.
As established earlier, the frequency in which agents choose eH is not significantly
different across treatments. In fact, the percentage of high effort choices is 7% higher
under the public signal. This implies that the increase in average joint earnings for
completed trades under the private signal must be driven by the noisy mapping between the agent’s effort choice e and his performance realization q. Indeed, when
the signal is public, eL results in qH 16% of the time while eH results in qH 71% of
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the time. For the private signal, qH is the result 32% and 83% of the time for eL
and eH respectively. Therefore, the agents experience a disproportional amount of
“good luck” in the private signal treatment, thereby increasing average joint earnings.12 Efficiency gains are therefore driven by exogenous factors to the contracting
relationship.
Table 3.5 presents the results of multi-level random effects regressions (at the
session and principal levels) in order to test for significant differences in per-period
earnings across treatments.13 In order to control for extreme observations that occurred in early rounds of the experiment, rounds 1 through 3 are excluded from
the analysis. The dependent variables analyzed are the earnings of the principal,
the agent, and their joint earnings. The estimates on the private signal treatment
dummy are positive and significant for both principal payoffs and joint payoffs with
estimates of 12.17 and 8.58 respectively. In contrast, the estimate for agent payoffs
is slightly negative and insignificant. Therefore, the “good luck” driving the increase
in efficiency across treatments benefits the principal but has no significant effect on
the agent’s payoff.
Main Result 2: For completed trades, the principal’s earnings significantly increase
when the performance signal is private. The agent’s earnings, however, are not significantly different across treatments. Therefore, principals act more advantageously
by capturing a larger share of the joint earnings under the private signal.
Although the agent’s payoff, in the aggregate, does not significantly differ across
treatments, are there certain situations that lead to significant differences in the
agent’s welfare? To explore this issue further, figure 3.4 displays the agent’s average earnings across treatments for relevant subsets of the data. Only completed
trades after round 3 are considered in the calculations. Interestingly, the agent’s
12

When aggregating the data across treatments, the mapping between e and q is much more in line
with the expected values. For eL , qH results 25.3% of the time and for eH , qH results 77.4% of the
time.
13
I encountered computation issues when attempting to include both principal and agent random
effects. The results, however, are robust when including agent random effects instead of principal
random effects.
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Table 3.5.: Regression estimates of the impact of the private signal on per-period
payoffs and surplus for completed trades (rounds 4-19)
(1)
Principal Payoffs
Private signal
12.17∗∗∗
dummy
(3.938)

∗∗

(3)
Joint
8.581∗∗
(3.885)

1
Period

-17.95
(25.92)

-6.933
(20.36)

-30.26
(25.94)

Constant

39.25∗∗∗
(4.485)
483

36.58∗∗∗
(2.414)
483

78.12∗∗∗
(4.489)
483

Observations
∗

(2)
Agent Payoffs
-3.247
(2.669)

p < 0.10,
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions estimated using multi-level random effects (at the
session and principal levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Observations
from periods 1-3 excluded as they alter the significance of the private signal dummy on the agent’s
payoff. Private signal dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the treatment where
the principal privately observed q.
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promised expected earnings, which are calculated under the assumption that all informal agreements specified in the contract are upheld, are similar across treatments.
That is, assuming that 1) the agent picks the principal’s requested effort level and 2)
the principal honors the corresponding promised bonus for the observed value of q,
agents expect to earn similar amounts across treatments. Principals, however, have
increased discretion in the private signal treatment due to lower upfront payments.
They can also send false performance feedback to the agents. This suggests that
agents may be worse off when the principal under reports performance when q = qH
and reneges on b(qH ).
Figure 3.4 also displays the agent’s actual payoff, on average, across high and low
realizations of q. For the private signal treatment, the data is separated based on
whether the principal provided truthful or false feedback about the realized value
of q. Independent of the feedback provided for qL realizations, average payoffs are
fairly close to one another across treatments. The qH realizations, however, depict a
different story. In the private signal treatment, agents on average earn 2.3 points more
when the principal provides truthful feedback. In contrast, if the principal reports
that q = qL the agent’s average payoff drops by roughly 23 points. This finding
suggests that the agent’s welfare is reduced whenever the principal under reports the
good performance signal. Table 3.6 confirms these findings using multi-level random
effects regressions (at the session and principal levels) where the dependent variable
equals the agent’s payoff for the different scenarios described above. All estimates on
the private signal dummy are insignificant except for the case where qH realizations in
the public signal treatment are compared to the subset of qH realizations in the private
signal treatment where the principal falsely reported that q = qL . The estimate
predicts a significant decrease in the agent’s payoff by roughly 16 points.
This significant payoff reduction for the agent implies that principals more frequently shirk on the promised bonus for high performance, b(qH ), when they under
report the performance signal. An easy way to analyze the extent to which principals
shirk on b(qH ) is to look at the fraction of the promised bonus paid to the agent,

B
,
b(qH )
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95% confidence intervals for the mean reported. The numbers at the base each bar chart reflect
the number of observations for that category. Promised expected earnings calculated under the
assumption that the agent picks the principal’s requested effort level and that the agent pays the
promised bonus for the realized value of q.

Fig. 3.4.: Average agent earnings comparisons for completed trades (rounds 4-19)

Table 3.6.: Regression estimates of the impact of the private signal on agent payoffs
across scenarios (rounds 4-19)
(1)
Expected Promised
Payoff
Private Signal:
Private signal
dummy

(3)
(4)
(5)
Actual Payoff
qL realized
qH realized
true report qL reported true report qH reported
4.529
-15.98∗∗∗
-6.684
-4.909
(5.392)
(5.562)
(4.569)
(12.80)

1
Period

28.03
(26.37)

15.11
(14.40)

33.45∗∗
(16.03)

-5.963
(20.90)

-51.60
(61.86)

Constant

57.43∗∗∗
(8.496)
483

37.72∗∗∗
(3.640)
254

35.08∗∗∗
(3.414)
177

29.99∗∗∗
(4.133)
166

35.34∗∗∗
(8.057)
106

Observations
∗

-4.008
(8.974)

(2)

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions estimated using multi-level random effects (at the
session and principal levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Private signal
dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the treatment where the principal privately
observed q.
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Fig. 3.5.: Fraction of promised bonus paid ( b(qBH ) ) across treatments for qH realizations
(rounds 4-19)

where B represents the actual bonus paid. Figure 3.5 graphs distributions of

B
b(qH )

for

qH realizations where b(qH ) > 0 so that the principal has an option to shirk on her
promise. Under the public signal or the private signal with truthful feedback, principals tend to honor their promises. The median fraction for both cases is 1, indicating
that principals honor b(qH ) a majority of the time. In contrast, principals shirk on
all promises when they under report the private signal and the median observation
pays 12% of b(qH ).14
Main Result 3: For completed trades, the agent’s earnings are significantly reduced
under the private signal in situations where the agent performs well (i.e. qH realized)
14

Given these findings, the regression results concerning the across treatment impact on the agent’s
welfare in table 3.6 are similar when dividing the data based on whether or not the principal honored
the promised bonus instead of dividing it based on the principal’s feedback.
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but the principal falsely reports that performance was poor. In such cases, principals
shirk on their promised bonus for good performance.

3.6

Feedback in the Private Signal Treatment
Given these across treatment results, I now explore one potential explanation for

why contracting remains just as successful in the private signal treatment despite
the lack of contracts that theoretically support relational contracting. Within the
treatment of interest, principals tend to provide honest performance feedback, which
implies that the truth telling constraint (T˜T ) may not be necessary to facilitate
contractual relationships. Figure 3.6 presents the fraction of truthful performance
reports separately for qH and qL realizations. Overall, principals report q truthfully
76.5% of the time. This percentage is slightly higher for qL realizations at 83%
compared to 73% of qH realizations.
Furthermore, contingent upon the observed value of q, the truth telling incentives
found in the model fail to elicit sizable increases in truthful performance feedback.
To see this, (T˜T ) can be relaxed so that the principal has the incentive to either
report that performance was high or that performance was low. Regardless of the
true value of the performance signal, the model predicts that the principal will report
m = “q = qH ” if

δ
(π̃eH
(1−δ)

− π̄) − b(qH ) > −b(qL ) and the termination condition is

included in the contract. Similarly, when the inequality is reversed the model predicts
that the principal will report m = “q = qL ”.
As illustrated in figure 3.6, however, subjects tend to report q truthfully even when
the relaxed (T˜T ) is violated. When truth telling is predicted for high performance
outcomes, the percentage of truthful reports is 82%. If the termination condition
is included in the offer but the relaxed truth telling constraint predicts that qL will
be reported, however, the percentage of qH reports is similar at 83%. Finally, when
the termination condition is not included in the offer, the fraction of truthful reports
falls to 69%. Therefore, satisfying the termination condition alone results in a small
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The numbers at the base of each bar chart reflect the number of observations for that category.
Truth telling is satisfied if: 1) the optional termination condition is included in the contract and
2) contingent upon the true value of q, the relaxed truth telling constraint is satisfied. For qH
δ
realizations the relaxed constraint is (1−δ)
(π̃eH − π̄) − b(qH ) ≥ −b(qL ). For qL realizations the
δ
relaxed constraint is (1−δ) (π̃eH − π̄) − b(qH ) ≤ −b(qL ).

Fig. 3.6.: Proportion of truthful performance reports by performance level

increase in truthful feedback for high performance realizations independent of whether
or not the relaxed (T˜T ) constraint is satisfied. For low performance outcomes, there
is a negligible difference in the fraction of truthful reports across all subsets of the
data. Principals tend to report qL truthfully regardless of whether the termination
condition is included in the offer and/or the relaxed (T˜T ) is satisfied. Therefore,
the general preference for truth-telling does not seem to be driven by the theoretical
framework.
Now I look the reporting behavior of individual principals to see if the data supports any general trends in truth telling. I exclude six principals who completed less
than five trades from the analysis leaving 34 principals. In terms of the performance
feedback given the principals can be classified into 5 groups, which are summarized in
table 3.7. 18% of subjects always report q truthfully. The largest group of subjects,
at 38%, always report qL truthfully but sometimes under report qH . In contrast,
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Table 3.7.: Description and distribution of performance feedback classifications
Description
(1) always report q truthfully

# subjects
6

%
18%

(2) always report qL truthfully but sometimes under report qH

13

38%

(3) always report qH truthfully but sometimes over report qL

6

18%

(4) misreport both qL and qH but mostly truthful

5

15%

(5) usually misreport q

4

11%

18% of subjects always report qH truthfully, but sometimes overstate qL realizations.
Finally, there is a subset of participants that misreport both qL and qH realizations.
Given these classifications, do these groups of principals renege on promised
bonuses at different rates, thereby alluding to certain types of strategic behavior?
Figure 3.7 summarizes this information for each principal type described in table 3.7.
For qH realizations 4 out of the 5 types report high performance truthfully more than
60% of the time. Furthermore, figure 3.5 illustrates that when principals under report
performance, they shirk on b(qH ) at much higher frequencies. Since principals tend to
report qH honestly, however, no noticeable pattern in terms of the principal’s propensity to honor b(qH ) appears across subject types. Similarly, most principal types tend
to report qL truthfully and there are no noticeable trends between the rate at which
types report qL honestly and the rate at which they honor b(qL ).
Furthermore, previous studies have found that subjects can be averse to lying,
which may explain why the truth telling incentives of the model are unnecessary
for performance feedback to be accurate.15 For instance, Gneezy (2005) compares
preferences over two types of monetary allocations between two players. Only player
one, however, observed the true value of the allocations before one was chosen. The
first allocation (i.e. generous) gave player two a relatively larger payoff while the
15

Besides Gneezy (2005), see Hurkens and Kartik (2009), Sánchez-Pagés and Vorsatz (2009), and
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013).
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Principal types correspond to the descriptions found in table 3.7.

Fig. 3.7.: Frequency of truthful reporting and honoring bonuses by the principal’s
performance feedback classification
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other allocation (i.e. selfish) gave player one a relatively larger payoff. In the control
treatment, player one simply picked between the two allocations. In the second, player
one had to send a message to player two who then chose the allocation. Enticing
player two to pick the selfish allocation, however, required the sender to lie and
falsely claim that it would increase player two’s payoff. Gneezy (2005) finds that
a significantly higher proportion of subjects choose the selfish option in the control
treatment compared to sending the deceptive message, thereby providing evidence of
lying aversion. Furthermore, Hurkens and Kartik (2009) analyze the data in more
detail and find that it supports an outcome where 50% of subjects never lie while the
other half lie whenever they prefer the outcome from lying over the one from telling
the truth.
In comparison to Hurkens and Kartik (2009)’s finding, this data supports a less obvious preference for truth telling or lying. Only one-fifth of the subjects always report
q honestly and these subjects do not uniformly honor the promised bonus. Furthermore, subjects do not necessarily lie when doing so provides them an opportunity to
increase their immediate payoff. For instance, subjects become less transparent when
reneging on b(qH ) by under reporting qH but paying b(qL ). The data, however, suggests that principals in general tend to provide honest performance feedback, which
may be explained by lying aversion. This, however, is not the only potential explanation. Subjects may not misreport q in every period if they believe that doing so will
hinder successful contracting in future periods. Therefore, other motivations such as
reputational effects may also support truth telling.

3.7

Conclusion
This paper has studied the implications of making the agent’s performance mea-

sure disputable within a relational contracting environment. In terms of efficiency,
across treatment changes in contract acceptance and the agent’s effort provision are
minor. Therefore, pairwise efficiency is unaffected as a result of the subjects’ actions.
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Pairwise earnings for completed trades, however, are significantly higher when the
principal privately observes the performance signal due to the noisy mapping between the agent’s effort choice and his performance value. Agents in that treatment
realize a relatively higher amount of good performance signals, resulting in a larger
surplus to be split between the principal and the agent. The larger surplus, however,
benefits the principal only as the agent’s earnings for completed trades are not significantly different across treatments while the principal’s earnings significantly increase
under the private signal.
Furthermore, principals restructure contractual payments across treatments by increasing their discretionary latitude when the performance signal is private, thereby
shifting more strategic uncertainty onto the agents. The agent’s welfare, however is
only significantly reduced across treatments when he performs well and the principal
understates the performance value. Sending an inaccurate performance report, however, only happens in roughly one-quarter of the trades. In general, principals tend
to provide honest performance feedback to the agents, which cannot be explained by
the predicted truth telling incentives outlined in the theoretical framework.
The results of this experiment suggest that subjective relationships are no worse
off under relational contracting as relationships where the agent’s performance is objective or easy to measure. Furthermore, the agent’s welfare may not be significantly
reduced in environments where the principal has access to important private information related to the agent’s performance level. The experimental design, however,
was not able to identify the specific reasons as to why principals generally report
performance feedback honestly. Future work must investigate the underlying factors
that promote truth telling within the relational contracting framework.
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Appendix: Deriving Payoffs under the Private Performance Signal
To characterize the set of optimal contracts, the expected payoffs, which depend
on e, the payments p and b(q), and the principal’s message m, must be derived under
the private performance signal. In a more general contract the principal specifies
a probability that the relationship terminates, 1 − α{m(q)}, contingent upon the
message she sends to the agent. Denote αL as the probability of the relationship
continuing when the principal sends the message m = “q = qL ” while αH denotes the
probability of the relationship continuing with the message m = “q = qH ”.
Using this notation define the present-discounted payoffs, expressed as a perperiod average, for the principal as:
π̃ = (1 − δ)Eq [q − b(q) − c(e)|e] + δπ̄ + δEq [α{m(q)}|e](π̃ − π̄)
π̃eL = (1 − δ){lqH + (1 − l)qL − [p + lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL )]} + δπ̄ + δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ](π̃eL − π̄)
π̃eH = (1 − δ){hqH + (1 − h)qL − [p + hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL )]} + δπ̄ + δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ](π̃eH − π̄)

Solving the recursive payoffs gives:
(1 − δ){πeH − π̄}
(1 − δ){lqH + (1 − l)qL − [p + lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL )] − π̄}
= π̄ +
1 − δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ]
1 − δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ]
(1 − δ){πeH − π̄}
(1 − δ){hqH + (1 − h)qL − [p + hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL )] − π̄}
= π̄ +
= π̄ +
1 − δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ]
1 − δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ]

π̃eL = π̄ +
π̃eH

Similarly, for the agent define the payoffs as:
ũ = (1 − δ)Eq [p + b(q) − c(e)|e] + δ ū + δEq [α{m(q)}|e](ũ − ū)
ũeL = (1 − δ)[p + lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL )] + δ ū + δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ](ũeL − ū)
ũeH = (1 − δ)[p + hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL ) − c] + δ ū + δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ](ũeH − ū)

Solving the recursive payoffs gives:
(1 − δ)[ueL − ū]
(1 − δ)[p + lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL ) − ū]
= ū +
1 − δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ]
1 − δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ]
(1 − δ)[ueH − ū]
(1 − δ)[p + hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL ) − c − ū]
= ū +
= ū +
1 − δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ]
1 − δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ]

ũeL = ū +
ũeH
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Adding the principal and agent’s payoffs give the corresponding formulas for surplus:
s̃ = (1 − δ)Eq [q − c(e)|e] + δs̄ + δEq [α{m(q)}|e](s̃ − π̄)
s̃eL = (1 − δ){lqH + (1 − l)qL } + δs̄ + δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ](s̃eL − s̄)
s̃eH = (1 − δ){hqH + (1 − h)qL − c} + δs̄ + δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ]](s̃eH − s̄)

s̃eL and s̃eH are solved in a similar manner.

π̃eL = π̄ +

(1 − δ)(πeL − π̄)
1 − δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ]

π̃eH = π̄ +

(1 − δ)(πeH − π̄)
1 − δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ]

ũeL = ū +

(1 − δ)(ueL − ū)
1 − δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ]

ũeH = ū +

(1 − δ)(ueH − ū)
1 − δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ]

s̃eL = s̄ +

(1 − δ)(seL − s̄)
1 − δ[lαH + (1 − l)αL ]

s̃eH = s̄ +

(1 − δ)(seH − s̄)
1 − δ[hαH + (1 − h)αL ]

An optimal contract provides the incentive for the agent to choose eH . Furthermore, self-enforcement implies that the principal has the incentive to provide honest
performance feedback and to pay the corresponding performance bonus b(q). Therefore, the following six constraints must be satisfied:
1. The principal’s participation constraint makes it worthwhile to enter the contract:

π̃eH ≥ π̄

˜ P)
(P C

2. The agent’s participation constraint makes it worthwhile to enter the contract:

ũeH ≥ ū

˜ A)
(P C

3. The agent’s incentive compatibility constraint prevents the agent from shirking:
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δ
[hαH + (1 − h)αL ](ũeH − ū) ≥
1−δ
δ
lb(qH ) + (1 − l)b(qL ) +
[lαH + (1 − l)αL ](ũeL − ū)
1−δ

hb(qH ) + (1 − h)b(qL ) − c +

˜
(IC)

4. The principal’s truth telling constraint provides her with the incentive to report
feedback honestly:

δ
δ
αH (π̃eH − π̄) − b(qH ) =
αL (π̃eH − π̄) − b(qL )
(1 − δ)
(1 − δ)

(T˜T )

5. Conditional on observing the high performance value, qH , the principal’s promise
keeping constraint ensures that she will honor the discretionary bonus, b(qH ):

δ
αH (π̃eH − π̄) ≥ b(qH )
(1 − δ)

˜ H)
(P K

6. Conditional on observing the low performance value, qL , the principal’s promise
keeping constraint ensures that she will honor the discretionary bonus, b(qL ):

δ
αL (π̃eH − π̄) ≥ b(qL )
(1 − δ)

˜ L)
(P K
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Appendix: Instructions for the Private Performance Signal Treatment
You can earn money during this experiment, with the exact amount depending
on the decisions you make during the experiment. Your experimental income is
calculated in points, which will be converted into cash at the rate of: $1 = 30 points.
We will start you off with a balance of 150 points ($5).
All written information you received from us is for your private use
only. You are not allowed to pass over any information to other participants in the experiment. Talking during the experiment is not permitted.
Violations of these rules may force us to stop the experiment.
General Information
This experiment is about how people buy and sell goods for which quality matters.
Participants are divided into two groups: half will be buyers and the other half sellers.
Then a trading period will start in which a buyer and seller will trade one unit of
a good that can vary in quality. The price agreed upon between the buyer and
seller and the quality of the good traded will determine how much money each party
makes in that period. There will many trading periods throughout the course of this
experiment.
Who will you trade with? The computer will randomly match each participant
in the room with another participant to form a buyer-seller pairing. You will be
informed whether you are the buyer or seller in your pairing. You will trade with
your pair-member. You will not be informed of the actual identity of the other person
(and s/he will not be informed of your identity). All sellers and buyers are assigned a
numeric ID which is not associated with their real identity. You will also retain your
ID and role (e.g. buyer or seller) through the entire experiment.
For how many periods will you trade with the same person?

All

participants will remain matched with their pair-member for a random number of
periods. How is this determined? At the end of each period, the computer will
determine randomly whether the same pairings will continue for the next period or
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whether new pairings will be formed. In any given period, there is an 80% chance
that the same pairings will continue for the next period. In other words, there is an
80% chance that you will continue to trade with the same person in the next period.
To help you understand this, imagine the computer has been programmed to spin a
roulette wheel. If it lands on 1,2,3,4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 then you will continue to trade with
the same person the next period. But if it lands on 9 or 10 the current pairings are
immediately terminated. And then for the next period, the computer will randomly
match you with a different person in the room to form a new pairing. This process
will repeat for every new pairing. At the beginning of each period, you will be notified
on-screen whether the random matching process has kept you with the same person
or matched you with a new person.
When does the entire experiment end?

If one of two conditions holds:

(1) The experiment will end if all participants have already been matched with all
possible trading partners. This is because no participant will be matched with the
same person more than once during this experiment. For example, if there are 4
buyers and 4 sellers, then no buyer or seller will have more than 4 unique pairings.
After 4 unique pairings, the experiment ends. (2) Even if all unique pairings have not
been exhausted, the last pairing will occur once the experiment has lasted at least 18
periods. In other words, if you have traded at least 18 periods for the experiment,
then your current pairing is your last one. This does not mean the experiment stops
at 18 rounds exactly; it only means that when your last pairing randomly ends, you
will not be paired with a new partner.
To summarize, if you have had less than 4 different trading partners during the
experiment, and the experiment has not lasted at least 18 total periods, then when
your current match is randomly terminated, the computer will match you with a new
person and the experiment would continue. However, if the experiment has lasted
at least 18 total periods, then the experiment will end once your current pairing is
randomly terminated.
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Conducting Trades
Each trade occurs within a trading period and each trading period is divided into
three phases:
1. During the proposal phase, the buyer can make a proposal on the terms of trade
to the seller. The seller can either accept or reject the proposal.
2. If the seller accepts the proposal, then during the effort determination phase,
the seller privately chooses an effort level to supply.
3. After the seller makes an effort choice comes the quality realization & payment
determination phase. During this phase, the buyer privately observes the realized quality and then can make final adjustments in payment depending on the
initial terms of the proposal.
Specific details of each phase are given below:
1. The Proposal Phase
Each period starts with a proposal phase. A proposal allows the parties to agree
to the terms of trade by including a list of promises and obligations of both parties
(see below for details). The buyer can submit a single proposal during the proposal
phase. Once a proposal is submitted, the seller will decide to accept or reject the
proposal.
How does a buyer make a proposal? A proposal screen will appear that will
require the buyer to enter values for the following terms: price, two quality-contingent
bonuses, and a requested effort level. The buyer must also specify whether to include
an optional ending condition for the trading relationship. These four components are
described below:
• Price This allows the buyer to state the price s/he will pay for the good traded.
The buyer enters a price in the “Price” field. The price ranges from -250 to 250
(whole numbers).
Important: The price the buyer specifies will be binding. This is similar to
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an upfront payment or a legally binding obligation once the proposal is agreed
upon, the computer will ensure that the price is paid to the seller.
• Quality-contingent bonus Two possible quality levels for the good traded
can be observed by the buyer: 30 or 120. The quality level realized depends
partially on a decision made by the seller in the effort determination phase (see
below for explanation).
In the proposal, the buyer states that s/he will pay a bonus linked to each possible quality level. That is, a bonus level must be specified for two cases: when
the realized quality is 30 and when realized quality is 120.
To enter a bonus for the case when quality is 30, enter a number into the “Bonus
amount for quality 30” field to specify the size of the bonus (whole numbers
from 0 to 250).
Similarly, for the case when quality is 120, enter a number into the “Bonus
amount for quality 120” field to specify the size of the bonus (whole numbers
from 0 to 250).
Important: The stated bonuses are not binding. During the payment determination phase, to come later, the buyer can choose any bonus level s/he wishes.
Thus, the stated bonuses, one for each possible quality level, are discretionary.
Only the price is ensured to be paid to the seller.
The total offered payment to the seller is: price + quality-contingent bonus.
• Requested effort level In the next phase, sellers who accept an offer must
choose an effort level of either 0 or 1 to supply. The seller’s effort choice helps
determine whether the quality level will be 30 or 120 for that period. Buyers
must request an effort level that they want their seller to choose. To indicate
the requested effort level, click the corresponding button next to the question,
“What effort level do you request the seller to provide?”
Note:If the offer is accepted, the seller is not obligated to choose the effort level
requested by the buyer.
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• Optional ending condition The buyer may also decide to include an ending
condition for the trading relationship in the proposal. To include the condition,
the buyer clicks the “Yes” button next to the question, “Would you like to
include the condition that the relationship will end if you report a quality of
30?” If the buyer does not wish to include the ending condition, he/she clicks
the “No” button.
Note: If included and the offer is accepted by the seller, then the buyer and
seller will not trade in future rounds if the buyer reports that quality 30 was
realized in the current trading period (see phase #3 below). This does not mean
that the experiment will end if the condition is satisfied. It does, however, mean
that the two parties will not be able to make or accept offers in their pairing
until randomly rematched with a new trading partner.
After the buyer has specified these terms, s/he needs to click the “Commit Decision”
button to submit it. Then comes the effort determination phase.
2. Effort Determination Phase
Following the proposal phase, sellers can accept or decline the buyer’s proposal.
Sellers who accept the agreement will choose between the two possible effort levels:
0 or 1. The seller clicks the button (0 or 1) corresponding to his or her effort choice.
Important: Only the seller observes his/her effort choice. The buyer does not
observe effort but can make inferences about the chosen effort based on the quality
realized in that period.
3. Quality Realization and Payment Determination Phase
During this phase, the realized quality level is privately observed by the buyer.
Then, the buyer provides feedback to the seller concerning the quality level. The
buyer does this by choosing to send one of two possible messages: “Quality was 30”
or “Quality was 120”. The buyer will click the button next to the corresponding
message he/she wishes to send to the seller.
Note: The message that the buyer decides to send may or may not reflect the realized
quality level (i.e. the buyer is not required to report the actual quality he observes).
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After choosing the message to send, the buyer must also decide the actual bonus to
be paid to the seller. The buyer will enter his/her bonus choice in the bonus payment
field.

Nothing restricts the buyer from choosing a bonus level that is different from

the bonus that was specified in the proposal. The actual bonus can range from 0 to
250 (whole numbers) at the buyer’s discretion.
Finally, buyers will also be asked to make a guess about the seller’s effort choice
in that period. Click the button corresponding to your guess (0 or 1).
Viewing Messages: The seller then observes the message and actual bonus payment sent from the buyer. Sellers will also be asked to make a guess about the realized
quality level that they believe the buyer actually observed in that period. Click the
button corresponding to your guess (“Realized quality was 30” or “Realized quality
was 120”).
Note: If the proposal included the optional ending condition and the message
“Quality was 30” was sent to the seller from the buyer, then the buyer and seller will
not trade after the current period. That is, if the ending condition is satisfied, offers
cannot be made or accepted in the pairing until the buyer and seller are randomly
rematched with a new trading partner.
At the end of each period, the buyer and seller will be shown a summary screen.
The following information is displayed on this screen:
• the points that you individually earned (or lost) in this period.
Note: Your points are private. Your partner cannot observe your earnings. Furthermore, note that buyers and sellers can incur losses in each period. These losses
are subtracted from your points balance.
If an agreement was formed, the following information will also be displayed:
• the Price the buyer offered.
• the Proposed Bonuses (for the two possible quality levels)
• the Actual bonus granted
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Please enter all the information on the screen in the documentation sheet supplied
to you. This will help you keep track of your performance across periods so that you
can learn from your past results.
At the beginning of the next period, the computer will inform you if
you have been randomly matched with the same trading partner or with
a different partner.
How do Buyers Make Money?
• If the buyer does not make an offer or the seller rejects the offer, the
buyer will receive 30 points for that period. If the trading relationship has
ended as a result of the ending condition, the buyer will receive 30 points in
each subsequent period until randomly rematched with a new seller.
• If the buyer’s offer is accepted, the buyer’s points for the period depend on the
realized quality, the price, and the actual bonus paid. That is,

Buyer Points = Realized Quality - Price - Actual Bonus
• As you can see, the higher the realized quality, the more points the buyer earns.
At the same time, the lower total payments (price plus actual bonus), the more
points the buyer earns.
• In summary, higher quality and lower payments means more points for the
buyer.
How is realized quality determined? The realized quality depends, in part,
on the seller’s effort choice. The table below summarizes the likelihood of observing
quality levels 30 or 120 given the seller’s effort choice:
After the seller makes his/her effort choice, the actual quality is randomly determined by the computer based on the above probabilities. That is, for either effort
choice, there is a chance observing a quality level of 30 or a quality level of 120. An
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Quality = 30

Quality = 120

Effort = 0

0.75

0.25

Effort = 1

0.25

0.75

effort choice of 1, however, increases the chance of observing a quality level of 120.
To help you understand this, imagine we randomly pick one ball from a bingo cage
containing 4 balls numbered 1 through 4. If the seller’s effort choice was “0” then
drawing the ball labeled 1 would result in the quality level of 120 while balls labeled
2, 3, or 4 result in a level of 30. If the seller’s effort choice was “1” instead, then
drawing balls labeled 1, 2, or 3 would result in a quality level of 120 while the ball
labeled 4 would result in a quality level of 30.
How do Sellers Make Money?
• If the seller rejects the proposal or the buyer does not make an offer,
the seller will receive 30 points for that period. If the trading relationship has
ended as a result of the ending condition, the seller will receive 30 points in
each subsequent period until randomly rematched with a new buyer.
• If the seller has accepted an offer, then the seller’s points depends on the price,
actual bonus, and effort costs s/he incurs. The points of a seller are determined
as follows:

Seller Points = Price + Actual Bonus - Effort Costs
How are effort costs calculated? Effort costs depend on the seller’s private
effort choice of 0 or 1. The table below summarizes the seller’s costs:
Effort:

0

Cost: 0

1
10
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An effort choice of “1” costs the seller 10 points while a choice of “0” costs the
seller no points.
• As you can see, the higher the actual payments, the more points a seller earns.
At the same time, the higher effort cost reduces points.
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4. HOW DOES THE PRINCIPAL STRUCTURE
PERFORMANCE PAY ACROSS AGENTS WITH
VERIFIABLE OUTPUT?: EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE
In this paper, I conduct an experiment exploring how the principal structures performance pay across two agents with independent yet verifiable production technologies. An agent’s output realization is a noisy function of his effort choice, which the
principal cannot observe. His output, however, is unaffected by the other agent’s
effort choice. Although the agents produce independently, the principal can structure an agent’s performance pay to depend on both output realizations. As a result,
the agent’s expected compensation may depend on how much effort the other agent
chooses to exert. Based on the relative magnitude of the performance bonuses specified in the contract, the principal endogenously creates cooperative, independent, or
competitive performance schemes. For instance, the principal may prefer to reward
the agents jointly by paying them the most when they both perform well. This contrasts with a relative performance mechanism where an agent is rewarded the most
when he performs well while the other agent performs poorly. One key question explored in this study is how the length of interaction alters the types of contracts that
principals prefer to design. In contrast to a one-shot environment, agents have the
ability to monitor each other’s effort choices across time in a repeated relationship,
which may affect both the types of evaluation schemes that principals implement and
the amount of rent left to the agents.
The importance of this research stems from recent trends in how companies organize and compensate their employees. First, organizing employees into teams of
workers has become more common. Lawler et al. (2001) surveyed Fortune 1000 companies about their workplace practices between 1987 and 1999. They found that the
percentage of firms with more than one-fifth of its employees working in teams rose
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from 37% in 1987 to 61% in 1999. A similar trend occurred in Great Britain where an
employment survey found that the fraction of respondents with employees working
in a team increased from 47% in 1992 to 59% in 2006 (Gallie et al. (2012)). Second,
more workplaces have linked employee pay to performance. Lawler and Mohrman
(2003) discuss updated survey results from Lawler et al. (2001) which includes new
data from 2002. Between 1987 and 2002, the percentage of Fortune 1000 companies
offering individual incentive plans to over three-fifths of its workforce rose from 5% to
33%. A similar statistic for group incentive schemes documented an increase from 5%
to 20% of firms. More recent evidence also highlights the frequent use of performance
incentives. A 2014 survey of 1,452 American firms notes that 58% of the respondents
used some form of individual performance pay, such as a performance bonus, while
26% used some form of group performance pay (Bruce (2014)).
The experimental design also addresses important aspects that have not been
explored within the experimental literatures on contract design and group incentive
systems. First, most experiments on contract design focus on bilateral relationships
between a single agent and principal. Those that do contain two or more agents
have mainly focused on fixed wage, or gift exchange, contracts. As a result, this experiment provides some insight into the effectiveness of performance-contingent pay
in contracting environments with multiple agents. Second, the experimental literature on team incentives has not allowed subjects, acting as principals, to design the
terms of compensation. The experimenter, instead, imposes the specific terms of compensation and compares the efficiency of different incentive systems in environments
where subjects only act as agents. The novelty of this experimental design is that,
via the contract offer, principals endogenously specify both the types of compensation schemes they prefer to use to motivate the agents and the manner in which the
group’s surplus is divided between the principal and the agents. Therefore, important
strategic considerations can now be accounted for when studying group incentives.
More specifically, the experiment documents whether principals 1) have a preference
for implementing certain types of group compensation schemes, 2) design optimal
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schemes in line with the equilibrium predictions, and 3) divide the surplus equitably
or disproportionately with the agents.
The main results of the experiment suggest that predictions under the standard
assumption of self-interest fail to explain the observed contracts for both treatments.
Theoretically, one-shot interactions provide the principal with flexibility in terms of
implementing contracts that are competitive, cooperative, or independent. Although
roughly three-quarters of contracts in equilibrium predict competition among the
agents, where an agent is paid more when outperforming his peer, over 80% of the
observed contract offers favor cooperation where an agent is rewarded the most when
both agents perform well. When the relationship is repeated, the equilibrium is unique
and takes an extreme form of cooperation where agents are only rewarded when they
both perform well. The data, however, suggest that principals tend to favor competition relatively more in the repeated environment. Now, only 50% of contracts foster
cooperation while 25% support competition. Therefore, counter to the comparative
static prediction, the proportion of cooperative compensation schemes declines in the
repeated environment. Analyzing the data more closely, however, the types of team
incentives that principals design across treatments are not significantly different although contract offers are significantly more variable in the repeated environment as
measured by absolute deviations from the treatment’s average contract offer. This
finding contrasts with the unique equilibrium in the repeated environment and the
wide range of feasible equilibria in one-shot interactions.
Furthermore, the theory predicts that agents can expect to be compensated less in
the repeated environment since agents can monitor each other’s effort choices across
time and, therefore, punish their partners when they shirk. Earnings for agents,
however, are not significantly different across treatments and tend to be higher than
required in equilibrium if all parties are self-interested. When aggregating data across
the two treatments, over 79% of the offers made give the agents larger expected
earnings while more than 97% of efficient trades give the agents higher expected
earnings. This result supports previous findings where payoff distributions are less
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extreme than predicted and, as a result, the agents earn some rent. Additionally, the
data from the repeated treatment suggests that agents, to some extent, engage in peer
monitoring. That is, agents are more likely to choose low effort after observing their
peer shirk in the previous period. Finally, I illustrate how Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s
theory of inequity aversion is a relatively better predictor of the efficient outcomes
for one-shot interactions compared to the standard assumption of self-interest. More
specifically, agents who are averse to earnings differences with the principal, but not
to differences with the other agent, can explain why contracts favor cooperation in
the static setting and why the payoff difference between the principal and the agents
is less extreme.

4.1

Related Literature

4.1.1

Theoretical

Economists have proposed several incentive systems that encourage agents to work
efficiently when organized in teams. These mechanisms can foster competition among
the agents such as a tournament where agents are ranked based on their productivity
and are rewarded when they outperform their peers (Lazear and Rosen (1981); Green
and Stokey (1983)). In contrast, other models have emphasized cooperation among
the agents by making pay contingent on the group’s overall level of performance
meeting some target (Holmstrom (1982)). Finally, some models have incorporated
concepts of peer monitoring as one method to mitigate shirking (Kandel and Lazear
(1992)).
The optimal performance scheme that efficiently motivates the agents depends,
in part, on the nature of the agents’ production technology. In some environments,
the agents produce output jointly and the principal can only measure the group’s
aggregate output. Here, however, it is assumed that the agents produce independently
observable outputs. Furthermore, the principal can link an agent’s pay not only to his
output realization, but to the other agent’s realization as well. The main implications
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to be tested were derived by Che and Yoo (2001) who assume that each agent’s
performance realization is verifiable by a third party such as a court. Kvaløy and
Olsen (2006) extend their model by allowing output to potentially be unverifiable,
which gives the principal the discretion to renege on the agents’ promised performance
pay. They also remove a common productivity shock from Che and Yoo (2001)’s
model. With this revision, the main results of Che and Yoo (2001) are not altered
significantly, which is why I focus on the latter model with verifiable output since the
environment is slightly less complex and, therefore, easier for subjects to comprehend.

4.1.2

Empirical

For conciseness, I summarize relevant laboratory experiments on group incentives
as they are the most closely related to this study. Therefore, I do not highlight studies
using observational data collected in the workplace. These studies, however, usually
focus on how one type of group incentive scheme affects the workers’ productivity.1
Experiments have also analyzed the effectiveness of different types of incentive systems
within a group of agents. Nalbantian and Schotter (1997) study several performance
schemes in groups of 6 agents. These include a tournament where the subjects are
split into groups of 3 and the team with the higher output receives a prize that
is shared among the teammates. They also study a revenue sharing scheme where
all 6 agents split the group’s total output equally. Van Dijk et al. (2001) compare
individual piece rates, group revenue sharing, and a rank-order tournament using a
real-effort task among two agents. Both of these studies find that the average effort of
the agents is larger under the tournament. Furthermore, Harbring (2006) compares
revenue sharing and a tournament among two agents in an environment where agents
1

Workplace studies can be characterized based on the type of incentive systems analyzed. For
group piece rates, see Weiss (1987) (electronic manufacturing) and Hamilton et al. (2003) (garment
production). For group piece rates and profit-sharing, see Boning et al. (2007) (steel minimills).
For gainsharing, see Hansen (1997) (call center). For group or firm-wide targets, see Knez and
Simester (2001) (airline departures), Reilly et al. (2005) (health services), and Burgess et al. (2010)
(tax collection). For tournaments, see Eriksson (1999) (Danish corporations), Bognanno (2001)
(American corporations), and Bandiera et al. (2013) (fruit production).
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can engage in pre-play communication before making their effort choices. Average
effort choices are higher under the revenue sharing scheme since subjects are able to
coordinate their effort choices through communication.
In these experiments, the specific terms of the compensation scheme were designed by the experimenter. Although this allows us to determine which mechanisms
effectively motivate the agents, it does not analyze several important decisions made
by the principal. First, principals may have a preference for implementing one type
of performance system over another. In previous experiments on group incentives,
the performance schemes are analyzed individually with subjects participating in one
scheme at a time. This study can capture a preference because the principal makes
performance cooperative or competitive via her contract offer, which gives her flexibility in terms of the types of incentives she can implement. Furthermore, this study
tests whether principals design performance mechanisms that are in accordance with
the theoretical predictions, which creates feedback for future theoretical work on how
group incentives are implemented. Finally, the principal now has a claim to a portion
of the group’s surplus instead of earnings being allocated solely among the agents.
Such a division is more realistic within the principal-agent framework.
These novelties are commonly present in the experimental literature on contract
design. Contracting experiments with multiple agents, however, have mainly focused
on gift exchange contracts. Therefore, each agent’s pay is not contingent on his performance level.2 Two studies have allowed the principal to tie pay to performance in
an environment with multiple agents. Whitford and Ochs (2006) analyze a contracting game where the production technology is not independent, but is a function of
both agents’ effort choices. They find that performance bonuses are not sufficient at
inducing the agents to exert high effort although subjects are unable to gain experience since the stage game is played only once. Königstein and Lünser (2007) study a
game where the principal offers a linear contract to the agents who can self-select into
either an individual or group performance task. Like in Whitford and Ochs (2006),
2

See Maximiano et al. (2007), Charness and Kuhn (2007), Gächter and Thöni (2010), Abeler et al.
(2010), and Gächter et al. (2012).
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however, individuals selecting into the group task do not produce individually observable outputs so that pay is not based on one’s relative performance to the other
agents.

4.2

Theoretical Framework

4.2.1

Environment

The framework follows Kvaløy and Olsen (2006)’s model with verifiable output.
A principal can interact with two agents in either a static or infinitely-repeated environment. For now, all parties are assumed to be risk neutral, self-interested, and
they share a common discount factor δ if the relationship is repeated.
When the parties agree to trade in a given period, each agent independently
produces output q ∈ {L, H} where L denotes the low output value and H denotes
the high output value with H > L. The value of each agent’s output accrues directly
to the principal. An agent’s output realization is a stochastic function of the agent’s
effort choice, which is also high, eH , or low, eL . An agent incurs a cost of c when
choosing high effort while low effort is costless. Unlike output realizations, which are
publicly observable, only the agents can observe each other’s effort choices.
The probability of an agent realizing H after choosing eH is denoted as pH . Similarly, pL represents the probability of realizing H when an agent chooses eL . It is
assumed that 0 ≤ pL < pH < 1, which implies that high effort increases an agent’s
likelihood of realizing high output.
In order to engage in trade, the principal offers the agents a take-it-or-leave-it
contract specifying the terms of compensation. These terms depend on the output
realizations of agents i and j, denoted qi ∈ {L, H} and qj ∈ {L, H} respectively.
Both realizations are verifiable, which implies that the principal cannot renege on
any payments stated in the contract. Although the agents’ output realizations are
independent, the principal structures compensation to depend on both values. More
specifically, the principal offers agent i a bonus vector, βi ≡ (βHH , βHL , βLH , βLL ),
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where the first subscript represents the value of agent i’s output realization, qi , and
the second subscript represents the value of agent j’s output realization, qj , in the
current period. Therefore, the bonus vector βi specifies agent i’s compensation for
each of the four possible outcomes that could occur if the parties engage in trade.
Each component of the bonus vector is restricted to be nonnegative as the agents are
subject to limited liability. As a result, the principal cannot extract payments from
the agents. Finally, since the agents are identical, the terms of compensation will
not vary across the agents. Therefore, the subscript is dropped on the bonus vector,
β ≡ βi ≡ βj , because agents are offered a symmetric contract.
After defining pi ≡ p(H|ei ) and pj ≡ p(H|ej ), we can express agent i’s expected
compensation as:
u(ei , ej , β) = pi pj βHH + pi (1 − pj )βHL + (1 − pi )pj βLH + (1 − pi )(1 − pj )βLL
Agent j’s expected compensation is defined similarly. Depending on β, the principal
can implement three types of compensation schemes:
1. If u(ei , eH , β) > u(ei , eL , β) the principal practices joint performance evaluation.
In this case, (βHH , βLH ) > (βHL , βLL ) and agent i’s expected compensation
increases when agent j chooses high effort.3
2. If u(ei , eH , β) = u(ei , eL , β) the principal practices independent performance
evaluation. In this case, (βHH , βLH ) = (βHL , βLL ) and agent i’s expected compensation does not depend on agent j’s effort choice.
3. If u(ei , eH , β) < u(ei , eL , β) the principal practices relative performance evaluation. In this case, (βHH , βLH ) < (βHL , βLL ) and agent i’s expected compensation
decreases when agent j chooses high effort.
The timing of play is as follows. If the principal does not offer a contract to the
agents or at least one of the agents rejects the offer, the principal receives an outside
3

The strict inequality implies that at least one of the components of the vector is strict.
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option of π̄ = 0 while each agent receives ū = 0 for the given period. If both agents
accept the offer, they simultaneously make their effort choices. After this, all parties
observe qi and qj . Each agent also observes the other agent’s effort choice, which
allows the agents to monitor each other’s effort choices in the repeated environment.
Finally, since performance is verifiable, the appropriate bonuses stated in the contract
are transferred from the principal to each agent and payoffs are realized.4

4.2.2

Optimal Contracts in the Static Setting

When designing the contract, the principal’s goal is to maximize her expected
net earnings. Assume that the principal always prefers that both agents choose high
effort, eH , in order to fulfill this goal.
The principal’s optimization problem in the one-shot setting solves for the leastcost contract, which induces both agents to exert high effort:
min u(eH , eH , β) subject to:
β

u(eH , eH , β) − c ≥ ū = 0

(P C)

u(eH , eH , β) − c ≥ u(eL , eH , β)

(ICS )

β ≡ (βHH , βHL ,βLH , βLL ) ≥ 0

(LL)

The participation constraint (P C) ensures that each agent accepts the contract offer.
In order to prevent an agent from shirking and choosing low effort, the static incentive
4

It is also assumed that the agents cannot not engage in side contracting and thus are prevented
from making transfer payments to one another.
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compatibility (ICS ) must also be satisfied.5 Finally, the limited liability constraint
(LL) ensures that the bonuses are nonnegative.
The agent’s outside option, ū = 0, is sufficiently small so that (P C) does not bind.
(ICS ) can be rewritten as:
pH βHH + (1 − pH )βHL − pH βLH − (1 − pH )βLL ≥

c
pH − pL

Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) prove that the principal’s optimal static contract βS∗ =
(βHH , βHL , 0, 0) satisfies:
pH βHH + (1 − pH )βHL =

c
pH − pL

(1)

The principal has flexibility in terms of the values of βHH and βHL that she
can specify. More specifically, the equilibrium is not unique and the set of contracts
making (1) bind can exhibit joint (βHH > βHL ), independent (βHH = βHL ), or relative
(βHH < βHL ) performance evaluation.
Each agent’s expected compensation under βS∗ is u(eH , eH , βS∗ ) =
fore, an agent’s expected payoff is

pH c
pH −pL

expected payoff is 2(pH H + (1 − pH )L −

4.2.3

−c =

pL c
.
pH −pL

pH c
.
pH −pL

There-

Likewise, the principal’s

pH c
).
pH −pL

Optimal Contracts in the Infinitely Repeated Setting

When the relationship is infinitely repeated, the principal still wishes to design
the least-cost contract that induces both agents to choose eH . The contract, however,
must induce high effort as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
5

To ensure that high effort from both agents is the unique equilibrium, we must also satisfy a second
incentive compatibility constraint: u(eH , eL , β) − c ≥ u(eL , eL , β). That is, an agent would prefer
to choose high effort when the other agent shirks. Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) show that it is without
loss of generality to ignore this constraint. This is because the agents have the same expected payoff
when choosing (eH , eH ) under the optimal contracting scheme (described below) as when choosing
(eL , eL ) under the cost-minimizing contract when this second incentive compatibility constraint
binds. Therefore, the agents are indifferent between the two outcomes when the additional incentive
compatibility constraint is violated under the optimal contract.
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Repeated interaction benefits the principal because the agents are able to observe
and monitor each other’s effort choices across time. Specifically, both Che and Yoo
(2001) and Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) show that under joint performance evaluation
(JPE), the agents can credibly commit to a punishment scheme that discourages the
other agent from shirking. Intuitively, an agent’s expected compensation increases
when the other agent chooses eH under JPE only. JPE, therefore, allows an agent
to effectively punish the other agent by playing eL in all subsequent periods after
observing the other agent shirk in the current period. This threat creates an implicit
incentive for each agent to choose eH , which lowers the amount of explicit incentives
that the principal must provide to the agents in order to induce high effort as the
unique equilibrium during each period.
Formally, assume that an agent’s effort choice in the current period depends
upon the entire history of past effort choices made by both agents. Furthermore,
assume that β is stationary across periods, which allows us to easily specify each
agent’s continuation payoff.6 If an agent shirks in the current period by choosing eL , the lowest payoff that he can guarantee for himself in future periods equals
min[u(eL , eL , β), u(eL , eH , β)]. This expression therefore represents the worst payoff
that can be sustained in equilibrium given β.
Assuming that the agents have an incentive to enforce the punishment, the necessary incentive compatibility constraint for both agents to choose eH in the current
period is:
1
δ
[u(eH , eH , β) − c] ≥ u(eL , eH , β) +
min[u(eL , eL , β), u(eL , eH , β)] (ICR )
1−δ
1−δ
This constraint says that the agent will play eH as long as the expected present value
from doing so is greater than shirking in the current period and then receiving the
worst sustainable payoff in all subsequent periods of interaction.
6

The stationary assumption is commonly used in the dynamic contracting literature when agents
are risk neutral (see Levin (2003)).
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Under relative (RPE) or independent (IPE) performance evaluation, u(eL , eL , β) ≥
u(eL , eH , β). Therefore, (ICR ) reduces to u(eH , eH , β) − c ≥ u(eL , eH , β), which is
the static incentive constraint (ICS ). This illustrates that the punishment provides
no advantage in the repeated setting under RPE or IPE. The principal must provide
the same incentives from the static environment to induce both agents to exert high
effort.
With JPE, however, (ICR ) reduces to:
1
δ
[u(eH , eH , β) − c] ≥ u(eL , eH , β) +
u(eL , eL , β)
1−δ
1−δ

(2)

Since u(eL , eL , β) < u(eL , eH , β) under JPE, the right hand side of the static incentive
constraint (ICS ) is now relaxed. Therefore, the principal can lower the amount of
expected compensation she must provide to the agents in the repeated environment.
Intuitively, this results from the agents engaging in peer monitoring, which creates
slack in the (ICS ) constraint.
The principal’s relaxed optimization problem is:
min u(eH , eH , β) subject to:
β

u(eH , eH , β) − c ≥ ū = 0

(P C)

1
δ
[u(eH , eH , β) − c] ≥ u(eL , eH , β) +
min[u(eL , eL , β), u(eL , eH , β)] (ICR )
1−δ
1−δ
β ≡ (βHH , βHL ,βLH , βLL ) ≥ 0

(LL)

Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) show that the optimal contract in the repeated setting,
∗
βR
= (βHH , βHL = 0, 0, 0), satisfies (2) with equality. This is an extreme form of JPE

where the agents are only rewarded when they both perform well. Under the optimal
scheme βHH =

c
.
(pH +δpL )(pH −pL )

Furthermore, two important points must be stated. First, Kvaløy and Olsen
(2006) prove that the punishment scheme of low effort, eL , from both agents is self∗
enforcing given βR
. That is, an agent has an incentive to play eL when being punished

116
by the other agent. Second, the equilibrium is collusion-proof from an outcome where
at least one of the agents chooses eL , which guarantees that eH from both agents is the
unique subgame perfect equilibrium in the repeated setting. These points illustrate
that the above analysis is sufficient in solving the principal’s optimization problem.
∗
∗
Under βR
, each agent’s expected payment is u(eH , eH , βR
) =
p2H c
(pH +δpL )(pH −pL )
p2H c
).
(pH +δpL )(pH −pL )

Therefore, an agent’s expected payoff is
payoff is 2(pH H + (1 − pH )L −

4.3

p2H c
.
(pH +δpL )(pH −pL )

− c. The principal’s expected

Experimental Design

4.3.1

Procedures

The experiment was framed as a buyer (the principal) interacting with two sellers (the agents). Sellers were informed that their individual effort choices helped
determine the quality level of a fictitious good that they individually produced. After instructions were read aloud, subjects were randomly assigned roles to be either
a buyer or a seller, which remained fixed throughout the experiment. During each
period subjects interacted in groups of three, each consisting of one buyer and two
sellers, via computers and individuals remained anonymous.
At the beginning of each round, the buyer could make at most one offer to the
sellers. In the offer, the buyer specified a nonnegative integer value for βHH and
βHL . The values of βLH and βLL were fixed at 0, the optimal contract value, to help
make the experimental environment less complex for subjects and, therefore, easier
to comprehend. First, it became less demanding for buyers to specify the terms of
the contract offer as they only had to specify two bonuses instead of four. Second, the
simplification made it easier for sellers to understand how they are compensated since
they only received a bonus in that case that their output was q = H. Furthermore,
L = 0 so it may seem natural that a seller receives no bonus when failing to generate
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additional surplus for the group.7 To complete the offer, the buyer also stated the
effort level that she wanted each seller to choose in order to signal her preferred effort
choice. This request, however, was nonbinding.
If the two sellers received an offer, they independently decided to either accept or
reject it. If both sellers accepted the offer, they then privately made their respective
effort choices, framed as letters with eL = X and eH = Y . After this, all three subjects
observed the quality level of the two goods produced. Sellers then observed the effort
choice made by the other seller since effort choices were made simultaneously. At the
end of the round, the appropriate payment(s) were transferred from the buyer to each
seller. Subjects were also shown a summary screen listing the relevant information
and choices they observed during the round.
If the buyer did not make an offer or at least one of the sellers rejected the offer,
all parties received their outside option of 0 points for that period. Earnings were
framed as points, which accumulated over the duration of the experiment. At the
end of the experiment, points were converted into cash and subjects were immediately
paid in private.
The experiment uses a 2x1 design, where the length of each group’s interaction
varies across treatments. More specifically, the manner in which the subjects were
rematched into groups of three at the start of each round depended on the treatment.
In the static environment, subjects were randomly rematched after each period to
form new groups consisting of one buyer and two sellers. In contrast, subjects faced a
75% (i.e. δ = 0.75) probability of being rematched with the same group members in
the next round when the relationship was repeated. This method is commonly used
to test infinitely-repeated horizon models in the laboratory (Roth and Murnighan
(1978); Dal Bó (2005)). This was conveyed to the subjects with a randomly drawn
integer between 1 and 4 being displayed on their screens at the start of each period.
If a 4 was drawn, subjects were randomly rematched to form new groups.
7

In future work, this restriction could also be relaxed by allowing the buyer to specify a bonus paid
to a seller whenever his output is L = 0. Such a design could avoid situations where sellers earn
negative earnings, but would also create the potential for the buyer’s earnings to be negative.
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Sessions were conducted during Spring 2016 at Purdue University’s Vernon Smith
Experimental Economics Laboratory, which has a subject pool containing mainly undergraduate students. Subjects who had previously participated in an experiment
on contract design were excluded from participating. Each session lasted roughly 75
minutes consisting of instruction reading, two practice periods, and a quiz to test
familiarity with the procedures before actual trading began. In the one-shot treatment sessions lasted for 15 periods. In the repeated matchings treatment subjects
were informed that the experiment would last at least 12 periods with the last round
occurring once the last supergame randomly ended. That is, if a 4 was randomly
drawn at the start of a given period after round 12, which gives an expected session length of 15 periods, the session was finished. To keep the number of rounds
consistent across sessions in the repeated matchings treatment, the random draws
were predetermined according to δ. Subjects were made aware of this before trading
began and could verify the draws were predetermined by opening a sealed envelope
containing the draws once the session was finished. Random rematchings occurred
at the beginning of rounds 5, 8, and 10 with the experiment ending after round 14.
zTree, an experimental software, was used to conduct the experiment (Fischbacher
(2007)). Four sessions were conducted for each treatment with each containing 9
subjects. Average earnings, including show-up fees, were equal to $20.75.

4.3.2

Parameters and Comparative Statics

Table 4.1 displays the parameter values used in the experiment, which will be
used to numerically illustrate the comparative statics. The first prediction concerns
the type of contracts that the principals design across the two treatments. Figure
4.1 displays the set of cost-minimizing contracts for both environments. The dashed
line represents the 45 degree line and, therefore, indicates points where the principal
practices IPE (βHH = βHL ). Points below the dashed line represent cases of JPE
(βHH > βHL ) while points above the line represent cases of RPE (βHH < βHL ). In
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Variable

Value

δ
0.75
H
80
L
0
pL
0.25
pH
0.75
c
15
βHH , βHL {0, · · · , 200}

Description
discount factor/probability of continuation
high performance value
low performance value
probability of H given eL
probability of H given eH
cost of eH
set of possible performance bonuses

Table 4.1.: Parameter values used in the experiment
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Fig. 4.1.: Set of cost-minimizing contracts by treatment

the static environment, 30 out of the 41 possible contracts practice RPE. The contract
that exhibits IPE has βHH = βHL = 30. This leaves 10 contracts where the principal
implements JPE. In contrast, the optimal contract in the repeated environment is
unique with βHH = 32 and βHL = 0. These equilibrium predictions suggest that the
proportion of contracts practicing JPE should not decrease in the repeated matchings
treatment.
Prediction 1: When moving from the static to the repeated environment, principals
are no less likely to implement contracts that practice joint performance evaluation.
Given the set of cost-minimizing contracts, each party’s expected payoff in a given
period can also be calculated. In the static case, the agent’s expected compensation
for all feasible contracts in equilibrium equals u(eH , eH , βS∗ ) = 22.5. This leaves each
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agent with a net payoff of 7.5 experimental points in a given period. Therefore,
the principal’s expected payoff equals 75 points. In the repeated environment, the
principal is able to capture a larger share of the surplus due to peer monitoring. The
∗
) = 18 leaving agents
principal’s expected payoff is now 84 points while u(eH , eH , βR

with a net payoff of 3 points.
Prediction 2: When moving from the static to the repeated environment, principals
capture a larger share of the group’s surplus, thereby reducing the net payoff to agents.
For both treatments, the extreme payoff distribution between the principal and
agents relies critically on the assumption that parties are self-interested. Previous
experiments, however, illustrate that parties tend to split the surplus more equitably, which implies that agents typically earn more than their reservation values.8
Therefore, prediction 2 fails to take these common findings into account. After presenting the main results, I consider cases of non-standard preferences and illustrate
how these preferences alter the predicted surplus distribution between the principal
and the agents.

4.4

Results

4.4.1

Contractual Form

In this section, I compare the types of contracts that principals design across the
two treatments and see how well contracts correspond to the theoretical predictions.
Figure 4.2 displays the set of contract offers for each treatment. Within each treatment, I also highlight the principal’s requested effort choice stated in the offer by using
blue circles to represent eH requests and orange triangles to represent eL requests.
Larger triangles or circles indicate more observations for that value of (βHH , βHL ).
For the one-shot treatment, 79.4% of the offers display JPE. As a result, relatively few
offers display RPE (6.1%). The average value for βHH is 41.2 while the average value
8

See Fehr et al. (2007) for evidence from a contracting experiment with performance bonuses and
Güth et al. (1982) for evidence from the ultimatum game.
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for βHL is 25.8, which provides further evidence of a preference for JPE. Furthermore,
principals tend to offer bonuses that are larger than required in equilibrium. 82% of
the offers contain some combination of (βHH , βHL ) that make the static incentive
compatibility (ICS ) constraint non-binding.9 Furthermore, principals request eH in
90% of the offers. 88% of the requests for high effort satisfy (ICS ), which contrasts
with the offers that request eL where only 33% of these observations satisfy (ICS ).
Compared to the one-shot treatment, the distribution of contract offers is more
variable in the repeated environment. Although principals are predicted to implement
an extreme form of JPE with βHL = 0, 50.6% offers exhibit JPE in this treatment
while 26.8% exhibit RPE. Therefore, a lower proportion of contract offers favor JPE
in the repeated matchings treatment, which conflicts with the first comparative static
prediction. Additionally, the average value for βHH is relatively lower in the repeated
treatment at 35.8 while the average value for βHL is relatively higher at 28.8. This
provides further evidence that contract offers favor JPE relatively less in the repeated
treatment although JPE continues to be the most commonly used. Like the one-shot
treatment, however, a majority of the offers, 75%, make the (ICR ) constraint nonbinding.10 Therefore, in both treatments most agents are offered payments higher
than expected in equilibrium. In this treatment, however, a smaller proportion of
offers request that eH is chosen at 67%. Although the proportion of high effort requests is smaller in the repeated treatment, these offers satisfy (ICR ) more frequently
relative to the offers that request eL . The proportion that satisfy (ICR ) is 87% and
51% respectively for eH and eL requests.
Figure 4.3 is similar to figure 4.2 except it focuses on the offers accepted by the
agents. Acceptance rates were 89% and 82% for the one-shot and repeated treatments respectively. Given these high acceptance rates, the characteristics of accepted
9

This statistic was computed by comparing the agent’s expected payment assuming both agents
choose high effort, pH pH βHH +pH (1−pH )βHL , with the expected payment in the static equilibrium,
pH c
pH −pL .
10
This statistic was computed by comparing the agent’s expected payment assuming both agents
choose high effort, pH pH βHH + pH (1 − pH )βHL , with the expected payment in the repeated equip2 c
librium, (pH +δpLH)(pH −pL ) .
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contracts are similar to the set of contract offers. A majority of the contracts practice
JPE although JPE is more prevalent in the one-shot treatment. Furthermore, most
contracts request that eH is chosen although the proportion is higher in the one-shot
treatment.
Finally, figure 4.4 focuses on the set of completed trades within each treatment
where both agents chose high effort, eH . Therefore, these are the contracts that generated the efficient outcome in the given period. 51% of the accepted offers were
efficient in the one-shot treatment compared to 44% in the repeated treatment. Several notable differences occur when comparing the set of efficient contracts to the set
of contract offers. First, in the repeated matchings treatment, a larger proportion
of efficient offers exhibit JPE. 68.9% of the efficient contracts exhibit JPE in this
treatment although 55.1% of the those accepted exhibit JPE. Second, within both
treatments a large percentage of efficient contracts give the agents larger earnings
than expected in their respective equilibriums. Over 97% have payments higher than
necessary in equilibrium. This suggests that agents require larger rents in order to
reach efficiency. Finally, a majority of efficient contracts request that eH is chosen.
Only one efficient trade in the one-shot treatment requests low effort while 18% of
the efficient trades request eL in the repeated treatment. Out of these low effort requests in the repeated treatment, however, only one observation violates (ICR ) which
indicates that subjects, at least theoretically, had the incentive to choose eH .
The first comparative static prediction focuses on how the set of optimal contracts
changes across treatments. More specifically, the fraction of contracts that exhibit
JPE should not decrease in the repeated treatment. The previous analysis, however,
suggests that the results do not support this prediction. In order to more precisely
describe how the degree of JPE changes across treatments, I analyze the fraction of
compensation coming from βHH . That is, I focus on the ratio

βHH
.
βHH +βHL

Although

this fraction ignores the magnitude of the agents’ expected compensation, it provides
an intuitive way to measure the extent to which JPE is used in a given contract. The
value is bounded between 0 and 1, with 1 being the extreme form of JPE (βHH >
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(a) One-shot treatment

(b) Repeated treatment

For one-shot treatment, N = 180. For repeated treatment, N = 168. Larger bubbles indicate
more observations. One observation not displayed for repeated treatment with βHH = 125 and
βHL = 100. The dashed line is the 45◦ line.

Fig. 4.2.: Offers made by treatment

(a) One-shot treatment

(b) Repeated treatment

For one-shot treatment, N = 160. For repeated treatment, N = 138. Larger bubbles indicate
more observations. One observation not displayed for repeated treatment with βHH = 125 and
βHL = 100. The dashed line is the 45◦ line.

Fig. 4.3.: Offers accepted by treatment
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(a) One-shot treatment

(b) Repeated treatment

Only includes offers where both agents chose high effort, eH . For one-shot treatment, N = 81.
For repeated treatment, N = 61. Larger bubbles indicate more observations. One observation not
displayed for repeated treatment with βHH = 125 and βHL = 100. The dashed line is the 45◦ line.

Fig. 4.4.: Efficient offers by treatment
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βHL = 0), 0.5 being IPE (βHH = βHL ), and 0 being the extreme form of RPE
(βHL > βHH = 0). Therefore, values closer to 1 highlight contracts that favor JPE
while values closer to 0 favor RPE.
Figure 4.5 compares box plots displaying the values of

βHH
βHH +βHL

for each treatment.

Once again, I focus on the set of offers made, accepted offers, and efficient trades
separately. In all three cases, the median values for the ratio are lower in the repeated
treatment, which contradicts prediction 1. Furthermore, for offers made and accepted
offers the average value for the repeated treatment is 0.57, which is less than 0.62, the
average value for the one-shot treatment. The average values are closer for efficient
offers, however, with values of 0.61 and 0.59 for the one-shot and repeated treatments
respectively. The box plots also illustrate how the ratio is consistently more variable
in the repeated treatment despite the unique equilibrium prediction in the repeated
environment and the multiplicity of equilibria in the one-shot environment.
To test for across-treatment differences concerning the value

βHH
βHH +βHL

and its

variability, table 4.2 presents the results of multi-level random effects regressions (at
the session and principal levels). Columns (1) through (3) present the results of
regressions where the dependent variable equals

βHH
.
βHH +βHL

Although the estimate on

the repeated treatment dummy is negative in sign, the magnitudes of the estimates
are fairly small and insignificant. Therefore, the degree of JPE is not significantly
different across treatments. Columns (4) through (6) present the results of regressions
where the dependent variable equals the absolute value of the difference between the
observed value of

βHH
βHH +βHL

and the treatment mean value of

βHH
.
βHH +βHL

For offers made,

the repeated treatment dummy variable has a significant estimate of 0.068 which
indicates that there are significantly higher deviations from the mean in the repeated
treatment. The same result holds true for accepted offers but not for efficient trades.
Therefore, contract offers and accepted contracts are significantly more variable in
the repeated treatment in terms of the types of performance evaluation used.
Main Result 1: When comparing the one-shot and repeated environments, no significant differences in the degree of joint performance evaluation ( βHHβHH
) exist across
+βHL
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Table 4.2.: Degree of joint performance evaluation ( βHHβHH
) regressions
+βHL

(1)
All
Offers
-0.0622
(0.0583)

(2)
Accepted
Offers
-0.0672
(0.0602)

(3)
Efficient
Trades
-0.0262
(0.0412)

Absolute Deviation from
Treatment Mean
(4)
(5)
(6)
All
Accepted Efficient
Offers
Offers
Trades
0.0681∗∗∗ 0.0597∗∗
0.0570
(0.0251) (0.0284) (0.0403)

-0.0384
(0.0526)

-0.0454
(0.0408)

0.0303
(0.0471)

0.0218∗
(0.0117)

0.00945
(0.0165)

-0.00510
(0.0245)

Length of
Interaction

0.00472
(0.00677)

0.00706
(0.00831)

0.00735
(0.0115)

-0.00551 -0.00439
(0.00498) (0.00742)

-0.00257
(0.0143)

Constant

0.626∗∗∗
(0.0226)
348

0.625∗∗∗
(0.0238)
298

0.594∗∗∗
(0.0162)
142

0.0865∗∗∗
(0.0189)
348

0.0722∗∗∗
(0.0186)
142

βHH
βHH +βHL

Repeated treatment
dummy
1
Period

Observations

0.0861∗∗∗
(0.0185)
298

∗

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions estimated using multi-level random effects (at the
session-principal levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session level. Regressions (1),
βHH
(2) and (3) have a dependent variable of βHH
+βHL . Regressions (4), (5) and (6) have an dependent
βHH
variable equal to the absolute value of βHH
+βHL - treatment mean value. Repeated treatment dummy
takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the repeated treatment. Length of Interaction indicates
the number of periods that the same principal-agent-agent group of subjects have interacted with
each other.

treatments. For all contract offers and offers accepted, however, absolute deviations
from the treatment mean of

βHH
βHH +βHL

are significantly higher in the repeated treatment.

Therefore, the types of incentive systems used are more variable when the relationship
is repeated.

4.4.2

Expected Payoffs to Agents

The second comparative static prediction concerns how the agent’s expected payoff changes across treatments. According to the standard prediction, an agent’s net
payoff in a given period is expected to decrease from 7.5 points in the one-shot treatment to 3 points in the repeated treatment. Figure 4.2, however, illustrates that
roughly 79% of the contracts offer payments higher than necessary in equilibrium,
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(a) Offers Made

(b) Accepted Offers

(c) Efficient Offers
The box plots show the relative degree of joint performance evaluation exhibited in the contracts.
A value of 1 indicates extreme joint performance evaluation (JPE) with βHL = 0. In contrast, a
value of 0 indicates extreme relative performance evaluation (RPE) with βHH = 0. A value of 0.5
indicates independent performance evaluation (IPE), βHH = βHL . N = 348, 298, and 142 for figures
(a), (b), and (c) respectively. Circles correspond to observations that fall outside 1.5∗interquartile
range.

) by treatment
Fig. 4.5.: Degree of joint performance evaluation ( βHHβHH
+βHL
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which suggests that expected payoffs are higher than predicted in both treatments.
To explore this issue further, I analyze the agent’s expected per-period payoff across
treatments. To calculate each agent’s expected payoff, I assume that both agents pick
the principal’s requested effort level stated in the contract offer if the contract offer
is rejected by at least one agent.11 Furthermore, for accepted offers I use the realized
effort choices of the two agents to calculate each agent’s expected payoff. That is,
the expected payoff for agent i is calculated as pi pj βHH + pi (1 − pj )βHL − c(ei ) where
pi ≡ p(H|ei ) and pj ≡ p(H|ej ).
Figure 4.6 presents histograms for each treatment of the agent’s expected payoff
given the bonuses stated in the contract. All offers, accepted offers, and efficient
trades are presented separately. The shapes of the histograms are fairly similar across
treatments. On average, the expected payoffs across treatments are fairly close to
one another. The average value for all offers made is slightly higher in the one-shot
treatment as predicted. For accepted offers and for efficient trades only, however, the
average value is slightly higher in the repeated treatment. Finally, both treatments see
average values that are higher than their respective equilibrium predictions confirming
that agents expect to earn some rent. The distribution of expected payoffs, however,
suggests that across-treatment differences are minor. Table 4.3 confirms these results
by presenting multi-level random effects regressions (at the session and principal
levels) where the dependent variable is an agent’s net expected payoff under these
assumptions. The estimate on the repeated treatment dummy is insignificant and
close to zero for all subsets of the data and it is only negative for the entire set of
offers.
Main Result 2: The agent’s expected payoff does not significantly differ across
treatments. For both treatments, however, agents on average expect to earn rents
above the standard equilibrium prediction.
11

The results are robust to different specifications of the expected payoffs for rejected offers such as
assuming that the agents choose eH if the appropriate incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied.
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Fig. 4.6.: Distribution of the agents’ expected payoffs
For accepted offers, each agent’s expected payoff is calculated using the two agent’s realized effort
choices for that round. For rejected offers, the agent’s expected payoff assumes that the agent
chooses the principal’s requested effort level stated in the contract offer. Two observations for the
repeated treatment are omitted with an expected value of 74.06.
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Table 4.3.: Regression estimates for impact of repeated matching on the agent’s
expected payoff
(1)
All
Offers
-0.710
(2.839)

(2)
Accepted
Offers
0.188
(3.053)

(3)
Efficient
Trades
0.0245
(2.518)

1
Period

-1.027
(2.741)

1.529
(4.131)

6.213
(9.624)

Length of
Interaction

0.233
(0.533)

-0.0632
(0.739)

-0.0693
(0.862)

Constant

11.29∗∗∗
(2.288)
696

11.19∗∗∗
(2.287)
596

15.35∗∗∗
(3.035)
284

Repeated treatment
dummy

Observations
∗

∗∗

p < 0.10,
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. For accepted offers, each agent’s expected payoff is calculated
using the two agent’s realized effort choices for that round. For rejected offers, the agent’s expected
payoff assumes that the agent chooses the principal’s requested effort level stated in the contract offer.
The dependent variable equals the agent’s expected payoff under these assumptions. Regressions
estimated using multi-level random effects (at the session and principal levels) with robust standard
errors clustered at the session level. Repeated treatment dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation
belongs to the market power treatment. Length of Interaction indicates the number of periods that
the same principal-agent-agent group of subjects have interacted with each other.

132

N = 160 for principal and groups in the one-shot treatment and N = 138 for principal and groups
in the repeated treatment. Since there are two agents in each group, the number of observations is
double for agents in each treatment. 95% confidence intervals for the mean are also reported.

Fig. 4.7.: Average per-period earnings for completed trades by treatment

4.4.3

Per-Period Earnings

Now I analyze actual payoffs for completed trades to test for any earnings differences across treatments.12 Figure 4.7 presents the average per-period earnings of
principals, agents, and the groups of three subjects for each treatment. Average
earnings are fairly similar across treatments. In both environments, principals capture roughly 70% of the group’s surplus leaving each agent with 15% of the surplus
on average. The surplus, however, is slightly higher in the one-shot treatment, which
is expected since the fraction of observations where both agents choose eH rises from
44% in the repeated treatment to 51% in the one-shot treatment. Although agents
on average capture 15% of the group’s surplus, their earnings are slightly higher than
predicted in equilibrium. On average, agents in a given period earn 3 and 6.6 points
higher than expected in the one-shot and repeated treatments respectively. Table 4.4
presents multi-level random effect estimates of actual earnings for completed trades
and confirms that no significant differences in earnings occur across treatments.
12

The qualitative results are similar when analyzing all offers or efficient trades only.
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Table 4.4.: Regression estimates of the impact of repeated matching on per-period
earnings for completed trades
(1)
Principal Payoffs
-3.540
(8.173)

(2)
Agent Payoffs
-1.387
(3.124)

(3)
Group Payoffs
-5.498
(9.232)

1
Period

-6.924
(6.983)

-1.678
(3.988)

-10.19
(10.28)

Constant

49.99∗∗∗
(6.404)
298

10.98∗∗∗
(2.845)
596

71.72∗∗∗
(8.110)
298

Repeated treatment
dummy

Observations
∗

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regressions (1) and (3) estimated using multi-level random
effects (at the session and principal levels) with robust standard errors clustered at the session level.
Regression (2) is similar but also includes random effects at the agent level. Repeated treatment
dummy takes a value of 1 if the observation belongs to the market power treatment. Only completed
trades considered.
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4.4.4

Agent Effort Response in the Repeated Treatment

In this section I briefly explore the factors that help determine an agent’s propensity to shirk and choose low effort in the repeated treatment. More specifically,
Kvaløy and Olsen (2006)’s model argues that agents have an incentive to punish
∗
their peers under the optimal contract, βR
, by playing low effort in all future periods

after observing the other agent shirk in the previous period. To study these dynamics, table 4.5 presents the results of a multi-level random effects regression (at the
session-principal-agent levels) and the marginal effects of a Probit regression where
the dependent variable takes a value of “1” if the agent chooses eL in the current
period and a value of “0” if eH is chosen. Violating the repeated incentive compatibility constraint (ICR ) does not have a significant effect on the agent choosing
eL and, although the estimates are positive as expected, they are fairly close to 0.
Therefore, the specific punishment scheme prescribed in the model does not seem to
be driving the agent’s effort choice. Agents, however, do respond to the other agent’s
effort choice in the previous period. When their peer shirks in the last round, the
propensity of the agent to choose eL in the current round significantly increases by
16-19%. Furthermore, this propensity to shirk is not significantly affected by the
other agent’s performance realization in the previous round. Therefore, some aspects
of the punishment scheme prescribed in the model fall in line with the observed dynamics. Specifically, agents respond to their peer’s previous effort choice but not to
their performance realization. Finally, agents are also significantly influenced by the
effort choice requested by the principal in the contract offer. If the principal requests
that the agent picks eH , this significantly reduces the agent’s propensity to choose eL
by 17-20%.

4.5

Inequity Averse Preferences
The standard predictions assume that all parties are self-interested. As a result,

the static equilibrium is not unique with cost-minimizing contracts that exhibit RPE,

135

Table 4.5.: Regression estimates of the determinants of the agent to choose low effort
(eL ) in the repeated treatment
(1)
0.0118
(0.127)

Probit
(2)
0.0332
(0.109)

eH requested dummy

-0.208∗∗∗
(0.0576)

-0.172∗∗∗
(0.0532)

Other agent chose eL in the last period dummy

0.161∗∗∗
(0.0601)

0.192∗∗∗
(0.0504)

Other agent realized qL in the last period dummy

0.0430
(0.0312)

0.0440
(0.0429)

Constant

0.401∗∗∗
(0.0658)
196

196

(ICR ) violated dummy

Observations
∗

p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Regression (1) is a linear probability model estimated using
multi-level random effects (at the session-principal-agent levels) with robust standard errors clustered
at the session level. Regression (2) presents the marginal effects of a Probit regression with robust
standard errors clustered at the session level. The dependent takes a value of 1 if the agent chose
eL in the current period and a value of 0 if they chose eH . Repeated treatment dummy takes a value
of 1 if the observation belongs to the market power treatment. Only completed trades considered.
(ICR ) violated dummy takes a value of 1 if the bonuses stated in the contract offer violate incentive
compatibility. eH requested dummy takes a value of 1 if the principal requested that the agent picks
high effort in the current period.
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IPE, or JPE. Results for the one-shot treatment, however, suggest that principals have
a preference for designing contracts that 1) exhibit JPE and 2) give agents payments
larger than necessary in equilibrium. In this section, I now consider situations in
which the agents are other-regarding in the static environment to illustrate how this
alters the equilibrium predictions and how this provides one feasible explanation for
the observed deviations from the standard prediction. More specifically, each agent
may experience inequity (or inequality) aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) develops
this theory, which assumes that individuals make payoff comparisons with others and
differences in earnings may generate some level of disutility for the agent.
Within this context, I continue to assume that the principal remains risk neutral
and self-interested. Therefore, the principal is not averse to inequity.13 Each agent,
however, makes inequity comparisons to an exogenous reference group. Itoh (2004)
considers an agent’s reference group to be the other agent. Under this assumption he
derives the optimal contract within two different contexts. In the first, the agent is
only averse to income differences. Therefore, the agent disregards the cost of effort c
and compares only the relative payments that the agents receive from the principal.
Itoh (2004) then assumes that each agent compares his net payoff to the other agent.
Therefore, c is now important when making inequity comparisons to the other agent.
For the sake of brevity, I will only focus on the latter case where the agent makes net
payoff comparisons with his reference group.14
The utility of agent i, ui , now depends not only on his material payoff but also on
comparisons to the other agent’s income or net payoff. As before, define βij as the
bonus payment made to agent i depending on the output realizations of agents i and
j, denoted as qi ∈ {L, H} and qj ∈ {L, H} respectively. The i subscript therefore
represents the value of qi while the j subscript represents the value of qj . Since the
agents are offered a symmetric contract, βji therefore represents the bonus payment
13

This simplification, although restrictive and ad hoc, makes it easier to solve for optimal contracts
assuming that the agents are inequity averse.
14
The theoretical results are only slightly altered when assuming that the agent disregards c when
making inequity comparisons.
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made to agent j as a function of qj and qi respectively. Finally let ci ∈ {0, c} denote
the cost of agent i’s effort choice and cj denote the cost of agent j’s effort choice.
If agent i is averse to differences in net payoffs with the other agent his utility can
be expressed as:
ui = βij − ci − α max{(βji − cj ) − (βij − ci ), 0} − β max{(βij − ci ) − (βji − cj ), 0}
The term α represents agent i’s level of disadvantageous inequity aversion. This
occurs when agent i’s net payoff is lower than that of agent j. Similarly, β represents
agent i’s level of advantageous inequity aversion, which occurs when his net payoff
is higher than that of agent j.15 Two restrictions are commonly placed on α and β.
First, α ≥ 0 implying that an agent’s utility cannot increase when earning less than
the other agent. Second, |β| ≤ α so that the effect of disadvantageous inequity on
the agent’s utility is at least as large as the effect of advantageous inequity.
Instead of summarizing the theoretical results of Itoh (2004), figure 4.8 presents
the numerical predictions based on the experimental parameters for varying levels of α
and β. In contrast to the standard prediction, the optimal contract is now unique for
the specific values of α and β, and for most cases agents are paid positive amounts for
both βHH and βHL . In the case that α = 2.5, or when α is fairly large, the expected
payment is larger than required under the standard equilibrium. For the majority
of cases, however, the expected payment is lower relative to the standard prediction
providing the principal with a cost-saving benefit. Furthermore, note that when β is
sufficiently large, the optimal contract now takes a unique form with βHL = 0, the
extreme form of JPE.
Prediction 3: If agents are inequity averse to other agent: 1) the contractual form
is unique and can be RPE, IPE, or JPE depending on the values of α and β and
2) the agent’s expected compensation tends to be less than what is required under the
standard prediction to ensure efficiency.
15

β is commonly used in the literature to denote the level of advantageous inequity. Do not confuse
this with βij which is used to indicate bonus payment made to agent i.
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Fig. 4.8.: Cost minimizing contracts: agent makes inequity comparisons to the other
agent’s payoff
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Although comparisons with the other agent are important to consider, the principal also remains a valid reference group for the agent. For example, the difference
in payoffs is quite large under the standard prediction with the principal expecting
to earn ten times more than each agent. Therefore, earnings differences between
the principal and each agent are also important to consider when discussing inequity
aversion. Using the framework of Itoh (2004), I derive the set of optimal contracts
assuming that the agent now makes inequity comparisons with the principal. Once
again, I will only present the numerical results under the experimental parameters.16
Furthermore, I focus on situations where α is sufficiently small so that an agent’s
earnings are always less than the principal for all possible output realizations. Since
the principal seeks to minimize her costs, such an outcome would be expected if the
payments are sufficient in motivating agents to choose eH .17 Therefore, the expression
for the utility function below excludes situations of advantageous inequity (β) due to
this restriction.
If agent i is averse to differences in net payoffs with the principal, his utility can
be expressed as:
ui = βij − ci − α{(qi + qj − βij − βji ) − (βij − ci )}
Figure 4.9 presents the set of optimal contracts for varying levels of α. Compared
to the standard prediction, the agent’s expected payment is generally larger when the
principal serves as his reference group. Furthermore, the set of optimal contracts is
usually not unique for a given value of α but tends to favor JPE.
Prediction 4: If agents are inequity averse to the principal: 1) contracts tend to
favor JPE although they are generally not unique and 2) the agent’s expected compensation is greater than what is required under the standard prediction to ensure
efficiency.
16

See the appendix for details.
Under the experimental parameters, α ≤ 2.71 for this assumption to remain valid. Since this value
is relatively large it is not an unrealistic restriction for most agents.
17
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Fig. 4.9.: Cost minimizing contracts: agent makes inequity comparisons to the principal’s payoff
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4.5.1

Comments

The equilibrium predictions under inequity aversion suggest one interesting story
that can explain why efficient contracts, and contracts more generally, in the one-shot
treatment favor JPE. Figure 4.4 illustrates this preference where 81% of the efficient
trades practice JPE in the one-shot treatment. Furthermore, 97% of these trades give
the agents higher expected earnings than predicted under the standard equilibrium.
These facts support the notion that agents are inequity averse to the principal but
not to the other agent. Inequity aversion to the other agent provides the principal
with a cost saving advantage. In contrast, the predictions under inequity aversion to
the principal, found in figure 4.9, highlight both the bias towards JPE and the higher
earnings agents expect to receive for a wide range of feasible α values.
Main Result 3: Efficient contracts in the one-shot treatment suggest that agents
are inequity averse to the principal’s earnings.

4.5.2

Estimating α

I now attempt to estimate the α parameter given the set of efficient contracts
observed in the one-shot treatment. To do so, I use the values of βHH and βHL
observed in an efficient contract to derive the corresponding value of α under these
assumed preferences.18 In the appendix, I illustrate that the value for α depends
on whether the relevant (P C) or (IC) constraint binds. Under the experimental
parameters, the value can be calculated as:

α=





30−.75βHH −0.25βHL
2.25βHH +.75βHL −βHL −110


 20−.75βHH −0.25βHL

2.25βHH +.75βHL −180

18

if 0 < α ≤ 0.14
if 0.14 < α ≤ 2.71

This analysis assumes that 1) the two agents have the same α value, 2) the principal can observe
α, and 3) principals always construct optimal contracts. Although these facts are fairly unrealistic,
it provides a benchmark for estimating the distribution of α.
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9 observations omitted. For 2 observations, the agent’s expected compensation fell below the amount
required under standard preferences (i.e. α = 0) causing the estimates to be negative. For the other
7 observations, the value of βHH ≥ 60, which implies that the agent would experience advantageous
inequity in the case that both output realizations are q = H. Therefore, α would not apply to these
observations.

Fig. 4.10.: Estimates of α for efficient contracts in one-shot treatment

Figure 4.10 presents the distribution of estimated α values for efficient contracts
in the one-shot treatment. Note that 9 observations are excluded as they either 1)
imply that the agent may experience advantageous inequity so that β instead of α
applies or 2) the agent’s expected compensation falls below the value under standard
preferences so that the α estimates are negative. Roughly one-third of the estimates
have 0.2 ≤ α < 0.3 with an average value of 0.42.
How do these estimates compare to other experiments concerning the distribution
of α? Fehr and Schmidt (1999) calibrate α using data from an ultimatum game
and find that 30% of observations have an α equal to 0, 0.5, or 1, while 10% have
an α of 4. Blanco et al. (2011) also analyze ultimatum game data and find that
31% of the observations have α < 0.4 while 36% have α ≥ 0.92. In contrast, my
estimates favor lower values of α. For instance, 63% have α < 0.4 while only 11%
have α ≥ 0.92. Two other studies also have estimates that support low α values.
Yang et al. (2016) conduct a menu choice experiment where the subject’s decision
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helps determine his own payoff as well as his partner’s payoff. They estimate that
over 98% of the observations have α < 0.25. Finally, Hoppe and Schmitz (2013) study
a contracting game where the principal has incomplete information about the agent’s
effort cost. Their quantal response equilibrium estimates for α range between 0.07
and 0.25. The literature, therefore, currently has a wide range of distributions when
estimating α.

4.6

Conclusion
The purpose of this experiment is to explore the types of performance incentives

that principals endogenously design across two agents and how the length of the
relationship affects the types of incentives that principals use. With regard to performance evaluation, principals favor joint performance evaluation in both the static
and repeated settings. The use of relative performance evaluation, however, is less
prevalent in the one-shot treatment, which contradicts the comparative static prediction assuming that parties are self-interested. Furthermore, agent’s earnings on
average are similar across treatments. For completed trades, principals on average
capture roughly 70% of the group’s surplus although this amount is less than what is
predicted in equilibrium.
Although the standard predictions are not in line with the observed contracts
designed by principals, I illustrate that agents who experience inequity aversion to
payoff differences with the principal can explain why joint performance evaluation is
favored in the one-shot treatment. This finding provides one feasible explanation as
to why contracts are not significantly restructured across treatments as cooperation
can be supported as the unique equilibrium outcome in both settings. One caveat,
however, is that other behavioral theories may also predict the observed contracting behavior. Kőszegi (2014) provides an extensive survey of work that incorporates
behavioral motivations into contracting models. Other motivations that should be
considered more carefully include loss aversion, risk aversion, overestimating the re-
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turn to effort, and reciprocity. Future empirical work, in particular studies that can
separately identify the implications of these behavioral aspects, is needed to understand the specific factors that 1) effectively motivate agents working in teams and 2)
influence the types of incentive systems that principals prefer to use when employing
multiple agents.
Furthermore, many team environments incorporate explicit sanctions by team
members when a peer is caught shirking or free-riding. The theoretical framework
of this paper uses an implicit punishment scheme where an agent withholds effort
after observing the other agent shirking. Although the results of this study suggest
that agents are more likely to withhold effort after their peer shirks, future work could
incorporate explicit punishment schemes such as administering a costly punishment to
team members after they shirk. Alternatively, one could incorporate rewards where
agents can award other team members after they work hard. Such research could
illustrate whether the carrot or the stick is more effective at encouraging peers to
work hard in contracting environments with multiple agents and whether this alters
the types of team incentives that principals design.
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Appendix: Inequity Comparisons to the Principal
I now assume that the agent makes inequity comparisons to the principal, who
remains risk neutral and self-interested. For simplification and in accordance with
the parameters of the experiment, L = ū = βLH = βLL = 0 in the following analysis.
Furthermore, I restrict my attention to situations in which the agent always experiences disadvantageous inequity aversion relative to the principal. That is, for all
possible contingencies, the principal earns at least as much as the agent. If possible,
such an outcome would be expected when the principal seeks to minimize her costs.
The following results, however, illustrate that this restriction only remains valid if
α is sufficiently small. Therefore, I ignore the potential cases where the agent may
experience advantageous inequity aversion (β) as this only applies when α is fairly
large under the experimental parameterization.

Net Payoff Comparisons with the Principal
The table below highlights the net payoff for each party for all possible output
realizations when each agent chooses the efficient effort, eH . Note that each agent
earns less than the principal when L = 0. In the case where both outputs are H,
the principal earns more than each agent if βHH < 23 H + 13 c. Likewise, in the case
where only one realization is H, the principal earns more than the agent with output
realization H if βHL < 12 (H + c).
Agent i’s q

Agent j’s q

Principal’s Payoff Agent i’s Payoff Agent j’s Payoff

H

H

2(H − βHH )

βHH − c

βHH − c

H

L=0

H − βHL

βHL − c

−c

L=0

H

H − βHL

−c

βHL − c

L=0

L=0

0

−c

−c

Table 4.6.: Set of possible net payoffs in a given period assuming agents choose eH
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The (P C) and (IC) constraints must be slightly revised to account for α. Now, the
participation constraint is:
pH pH (βHH − α[2(H − βHH ) − (βHH − c)])
+ pH (1 − pH )(βHL − α[(H − βHL ) − (βHL − c)])
+ (1 − pH )pH (0 − α[H − βHL − (0 − c)])
+ (1 − pH )(1 − pH )(0 − α[0 − (0 − c)]) − c ≥ 0

(PC)

Rearranging:
pH (1 + 3α)βHH + (1 − pH )(1 + 3α)βHL ≥

c
(1 + α) + 2αH
pH

(PC)

Similarly, the incentive compatibility constraint is:
pH pH (βHH − α[2(H − βHH ) − (βHH − c)])
+ pH (1 − pH )(βHL − α[(H − βHL ) − (βHL − c)])
+ (1 − pH )pH (0 − α[H − βHL − (0 − c)])
+ (1 − pH )(1 − pH )(0 − α[0 − (0 − c)]) − c ≥
pL pH (βHH − α[2(H − βHH ) − βHH ])
+ pL (1 − pH )(βHL − α[(H − βHL ) − βHL ])
+ (1 − pL )pH (0 − α[H − βHL ])
+ (1 − pL )(1 − pH )(0 − α[0 − 0])

(IC)

Rearranging:
pH (1 + 3α)βHH + [(1 − pH )(1 + 3α) − α]βHL ≥

c
(1 + α) + αH
(pH − pL )

(IC)
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Now, the principal’s static optimization problem is:
min

βHH , βHL ≥0

pH pH βHH + pH (1 − pH )βHL subject to:

c
(1 + α) + 2αH
pH
c
(1 + α) + αH
pH (1 + 3α)βHH + [(1 − pH )(1 + 3α) − α]βHL ≥
(pH − pL )
2
1
1
βHH ≤ H + c, βHL ≤ (H + c)
3
3
2
pH (1 + 3α)βHH + (1 − pH )(1 + 3α)βHL ≥

(PC)
(IC)

Case One
Suppose that the incentive compatibility (IC) binds. Since α > 0, the cost-minimizing
contract offer sets βHL = 0 with:
∗
βHH



1
c
=
(1 + α) + αH
pH (1 + 3α) pH − pL

Note that when you plug this into (P C), this result holds only if:


 

c
c
(1 + α) + αH ≥
(1 + α) + 2αH
pH − pL
pH

As long as HpH (pH − pL ) − pL c > 0, this becomes:
α≤
Therefore, if α ≤

pL c
HpH (pH − pL ) − pL c

pL c
HpH (pH −pL )−pL c

the incentive compatibility (IC) is the binding

constraint. Therefore, (IC) is the relevant constraint when the agents do not suffer
from a high level of disadvantageous inequity aversion. One must also ensure that
∗
βHH
< 32 H + 13 c.
∗
Under βHH
, the principal’s expected payment is:

∗
pH pH βHH



pH
c
=
(1 + α) + αH
(1 + 3α) pH − pL

The expected payment is increasing in α if H >

2c
.
(pH −pL )

148
Case Two
If α >

pL c
HpH (pH −pL )−pL c

∗
∗
then (P C) will bind. The cost-minimizing contract (βHH
, βHL
)

is no longer unique for the range of α that satisfy all of the necessary constraints.
∗
∗
Therefore, βHH
and βHL
make (P C) bind subject to some restrictions. First, one

must ensure that (IC) is not violated. Plugging the (P C) into (IC):
c
c
(1 + α) + 2αH − αβHL ≥
(1 + α) + αH
pH
(pH − pL )
⇒
βHL



(1 + α)
pL c
≤ H−
α
pH (pH − pL )

Furthermore note that βHL ≤ 21 (H + c). Therefore, the set of contracts that minimizes the principal’s expected payment satisfies (P C) with equality, requires βHL ≤
h
i
pL c
min{H − (1+α)
, 21 (H + c)}, and requires βHH ≤ 32 H + 13 c. Under this
α
pH (pH −pL )
contracting scheme, the principal’s expected payment is:
∗
pH pH βHH

+ pH (1 −

∗
pH )βHL



c
pH
=
(1 + α) + 2αH
(1 + 3α) pH

The expected payment is increasing in α if H >
too large. If

c(1+α)+2pH αH
pH (1+3α)

c
.
pH

This also implies that α is not

> 31 pH (2H + c) + 12 (1 − pH )(H + c), the principal must

then increase βHH or βHL so that the agent’s net payoff is sometimes higher than the
principal’s net payoff.

Estimating α
In the paper, I estimate α by using the observed values of βHH and βHL from the
efficient contract offers in the one-shot treatment. Assuming that the agent makes
net payoff comparisons to the principal, the value of α depends on whether the (IC)
or (P C) constraint binds. In the set of equations below, the first equation solves for
α when (IC) binds while the second equation solves for α when (P C) binds.
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α=


c
−pH βHH −(1−pH )βHL

pH −pL


c

−H
3pH βHH +3(1−pH )βHL −βHL − p −p

H
L


c

−p
β
−(1−p
)β
H
HL

 pH H HH
c
3pH βHH +3(1−pH )βHL − p

H












−2H

if 0 < α ≤
if

pL c
HpH (pH −pL )−pL c

pL c
HpH (pH −pL )−pL c

and

c(1+α)+2pH αH
pH (1+3α)

1
p (2H
3 H

<α
<

+ c) + 21 (1 − pH )(H + c)

150
Appendix: Instructions for the One-Shot Matchings Treatment
You can earn money during this experiment, with the exact amount depending on
the decisions you and others make during the experiment. Your experimental income
is calculated in points, which will be converted into cash at the rate of: $1 = 25
points. We will start you off with a balance of 125 points ($5).
All written information you received from us is for your private use only.
You are not allowed to pass over any information to other participants in
the experiment. Talking and cell phone use during the experiment is not
permitted. Violation of these rules may force us to stop the experiment.
General Information
This experiment is about how people trade goods, which can vary in quality level.
Participants are divided into two roles:

1
3

will be buyers and the other

2
3

will be

sellers. These roles are determined randomly by the computer and remained fixed
throughout the experiment.
Who will you trade with? The computer will randomly match each buyer in
the room with two sellers to form a group of three participants. You will trade within
this group of three. You will not be informed of the actual identity of the other
participants you are matched with (and they will not be informed of your actual
identity).
For how many periods will you trade with the same participants? All
participants will remain matched with their group for one period. At the beginning
of each period, the computer will randomly rematch all participants in the room to
form new groups, each consisting of 1 buyer and 2 sellers.
When does the experiment end?

The last grouping will occur once the

experiment reaches the 15th period. Therefore, the experiment will end after period
15.
Important: It is very important that you pay careful attention to these instructions as it will help you understand the experiment. Furthermore, all participants
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must complete a quiz with 5 questions which will test your familiarity with the procedures. As an added incentive, you will receive $0.25 for each question answered
correctly on the quiz. Exceptionally poor performance on the quiz may prevent you
from participating in today’s experiment.
Finally, as we read through the instructions, we will conduct 2 trial periods so
that you can get accustomed to the computer’s interface. During the trial periods,
no money can be earned since you are simply practicing. Please follow along and do
not enter things on your computer screen until I instruct you to do so.
During each period, the buyer has an opportunity to purchase two fictitious goods
from the sellers in his/her group. Each seller is responsible for producing one of
these goods. A seller’s good will be one of two potential quality levels, which will be
described as “quality level 0” and “quality level 80” for convenience. The seller makes
an effort choice, either effort choice ‘X” or effort choice “Y,” which helps determine
the quality level of the good that he/she produces.
At the end of each period, the earnings of each party depends on: 1) the quality
level of the good produced by each seller and 2) the payments specified in the buyer’s
proposal, which must be accepted by both sellers before they produce the goods.
The outline below illustrates that each period is divided into several phases if both
sellers accept the buyer’s proposal:
1. Buyer makes proposal
2. Each seller makes an effort choice
3. The quality level of each seller’s good is determined
4. Payments, outline in the proposal, are transferred from the buyer to each seller
1. The Proposal
Each period starts with the buyer having an option to make a proposal to the
sellers. The buyer can submit a single proposal to the sellers. If submitted, the
sellers will then decide to accept or reject the proposal.
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To make a proposal, the buyer must click the “Make Proposal” button on the
computer screen followed by the “Update” button. The buyer then specifies values
for several components, which will now be described.
First, the buyer must specify two payments he/she agrees to pay to each seller.
These payments depend upon the quality levels of the two goods produced in the
current period.
• “Bonus (80/80)” is the bonus paid to a seller when both of the goods produced
have a quality level of 80. Both of the sellers receive this bonus payment.
Therefore, “Bonus (80/80)” is paid out twice by the buyer, with each seller
receiving one of these bonus payments (of equal value).
• “Bonus (80/0)” is the bonus paid when only one of the goods has a quality level
of 80 while the other good has a quality level of 0. Only the seller with a quality
level of 80 receives this bonus payment, so in this case the buyer pays out this
bonus only once.
• When a seller’s quality level is 0, he/she does not receive a bonus payment from
the buyer.
The bonus values must be whole numbers ranging from 0 to 200. Furthermore, the
stated bonuses are binding, which means that the buyer must pay the corresponding
bonus(es) in the case that at least one of the goods has a quality level of 80.
To help the buyer formulate bonus values, a Calculation Toolbox is also available
on screen. Here, buyers can enter hypothetical values for “Bonus (80/80)” and “Bonus
(80/0).” The toolbox will then display the buyer’s earnings for all potential scenarios
that could occur later in the period.
Second, the buyer must state the effort level, either “X” or “Y,” that he/she wants
each seller to choose. To indicate the desired effort level, click the corresponding
button next to the Desired Effort Level text. Sellers, however, are not obligated to
choose the buyer’s desired effort level. It is simply a request.
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After the buyer has specified the bonuses and the desired effort level, he/she must
click the “Commit Decision” button to submit the proposal. Then, both sellers will
observe the terms of the proposal independently and must decide to accept or reject
the proposal. The sellers cannot communicate with one another and must make this
decision on their own. A seller must click the OK button to confirm his/her decision.
2. Sellers Make Their Effort Choices if They Both Accept the Proposal
If both of the sellers accept the proposal, they must then make their effort choices,
which helps each seller determine the quality level of the good that he/she produces.
Each seller clicks the button next to his/her corresponding effort choice (either “X”
or “Y”). To confirm the choice, click the OK button.
Important: The buyer cannot observe the effort choices of the sellers. Furthermore, the two sellers make their effort choices simultaneously and independently.
That is, they cannot communicate about the effort levels they intend to choose and,
at this time, they cannot observe the effort choice made by the other seller.
3. Each Seller’s Quality Level is Determined after Effort Choices Are
Made
The diagram below illustrates how a seller’s effort choice helps determine his/her
quality level:
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We wish to emphasize several points based on this information:
• Effort choice “X” gives a seller a one-in-four chance of realizing a quality level
of 80 (and a three-in-four chance of realizing a quality level of 0).
• Choosing effort “Y” raises a seller’s effort cost by 15 points. It also increases the
likelihood that the seller’s quality level is 80. Now, the seller has a three-in-four
chance of realizing a quality level of 80.
• Each seller’s quality level is not affected by the effort choice made by the other
seller. That is, a seller’s quality level is independent of any decision made by
the other seller in his/her group. A seller’s quality level is determined only by:
1) his/her individual effort choice and 2) by chance.
After the sellers make their effort choices, the computer determines the quality
level of each good based on the corresponding probabilities listed above. Then, the
buyer and the two sellers will jointly observe the quality level of the good produced
by each seller. That is, everyone in the group observes the quality level of the two
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goods produced. Furthermore, each seller can now observe the effort choice made by
the other seller in the current period.
4. Appropriate payments, outlined in the proposal, are transferred
from the buyer to each seller.
Each person’s payoff depends on: 1) the quality levels of the two goods produced,
2) the bonuses stated in the proposal, and 3) for each seller, his/her individual effort
choice.
The following table describes the four different possible earnings for each group
member when the group engages in trade. The sellers are denoted as Seller #1 and
Seller #2 arbitrarily.
Seller #1’s
Quality
Level

Seller #2’s
Quality
Level

80

80

80

0

80
-“Bonus(80/0)”

“Bonus(80/0)”
- Effort Cost

0
- Effort Cost

0

80

80
-“Bonus(80/0)”

0
- Effort Cost

“Bonus(80/0)”
- Effort Cost

0

0

0

0
- Effort Cost

0
- Effort Cost

Buyer’s
Points

Seller #1’s
Points

80+80
“Bonus(80/80)”
-2×“Bonus(80/80)”
- Effort Cost

Seller #2’s
Points
“Bonus(80/80)”
- Effort Cost

In summary:
• The value of each good to the buyer depends on its quality level. A quality level
of 0 generates no value for the buyer, and hence no earnings. A quality level of
80 generates 80 points for the buyer.
• The stated bonuses are only applicable in certain cases:
• A seller receives no bonus if their quality level is 0.
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• If one of the quality levels is 0 while the other is 80, the buyer pays “Bonus
(80/0)” to the seller with a quality level of 80.
• If both of the quality levels are 80, the buyer pays “Bonus (80/80)” to both of
the sellers.
What if the buyer does not make a proposal or at least one of the sellers rejects
the buyer’s proposal?
• If the buyer does not make a proposal or at least one of the sellers rejects the
proposal, the buyer and the two sellers will receive 0 points each for that period.
5. End of the Period Summary Screen
At the end of each period, the buyer and sellers will be shown a summary screen.
The following information is displayed on this screen:
• The points that you individually earned (or lost) in this period.
• If a proposal is made, the specific terms stated the buyer’s proposal
• If trade occurs:
– each seller’s quality level
– sellers also observe both effort choices (the buyer does not observe effort
choices)
Note: Your group members’ points will not be displayed on your screen. Similarly,
your points will not be displayed on their computer screens.
Furthermore, it is possible that buyers and sellers can incur losses in a given
period. These losses are subtracted from your points balance, which accumulates
across all periods throughout the duration of the experiment.
Please enter all the information on the summary screen in the record sheet supplied
to you. This will help you keep track of your performance across periods so that you
can learn from your past results.
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Antràs, P. and F. C. Foley (2015). Poultry in motion: A study of international trade
finance practices. Journal of Political Economy 123 (4), 853–901.
Bandiera, O., I. Barankay, and I. Rasul (2013). Team incentives: evidence from a
firm level experiment. Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (5), 1079–
1114.
Bernheim, B. D. and M. D. Whinston (1998). Incomplete contracts and strategic
ambiguity. American Economic Review 88 (4), 902–932.
Blanco, M., D. Engelmann, and H. T. Normann (2011). A within-subject analysis
of other-regarding preferences. Games and Economic Behavior 72 (2), 321–338.
Bloom, P. N. and V. G. Perry (2001). Retailer power and supplier welfare: The case
of wal-mart. Journal of Retailing 77 (3), 379–396.
Bognanno, M. L. (2001).
nomics 19 (2), 290–315.

Corporate tournaments.

Journal of Labor Eco-

Boning, B., C. Ichniowski, and K. Shaw (2007). Opportunity counts: Teams and the
effectiveness of production incentives. Journal of Labor Economics 25 (4), 613–650.
Breitmoser, Y. (2015). Cooperation, but no reciprocity: individual strategies in the
repeated prisoner’s dilemma. American Economic Review 105 (9), 2882–2910.
Brousseau, E. and J.-M. Glachant (2002). The Economics of Contracts: Theories
and Applications. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.
Brown, M., A. Falk, and E. Fehr (2004). Relational contracts and the nature of
market interactions. Econometrica 72 (3), 747–780.

158
Brown, M., A. Falk, and E. Fehr (2012). Competition and relational contracts: the
role of unemployment as a disciplinary device. Journal of the European Economic
Association 10 (4), 887–907.
Bruce, S. (2014). Two-thirds of employers provide some type of ‘at risk’ pay to
employees (survey results in). Technical report, Business and Legal Resources.
Available at: http://hrdailyadvisor.blr.com/2014/10/15/two-thirds-of-employersprovide-some-type-of-at-risk-pay-to-employees-survey-results-in/.
Burgess, S., C. Propper, M. Ratto, S. von Hinke Kessler Scholder, and E. Tominey
(2010). Smarter task assignment or greater effort: The impact of incentives on team
performance. The Economic Journal 120 (547), 968–989.
Casoria, F. and A. Riedl (2013). Experimental labor markets and policy considerations: Incomplete contracts and macroeconomic aspects. Journal of Economic
Surveys 27 (3), 398–420.
Catelo, M. A. O. and A. C. Costales (2008). Contract farming and other market
institutions as mechanisms for integrating smallholder livestock producers in the
growth and development of the livestock sector in developing countries. Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Pro-Poor Livestock Policy Initiative
Working Paper 45.
Charness, G. and P. Kuhn (2007). Does pay inequality affect worker effort? experimental evidence. Journal of Labor Economics 25 (4), 693–723.
Che, Y.-K. and S.-W. Yoo (2001). Optimal incentives for teams. American Economic
Review 91 (3), 525–541.
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